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ALL RIGHTS RESERVED“Ah,” said Arthur, “this is obviously some strange usage of the word ‘safe’
that I wasn’t previously aware of.”
- Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the GalaxyAbstract
Correctly specifying requirements for composite systems is essential to system safety. In a
distributed development environment, safety requirements must be clearly deﬁned for sub-
systems. Unfortunately, decomposing non-functional requirements, also known as goals,
is not always straightforward. Quantiﬁable goals, such as cost or performance, may be
decomposed by allocating a ﬁxed limit on each component. However, system safety is
usually not expressible as a sum of parts. Rather, it is considered to be emergent.
This thesis deﬁnes emergent and composable behaviors in the context of formally spec-
iﬁed goals, and identiﬁes useful special cases in which emergent system goals may be
partially composable. Indirect Control Path Analysis (ICPA) is introduced as a new tech-
nique for identifying and documenting safety goals for components, using control ﬂow and
goal coverage strategies to guide goal elaboration.
ICPA was applied to a semi-autonomous automotive system from a commercial automo-
tive research laboratory and the goals and subgoals were monitored at run-time in a partial
implementation of the vehicle in a simulation environment. Violations of both the goals
and subgoals identiﬁed several critical design defects in the incomplete implementation. In
some situations, false positive detection at the subsystem level identiﬁed problems in the
subsystems that were masked by redundant goal coverage. False negative detection at the
subsystem level in some of the scenarios suggests the set of subsystem safety goals only
partially composes the system-level behavior. The results demonstrate proof of concept of
the ICPA technique for deﬁning system safety subgoals in a real system.
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xiiChapter 1
Introduction
Research has shown that system safety, deﬁned by Leveson as “freedom from accidents or
losses” [50], is closely linked to the quality of requirements. One case study of safety-
critical software isolation revealed that some dependencies between safety-critical and
non-safety-critical components were missed during safety analysis [4]. Other research has
traced safety-related software errors and operational anomalies in spacecraft to latent re-
quirements, misunderstood requirements, and misunderstood interfaces between the phys-
ical system and the software [59][60].
System safety is diﬃcult to deﬁne and ensure in a distributed development environment.
In one study of software errors in spacecraft [59], miscommunication between development
teams was the primary cause of safety-related interface faults. In other industries with less
regulation or less centralized oversight of development, the problem may be worse. For
example, in the automotive industry vehicle subsystems are often developed by diﬀerent
internal departments or external suppliers. These suppliers may not have access to require-
ments for the vehicle as a whole, or for other subsystems. Similarly, vehicle manufacturers
may have little control over the development process or internal details of components pur-
chased from vendors. In order to manage safety at the subsystem level prior to system
integration, system safety requirements must be clearly deﬁned for subsystems.
Unfortunately, decomposing non-functional requirements, also known as goals [18] or
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Figure 1.1. Safety goal elaboration from system to subsystems
quality attributes [39][7], is not straightforward. Some quantitative goals, such as cost
or performance, may be decomposed by allocating a ﬁxed limit on each component in
the functional decomposition [65]. However, other goals may be qualitative or not easily
represented as a sum of parts. For example, an automotive safety goal might be “the vehicle
shall experience zero collisions.” Unlike performance goals, where the concept of “time”
is the same for systems and subsystems, the concept of “collision” in system safety does
not have the same meaning at diﬀerent levels of the system hierarchy.
1.1 Problem and scope
This thesis addresses the problem of deﬁning safety goals for subsystems in a composite
system, which is illustrated in Figure 1.1, using the notation described in [41]. For each
system safety goal Gi there is some set of subgoals {Gαk
i }, k = 1, 2, ..., j, where α is the
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subsystem to which the subgoal is assigned. The primary research questions are:
• What does it mean for a goal to be composable or emergent?
• When is it possible to decompose a system-level goal?
• Is partial decomposition possible, and if so, is it useful?
• How can full or partial decomposition of system safety goals be achieved?
• How do we evaluate the value of a partial decomposition?
The problem scope is deﬁned with respect to requirements engineering, hazard analysis,
and system decomposition:
Requirements engineering. Any system development process, safety-critical or not, be-
gins with requirements elicitation. Goal Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE) [18]
is one approach to specifying system requirements from high-level system goals. In GORE,
goals are ﬁrst reﬁned into subgoals that can be assigned to individual agents (subsystems,
software components, the user, etc.), and then operationalized into functional requirements
(the behaviors that realize the goal). In general, the objective of goal elaboration is to ﬁnd a
set of subgoals and operationalized requirements that satisfy the parent goal. With system
safety goals, the objective of goal elaboration is to analyze all agents that might impact
the safety goal and identify a set of subgoals and operationalized requirements for some
of those agents that satisfy the parent goal and also satisfy a goal coverage strategy. This
thesis proposes additional tactics for safety goal elaboration in the GORE framework.
Hazard analysis. In safety-critical system design, diﬀerent hazard analysis techniques are
used throughout the development process to identify system hazards and their causes, and
to deﬁne requirements to avoid the hazards by eliminating their causes, or to control the
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consequences of the hazards. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) may be used early in
requirements development to identify hazards related to general system functionality [50].
For example, a PHA in an automotive system might be used to identify hazards related
to acceleration, deceleration, steering, and driver distractions. As the system design pro-
gresses, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) may be used to trace top-level hazards to the underlying
events that cause them [50]. An FTA of an unexpected deceleration hazard in an automotive
system might trace the hazard to a fault in object detection. The objective of the techniques
proposed in this thesis is not to identify hazards, root causes of hazards, or system safety
goals for avoiding the hazards. Rather, it is to identify subsystem safety goals that satisfy
the system goals that have been obtained from other hazard analysis techniques.
System decomposition. Decomposition is a common strategy for managing system com-
plexity that is applied to three diﬀerent types of design attributes: structures, behaviors,
and goals [41]. In most systems, decomposition is applied to structures, behaviors, or some
combination of both. For example, an automotive system is decomposed by both behavior
(cruise control, electronic stability control, anti-lock braking, etc.) and structure (brakes,
transmission, steering, etc.). This thesis addresses the problem of decomposing system
safety goals along an existing structural + behavioral decomposition.
1.2 Indirect Control Path Analysis
This thesis proposes and evaluates a safety goal elaboration technique called Indirect Con-
trol Path Analysis (ICPA) [11][12]. ICPA is a top-down analysis approach, similar to FTA.
Whereas FTA traces a top-level hazard to its lower-level causal events, ICPA traces a top-
level state variable in a system safety goal through the design to the agents that inﬂuence
it. ICPA uses a table structure similar to Failure Modes and Eﬀects Analysis (FMEA) [50]
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Figure 1.2. ICPA table layout and steps
to record these indirect control relationships. Figure 1.2 shows the layout and steps of an
ICPA. Agents that indirectly inﬂuence a state variable belong to the indirect control path
and require further analysis of their relationships to the root variable.
A goal coverage strategy is a plan for allocating subgoals to ensure that a high-level
goal is met. Each strategy is deﬁned by goal assignment and goal scope. Goal assignment
deﬁnes which indirect control sources have subgoals and how those subgoals relate to each
other (e.g., single responsibility, redundant responsibility, and coordinated responsibility).
Goalassignmentmaybedrivenbyphysicallimitationsofthesystem(e.g., actuationdelays)
or by possible loss of monitorability and controllability by agents in the system. Goal scope
deﬁnes how closely the safety subgoals satisfy the system safety goal. Although it may be
possible for agents to satisfy the original safety goal exactly, it may sometimes be necessary
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or desirable to assign subgoals that are more restrictive than the original safety goal. The
result of an ICPA is both a set of subsystem safety goals that satisfy the parent goal, and
a record of the critical assumptions, goal realizability tactics, and goal coverage strategies
used to deﬁne them.
1.3 Thesis contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions:
• I provide a formal deﬁnition of emergence within a framework of goal decom-
position. In GORE and ICPA, system safety goals are represented as temporal logic
expressions. This thesis deﬁnes emergent, fully composable, and emergent but par-
tially composable goals within this mathematical framework, both with and without
redundancy, and identiﬁes useful special cases in which partial decomposition of
emergent safety goals is possible.
• I create a technique for guiding system safety goal elaboration in a directed and
documented way. Indirect Control Path Analysis (ICPA) is a technique for decom-
posing system safety goals from the system level to the subsystem level. Decomposi-
tion is guided by architectural control ﬂow and formal representation of system goals
and indirect control paths. It provides a structured, deliberate, and documented anal-
ysis of potential subgoal agents and goal coverage strategies. It also allows demon-
stration by mathematical proof or model-checking that the set of subsystem goals
produced with ICPA partially or fully compose the system goals under a speciﬁed set
of critical assumptions.
• I demonstrate that monitoring of system safety goals and subgoals can detect
some hazards at run-time. In this thesis, ICPA is applied to a semi-autonomous
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automotive system from a commercial automotive research lab. The safety goals
for the system and key subsystems are monitored at run-time in a simulation-based
implementation of the vehicle. Results demonstrate that monitoring of safety goals at
the subsystem level can detect system safety-related errors. In addition, monitoring
of safety goals at both the system and subsystem level is valuable for identifying
certain safety-related errors that may be imperceptible to system testers or the driver.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents background
information and related work. Emergence is deﬁned in the context of formally speciﬁed
goals for composite systems in Chapter 3. ICPA is introduced in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5,
ICPA is evaluated in a simulation-based implementation of a semi-autonomous automotive
system. A discussion of those results is found in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents conclusions
and future work.
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Background and Related Work
2.1 Overview
This chapter describes the background work related to the ICPA technique for elaborating
system safety goals in composite systems. Section 2.2 describes background information
on system safety and hazard analysis techniques related to the work presented in this thesis.
Section 2.3 presents background on structuring, eliciting, and reﬁning requirements, as
well as related approaches to deﬁning and elaborating system safety goals. Section 2.4
describes the problem of emergence in composite systems. Finally, Section 2.5 describes
related work in run-time monitoring of system safety properties.
2.2 System safety
The application domain for this thesis is safety-critical distributed embedded systems. An
embedded system is a system that includes computer control but is not used for general-
purpose computing. An embedded system is distributed if control is divided among sub-
systems or components, rather than centralized in one dedicated control unit. Within the
scope of this thesis, the term safety refers to system safety, which Leveson deﬁnes as “free-
dom from accidents or losses” [50]. A safety-critical system is one that can directly or
indirectly contribute to a loss event. The deﬁnition of a loss is dependent on the domain,
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and can be very broad (loss of life, bodily injury, loss of system, ﬁnancial cost, etc.). Some
examples of safety-critical distributed embedded systems are cars, aircraft, and elevators.
Hazards are system states in which an accident could eventually occur [50]. The combi-
nation of the likelihood that a hazard will occur and its consequences is risk [80]. The goal
of safety engineering is to reduce risk, either by reducing the likelihood that the hazard will
occur, or by reducing its consequences. Although in most systems it may not be possible
to eliminate all hazards, it is still important to try to reduce risk as much as possible.
Hazards can arise when faults manifest as errors in the system. Avizienis et al. deﬁne
an error as a deviation in correct system state, and a fault as its root cause [6]. A fault
could be in hardware (e.g. a sensor that fails ‘ON’) or software (e.g. buﬀer overﬂow).
Sometimes the fault is in the requirements, design, or implementation. Some research has
shown that critical software errors result more often from defects in the requirements and
misunderstandings about the software/system interface than from implementation defects
(e.g., source code bugs) [59][60].
Safety is considered a non-functional system property. Non-functional properties, also
known as goals [18] or quality attributes [39][7], are not speciﬁc actions the system must
perform, but rather are characteristics the system should exhibit while doing whatever it
does. Other examples of non-functional system properties are dependability, performance,
cost, and maintainability. The focus of safety is hazard prevention; thus, safety require-
ments often take the form of constraints on system behavior.
A common misconception about safety engineering is the belief that designing a system
to be reliable will also make it safe. Although safety and reliability are related, they are
not equivalent. Whereas the goal of a reliable system is continuation of correct service, the
goal of a safe system is prevention of accidents or losses. For example, if the throttle of an
automobile fails such that the throttle is closed and the vehicle rolls to a stop, the system
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Figure 2.1. V-model of system development (adapted from [29])
might remain safe, even though it has lost service and is not reliable. Likewise, a system
that is reliable might not be safe for a given set of environmental operating conditions (e.g.,
a vehicle that is correctly driving down the road with another vehicle in its path).
2.2.1 Hazard analysis
Hazard analysis provides a structured method of reasoning about hazard causation through-
out the system development life cycle. One common representation of this cycle is the
“Vee” model developed by NASA for the Software Management and Assurance Program
(SMAP) [29]. A similar model of software development called the V-model was developed
simultaneouslybytheEuropeantechnologycompanyIABGfortheFederalMinistryofDe-
fense of the Republic of Germany for use in military information technology systems [34].
Figure 2.1 shows a basic V-model adapted from the one presented in [29]. Design activities
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on the left side of the V represent decomposition, from high-level system requirements to
low-level component speciﬁcations. Activities along the right side of the V integrate com-
ponents to form the complete system and verify and validate the implementation against
the requirements and design speciﬁcation. Traceability occurs between stages as the cycle
progresses.
In the context of this V-model, hazard analysis begins during requirements speciﬁcation
and continues at each subsequent stage of development. In the early stages, hazard analysis
is used to identify hazards, reason about their underlying causes, assess their risks, and de-
velop measures to eliminate them, reduce their occurrence, or mitigate their consequences.
Later, hazard analysis is used to verify that these measures have been implemented cor-
rectly. Traditional systems safety engineering relies on a variety of hazard analysis tech-
niques, each with slightly diﬀerent requirements and goals. This section describes four
diﬀerent hazard analysis techniques related to the work presented in this thesis.
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA). Safety requirements elicitation typically begins
with Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) very early in development, during the require-
ments engineering stage [28]. The PHA produces a list of general hazards related to both
the application domain and the particular application under review. It also usually includes
some indication of hazard severity. As the development process and the system design
progress, prevention and mitigation techniques are added for each hazard in the PHA. Be-
cause PHA occurs so early in development, it is generally a system-level analysis used
to identify system-level safety goals. The ICPA technique presented in this thesis, which
focuses on deﬁning subsystem safety requirements from system safety requirements, does
not replace the PHA, but complements it.
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Figure 2.2. Partial fault tree for a semi-autonomous automotive system
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). As the subsystem requirements and design speciﬁcation is
completed, other hazard analysis is used to identify component-level sources of system
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hazards. FTA is a backward search technique that starts from a hazard and traces through
its causal event chain to identify the fault or failure in the system that is the root cause [85].
Figure 2.2 shows a partial fault tree for a semi-autonomous automotive system. Component
failure events are connected by logical AND and OR operators to indicate when an output
event requires all or at least one input event. This allows failure scenarios to be constructed
and simpliﬁed using Boolean algebra. In Figure 2.2, the hazard Unintended sudden accel-
eration could occur if a high-priority subsystem cancels an attempt to decelerate the vehicle
at the same time as a low-priority subsystem requests a vehicle acceleration.
The goal of a traditional FTA is to identify and eliminate single-point failure scenarios,
indicated by paths up the fault tree that traverse no AND gates. In the case of hardware
failures, redundancy can be used to eliminate or mitigate the hazard. Although fault tree
generation is manual, determination of hazard probability from component failure rates (if
known) could be automated.
Software fault tree analysis (SFTA) [55] was the ﬁrst signiﬁcant attempt to adapt a tra-
ditional hazard analysis for software veriﬁcation. This was also the ﬁrst paper to deﬁne
software safety as distinct from safety in traditional electromechanical systems. Other
work in SFTA can be found in [32][63][22]. SFTA traces hazardous software outputs back
through the code to the logic or input failures that could cause them. The results of the
code-level SFTA are then used to determine where run-time assertions might be neces-
sary. Leveson and Harvey provide templates for SFTA using symbols found in traditional
FTA [55]. These templates demonstrate how common code structures, such as if-then-else
and while loops, can be broken down into fault trees. Although code-level SFTA can be
useful for identifying coding defects, such as not checking for inﬁnite loop execution, it
does not address faults in requirements that are common sources of hazards in software
systems.
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Figure 2.3. Partial FMEA for a semi-autonomous automotive system
Both FTA and ICPA are backward search techniques. The primary diﬀerence between
FTA and ICPA is that fault trees trace hazards through the design to identify the underlying
faults that cause them, whereas ICPA traces high-level safety goals through the design to
deﬁne safety requirements for the subsystems and components. ICPA is concerned with
deﬁning goals for the functional behavior of components, rather than identifying faults that
could cause those goals to be violated. A secondary diﬀerence is that FTA is recorded in a
tree structure, whereas ICPA is recorded in tabular format.
Failure Modes and Eﬀects Analysis (FMEA). FMEA is a forward search technique that
lists potential faults in components and identiﬁes their possible eﬀects on the system [50].
This analysis is done manually by domain experts and produces a list of components, their
failure types, and the resulting system eﬀects in tabular form. A variant of FMEA is the
Failure Modes, Eﬀects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA), which includes additional anal-
ysis of the criticality of each failure mode. Detailed instructions for performing a hardware
FMECA can be found in [83]. Figure 2.3 shows a partial FMEA for a semi-autonomous
automotive system that lists potential failure modes for a long-range radar sensor.
14CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The goal of traditional FMEA is to identify components whose failure might lead to a
hazard. Usingthisinformation, systemsengineerscanmodifythedesign, usuallybyadding
redundancy, to remove the hazard or reduce its consequences. One advantage of this type of
hazard analysis is that the list of components, though possibly extensive, is usually known
at the time of analysis. One possible disadvantage, particularly for software, is that all
failure modes of those components might not be known.
Like traditional FMEA, Software Failure Modes and Eﬀects Analysis (SFMEA) is a
forward search technique that lists potential faults in software components and identiﬁes
their possible eﬀects on the system [62][61][63][30]. Failure modes of software, how-
ever, are often more numerous and more complex than their hardware counterparts. Lutz
and Woodhouse propose analyzing eight diﬀerent software component failure modes [62].
Data failure modes represent faults in communication between components and include
absent, incorrect, mistimed, or duplicate data. Event failure modes represent faults in soft-
ware processes (programs in execution) and include abnormal process termination, process
omission, incorrect logic, or mistimed events. For example, a critical mode ﬂag (data)
that suﬀers an incorrect value fault might cause the system to be set to an incorrect mode
[62]. One that suﬀers a mistimed data fault might cause a delay in setting the system to the
appropriate mode.
One key diﬀerence between SFMEA and SFTA is that SFMEA is performed on the
requirements, rather than on the code. In their analysis of the Cassini spacecraft, Lutz and
Woodhouse identiﬁed forty-eight issues in the requirements, twenty-ﬁve of which required
changes to the requirements [62]. Four of the changes involved unresolved speciﬁcation
requirements andwerelinkedtofailuremodesthathadnotpreviously beenconsidered. Itis
important to note that this version of SFMEA only identiﬁes which faulty software output
behavior, with respect to its interaction with the rest of the system, is hazardous enough
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to warrant more analysis; SFTA is still required to trace that faulty output behavior to its
source (processor fault, sensor input fault, faulty software logic, etc.). In this capacity,
SFMEA can be used to reduce the scope of SFTA, as Lutz and Woodhouse do in their
analysis. It may also be possible to use SFMEA to trace faults in software inputs forward
to hazardous software outputs, but this use of SFMEA is not explored.
The primary diﬀerence between FMEA and ICPA is that the former is forward search
while the latter is backward. FMEA traces component failures through the system to the
hazards they might produce, whereas ICPA traces system safety goals through the system
architecture to deﬁne subsystem safety goals. One similarity between FMEA and ICPA is
the use of tables for recording details of the analysis. Another is that both techniques are
concerned with component I/O, with FMEA focusing on fault models of component I/O
and ICPA focusing on the controllability and observability of system state by components.
STamP Analysis (STPA). Leveson introduced a new approach for accident reasoning us-
ingsystemstheorycalledSystems-TheoreticAccidentModelandProcess(STAMP)[52][54].
This new model is based on the assertion that traditional hazard analysis techniques do not
work for software-intensive systems because software is complex and non-linear. Because
most hazards in complex software-intensive systems are not caused by component faults,
but rather by failures in requirements to adequately address safety, tracing the paths from
hazards back to component failure and vice versa will not detect many common sources of
hazards in software systems. In contrast, STAMP attributes hazards to control processes
that fail to enforce safety constraints. This might occur because the control process itself is
inadequate or inadequately executed, or because of inadequate feedback to the control pro-
cess. For example, an inadequate control action might be a ﬂaw in the control process for
monitoring constraints or an overlooked hazard which was not assigned a safety constraint.
A STAMP hazard analysis (STPA) [53][25] begins with deﬁning the control architecture
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of the system. Once controllers and control ﬂow are known, failure modes are identiﬁed for
each component in the architecture. The four types of control failures are missing control,
incorrect or unsafe control, late control, and premature stop of control [53]. These types of
subsystem control failures are then traced to potential causes using a formal model of the
system and control failures in the SpecTrm-RL language [14].
One tenet of the STAMP hazard model is that safety analysis of components cannot
be separated from safety analysis of the system. Leveson asserts that although the sys-
tem itself may be hierarchical, certain properties such as safety emerge only at the highest
level of the hierarchy, and that individual components are neither safe nor unsafe outside
the context of the system. In this view of safety, separating hazard analysis of any com-
ponents from system-level analysis is not appropriate. However, the component control
constraints generated during the STPA process are comparable to the concept of safety
goals for subsystems in the ICPA framework. Similar to ICPA, the STPA analysis is based
on the control architecture of the system. Unlike ICPA, which uses backward search from
safety goals deﬁned at the system level through the control architecture to deﬁne safety
goals for components, STPA uses forward search from components to system hazards. The
backward search in STPA is used to identify the source of component control failures.
PARCEL. Johnson introduced the Programmable electronics systems Analysis for Root
Causes and Experience-based Learning (PARCEL) [38][37] hazard analysis technique for
software-intensive systems. It traces accidents and incidents back to failures in the soft-
ware development cycle. The main idea of PARCEL is that adverse events occur when
development processes fail to meet safety-critical system development standards, such as
IEC61508 [35] or DO-178B [73]. PARCEL utilizes ﬂow charts with speciﬁc questions to
trace incidents back to the process failures that caused them. It then applies a modiﬁed
version of Events and Causal Factors (ECF) analysis from the Department of Energy [23],
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which is an event based modeling technique. Together, STAMP and PARCEL can be used
to identify both the control failures and development process failures that contribute to
incidents or accidents.
2.3 Requirement elicitation, speciﬁcation, and reﬁnement
Requirements engineering is deﬁned by Nuseibeh and Easterbrook as the process of iden-
tifying and documenting the purpose of a system “in a form that is amenable to analysis,
communication, and subsequent implementation”[67]. The primary tasks of requirements
engineering are eliciting, modeling and analyzing, communicating, agreeing, and evolving.
Although most of these tasks occur early in the design process (e.g., during the ﬁrst stage of
the V-model shown in Figure 2.1), requirements are often updated as a result of subsequent
development activities.
In the emerging ﬁeld of computer systems engineering, Ross and Schoman ﬁrst iden-
tiﬁed the need for a requirements development practice more similar in rigor to the one
applied in manufacturing processes [75] [43]. They called for requirements deﬁnition to
include context analysis (the objective of the system), a functional speciﬁcation (what the
system should do), and design constraints (how the system should be built), with full doc-
umentation of each component. Ross introduced the Structured Analysis (SA) language as
a framework for modeling understanding, not only for requirements development but also
for any other work that produces an intellectual product [74]. SA uses both text and graph-
ical representations of software components and functions. It also allowed for hierarchical
representation of system designs.
Feather introduced formal reasoning about speciﬁcation of agents in composite sys-
tems [26]. He proposed separate speciﬁcations for describing the decomposition of a
system into components and for describing composite system behavior. Speciﬁcations of
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component behaviors were derived by pruning (eliminating behaviors which violate some
constraint) and decomposing constraints to assign to agents.
2.3.1 Specifying non-functional requirements
Mylopoulos et al. proposed a framework for specifying non-functional requirements in
composite systems [65]. In their process-oriented approach, non-functional requirements
were deﬁned in terms of goals, links between goals, methods for goal reﬁnement, correla-
tion rules, and a labeling structure for linking goals to design decisions. It also included a
detailed decomposition of two types of non-functional requirement, accuracy goals (infor-
mation correctness) and performance goals (execution time and storage space). Similar to
ICPA, accuracy goals were decomposed by assigning a separate goal to each component
of the information (e.g. report accuracy was divided by report types, report sections, and
function and input parameters). Performance decomposition divides the performance goal
as a sum-of-parts (e.g., response time goals for an operation are the sum of the response
times of the diﬀerent parts of the operation).
Leveson’s intent speciﬁcations are another approach to specifying non-functional re-
quirements [51]. Intent speciﬁcations provide hierarchical system abstraction that relies on
means-to-ends representation, rather than part-to-whole. Various levels in the intent hier-
archy include system purpose, system design principles, black box behavior, physical and
logical function, and physical realization. Safety-related constraints are deﬁned as system
design principles. This approach provides a framework for expressing system safety goals,
but does not oﬀer tactics for safety goal decomposition.
Bitsch attempted to make formal speciﬁcation of safety requirements easier for non-
formalists by introducing a set of formal temporal logic patterns that map to safety require-
ments written in a natural language [9][10]. Table 2.1 displays the classiﬁcation scheme.
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Table 2.1. Safety requirements pattern classiﬁcation scheme from [10]
Static Safety Requirements (Invariants)
Dynamic Safety Safety Requirements Beginning of Validity
Safety Requirements about Chronological Duration of Validity
Requirements with Temporal Succession Beginning & Duration
Dependencies Safety Requirements Time Triggering
with Explicit Time Event Triggering
Safety Requirements about General Access Guarantee
A disadvantage of formal speciﬁcation is that non-formalists may be reluctant to use for-
mal requirements, particularly in the early analysis and design stages when creating safety
requirements is begun [10][31]. Formalizing an existing requirement written in natural lan-
guage may be easier than trying to identify new requirements entirely within a formalized
framework.
In Bitsch’s technique, requirements are ﬁrst classiﬁed as static or dynamic based on
whether they apply to one or multiple system states. Dynamic requirements are further
classiﬁed based on the type of temporal dependency. Each classiﬁcation is mapped to a
speciﬁc formula in Computation Tree Logic (CTL). The catalog of patterns provides a clear
explanation of the logical expression in natural language. Although the primary purpose of
the technique is to translate from natural language to temporal logic, the patterns could be
applied in reverse to invariants obtained from pattern reduction.
2.3.2 Goal Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE)
This thesis builds primarily upon Goal-Oriented Requirements Engineering (GORE), intro-
duced by Dardenne, van Lamsweerde, and Fickas [18][44]. In this approach, requirements
engineers ﬁrst deﬁne a set of high-level goals (objectives to be achieved by the composite
system). Agents are entities within the system or external users of the system that perform
the actions needed to achieve the goals [18][46][47]. At the highest level, these objectives
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A   B
VehicleAcceleration.Source = CollisionAvoidance
 (VehicleAcceleration.Value = 1.3 m/s
2)   2 m/s
2
M e ta   L e v e l
va: VehicleAcceleration
IsSubsystem(va.Source)   va.Value   2 m/s
2
I n s ta n c e   L e v e l
D o m a i n   L e v e l
Figure 2.4. Modeling levels for a goal in GORE/KAOS
are nonoperational; no single agent within the system can achieve the goal alone. Through
requirements elaboration, goals and subgoals are operationalized into actions (the behav-
iors that achieve the goal) and reﬁned until they can be assigned to individual agents (a
subsystem, a software component, the user, etc.) [19][20][45][46][47][48][49].
GORE operates in three levels of system modeling: the meta, domain, and instance
levels [18]. These levels are shown in Figure 2.4 for a single goal. The highest level, the
meta level, refers to the abstract concepts such as “goals,” “agents,” and “actions,” and how
they interact. The domain level refers to a speciﬁc instance of the meta-model, such as a set
of speciﬁc goals and agents for a given system implementation. Finally, the instance level
refers to a speciﬁc instance of the model deﬁned at domain level. This could be an instance
of an action performed by an agent at speciﬁc time during system execution.
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P true in current state
¬P false in current state
lP true in previous state
 P true in some previous state
nP true in all previous states
mP true in next state
♦P true in current or some future state
qP true in current and all future states
P ∧ Q P AND Q
P ∨ Q P OR Q
P → Q P implies Q in current state
P ⇒ Q q(P → Q); P implies Q in all states
P ⇔ Q P iff Q in all states
ln<TP true for duration T in previous state
l <TP true at least once in duration T in previous state
@P l¬P ∧ P; true in current state, false in previous state
S0 ￿ P True in the initial state
Γ ⊢ P P is syntactically derivable from the premises Γ
Γ 0 P P is not syntactically derivable from the premises Γ
Figure 2.5. Temporal logic operators
Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Speciﬁcation (KAOS) framework. KAOS is the
requirements speciﬁcation language used in GORE [18]. KAOS includes formal deﬁni-
tions in temporal ﬁrst-order logic [42] for components of the system meta-model, including
agents, actions, entities, and goals, as well as the relationships between them. Figure 2.5
lists the temporal operators of KAOS. Formal representation makes system goals explicit
and facilitates analysis. An example of a goal for a train control system from [44] is shown
in Figure 2.6.
Goal: Achieve[TrainProgress]
InformalDef: The train shall progress through consecutive blocks.
FormalDef: (∀ tr: Train, b: Block) [On(tr, b) ⇒ ♦On(tr, b+1)]
Figure 2.6. Goal Achieve[TrainProgress] from [44]
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Table 2.2. Goal pattern classiﬁcations from [20]
Goal Class GoalPattern
Achieve P ⇒ ♦Q
Cease P ⇒ ♦¬Q
Maintain P ⇒ qQ
Avoid P ⇒ q¬Q
Reﬁnement patterns. One advantage of using formal speciﬁcations is that goal structure
canguideelaboration. DarimontandvanLamsweerdeidentiﬁedformalreﬁnementpatterns
for elaborating goal-oriented requirements [19][20]. They identiﬁed four general patterns
for goals: achieve, cease, maintain, and avoid, as shown in shown in Table 2.2 [19, 20].
In this context, safety goals are expressed in the avoid pattern (P ⇒ q ¬Q), where P
represents the predicate, Q represents the hazardous condition to be avoided, q signiﬁes
somethingthatwillholdalwaysinthefuture, ⇒signiﬁesentails, and¬istheNOToperator.
High-level goals are reﬁned into sub-goals by AND/OR graph reduction from the ﬁeld
of Artiﬁcial Intelligence [66], by applying formal reﬁnement patterns for logical expres-
sions [19, 20], and by identifying subgoals that are realizable by particular agents [47]. In
AND/OR reduction, goals are broken-down into a set of subgoals that all must be satisﬁed
(connected with an AND operator) or a set of alternative goals (connected with an OR op-
erator). Formal reﬁnement patterns identify possible combinations of subgoal patterns that
meet the parent goal. For example, a parent goal in the achieve form (P ⇒ ♦Q), where
⇒ indicates a material implication and ♦ signiﬁes eventually, could be replaced by two
achieve subgoals of the forms (P ⇒ ♦R) and (R ⇒ ♦Q).
Darimont and van Lamsweerde oﬀer a reﬁnement pattern speciﬁcally for safety goals in
which safety goals are reﬁned by introducing subgoals for monitoring and responding to
an alarm event [20]. The alarm is triggered early enough to give the response mechanism
a ﬁnite period of time to correct the problem and prevent the original safety goal from
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being violated. This provides a template for a general monitoring structure, but gives little
guidance on how to deﬁne what to monitor. In addition, it allocates all responsibility for
achieving the goal to the alarm/response agents. Although this is a common technique for
hazard reduction, it is not the only one and may not be desirable for all systems.
Goal realizability. Not every set of subgoals that can be deﬁned to satisfy a parent goal
is actually realizable in the system. In the KAOS framework, goal realizability is driven
by monitorability and controllability of system state variables. Letier and van Lamsweerde
deﬁned a goal to be strictly realizable by an agent if the agent has the ability to monitor
all state variables to be monitored and control all state variables to be controlled that are
necessary to satisfy the goal [46][47]. More formally, a goal relation can be expressed as
G(M,C), where G is the goal to be realized in the system, M is the set of variables in the
goal to be monitored, and C is the set of variables in the goal to be controlled. A goal is
realizable by an agent if M is a subset of the variables monitored by agent ag and C is a
subset of the variables controlled by agent ag, (M ⊆ Mon(ag) and C ⊆ Ctrl(ag)).
Letier and van Lamsweerde classiﬁed unrealizable goals into the following categories:
lack of monitorability, lack of control, reference to future, goal unsatisﬁability, and not
ﬁnitely violable goal. Consider a goal of the form (A ⇒ B). Realizability of this goal
requires an agent with the ability to control both A and B. If an agent has the ability to
monitor A and control B, the goal is still not realizable due to a reference to the future (the
agent cannot monitor A and control B in the same state). The goal lA ⇒ B could be real-
izable by an agent with the ability to monitor A and control B. Letier and van Lamsweerde
also provide several goal patterns to help identify and resolve goal unrealizability.
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2.4 Emergence
Safety goal elaboration is complicated by the emergent nature of system safety. Emergence
had been observed in natural systems as early as the time of Aristotle, who recognized there
were systems in which, “the whole is something beside the parts” [5]. The term emergent
was ﬁrst deﬁned by Lewes [57], who asserted that a resultant system could be expressed
as a sum or product of its components’ outputs, whereas the outputs of components in an
emergent system are fundamentally diﬀerent, both from each other and from the resulting
system behavior:
Add heat to heat and there is a measurable resultant; but add heat to diﬀerent
substances, and you get various eﬀects, qualitatively unlike...
Emergence has also been studied in complex systems such as artiﬁcial life [16][21] and
agent-based systems [72]. Cariani [16] diﬀerentiates among three types of emergence:
computational, thermodynamic, or relative to a model. Whereas computational emergence
focuses on identifying emergent behaviors that arise from local computations, emergence
relative to a model is more concerned with how emergent properties of the system aﬀect
the behavior of its components.
Darley [21] asserts that, similar to the halting problem [82], determining whether or not
a system is emergent is undecidable, and the best predictor of system behavior is simula-
tion. It may be possible to observe emergent behavior (something that is not predicted by
individual component behaviors) as the system runs, but it is impossible to know for sure
that a system is non-emergent, or even that all emergent behaviors in the system have been
exposed.
Privosnik [72] proposed deﬁning emergence at various levels of the hierarchy in agent-
based systems. Component behaviors contribute to emergent behaviors at the subsystem
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level, which contribute to new emergent behaviors at the system level. Thus, system behav-
ior is achieved by deﬁning the behaviors of combinations of agents, as well as the agents
themselves.
2.4.1 Feature interaction
Bowen et al. identiﬁed emergent behaviors that resulted from the integration of new fea-
tures into existing telecommunication systems as feature interactions [13]. A feature is
“a package of functionality incrementally added to a service to enhance or modify it” [84].
In a telecommunication system, caller-ID and call-waiting are examples of features that
have been added to basic telephone service (also known as Plain Old Telephone Service
or POTS). New interactions arise when features share resources, such as signaling inputs
or network messages, or when new behaviors violate feature assumptions [15]. This fea-
ture interaction problem applies to automotive systems as well. For example, new fea-
tures that introduce autonomous vehicle control, such as Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC)
or Collision Avoidance (CA) may violate previous assumptions that all brake commands
are driver-initiated. Likewise, multiple features may have conﬂicting throttle commands.
Zave suggested the use of formal speciﬁcations to eliminate many feature interactions
in telecommunication systems [88]. The basic idea is to eliminate ambiguities in feature
behavior or assumptions by formalizing them. In the approach, system-level invariants are
proposed as a means of limiting unwanted behavior across features. Jackson and Zave
proposed an architecture for composing features to eliminate unwanted feature interactions
called Distributed Feature Composition (DFC) [36]. In this architecture, features are mod-
eled as components with inputs and outputs. Calls between customers are directed by a
central router from feature to feature until completion. Feature interactions are limited
by the order in which the call was routed through the features. Although this may work
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in telecommunication systems where each call has a source and destination, it is unclear
whether this pipe-and-ﬁlter architecture would work for automotive systems with closed-
loop control.
2.5 Safety goal monitoring
Feather et al. proposed a run-time monitoring system based on goal-driven requirements
[27]. In their approach, monitored parameters that can be violated are identiﬁed at design
time, and alternative system designs for recovery actions are explored. At run time, the
violated properties are reconciled by choosing an alternative requirement to enforce, or
by changing control parameters to restore the original invariant. Although the general
process is outlined, the approach does not identify speciﬁc tactics for choosing invariants
to monitor. Also, the run-time system adaptation seems better suited for systems that are
not safety critical.
Plale-Schroeder et al. proposed using a database query language to check safety con-
straints at run-time [78][70][69]. Safety constraints derived from hazard analysis are de-
ﬁned as a triggering event, a set of conditions for a response, and a response action. The
technique was applied to a set of autonomous robots in which monitoring of constraints
was centralized. Although a database query language seemed well-structured for checking
constraints and performing recovery actions, it would not be easy to use in many embedded
systems where there are no existing similar systems and computing resources are limited.
Kim et al. proposed a run-time monitoring technique, Monitoring and Checking (MaC),
based on formal system models [40]. The basic idea is to use a model-checker on real
system values at run-time, rather than on a model of the speciﬁcation, to verify that the
software is meeting its formal requirements. This required mapping of the low-level sys-
tem state variables to model state. Monitor scripts are written in Primitive Event Deﬁnition
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Language (PEDL) and contain a monitored entity (software method, class, etc.), condi-
tions (statements that evaluate to true or false), and events (generated when state variables
change). Sokolsky et al. extended this work by deﬁning index and attribute quantiﬁers for
each event [79]. Index quantiﬁers bind groups of events (e.g. airbag deployed messages
from a particular vehicle) and attribute quantiﬁers bind a variable in the checked formula
to the most recent occurrence of the event (e.g. the last airbag deployed message from a
particular vehicle). Whereas these techniques require a formal speciﬁcation of the system
design, my goal is to provide run-time monitoring that will work whether or not a formal
design speciﬁcation exists. Also, the focus of my approach is not functional correctness,
but rather the much narrower property of conformance to safety requirements.
Peters and Parnas [68] identiﬁed issues with requirements-based monitors for real-time
systems. Because physical devices have some range of precision, monitors that observe
those devices may have a range of outputs depending on whether they use the best-case
value, worst-case value, or something in between. This could also aﬀect monitor accuracy,
as pessimistic monitors may be more likely to trigger false positives (indicate the system
is not functioning according to the requirements when it is). Likewise, optimistic moni-
tors may be more likely to trigger false negatives (indicate that the system is functioning
according to the requirements when it is not). Another problem arises when timing diﬀer-
ences between the monitor and the system lead to nondeterminism, if the monitor samples
environmental variables independently of the target software system. This is not an issue
for monitors that share inputs with the software system being observed. Although the mon-
itors described by Peters and Parnas were non-hierarchical, the issues they identiﬁed are
relevant to my approach.
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2.5.1 Safety kernels
Leveson et al. introduced the idea of a safety kernel to detect and recover from safety-
critical errors [56]. In their approach, assertions to check safety invariants are embedded in
the application software. A separate timer is used to monitor real-time requirements. When
a hazard is detected, the safety kernel executes a recovery action. One of the main purposes
of the safety kernel is to isolate the recovery mechanisms and the policies governing them
from the rest of the system. This reduces complexity for analysis and testing of critical
functions. My approach diﬀers in that the monitoring functions are separate from the sub-
systems being monitored, rather than embedded in the application code as assertions. Also,
there is no centralized recovery mechanism; both monitoring and response in my approach
are distributed across the subsystems. Their version of the safety kernel design was neither
implemented nor evaluated in a real safety-critical system.
Rushby proposed using safety kernels to enforce, rather than monitor, safety properties
of the system [76]. He proposed that a safety kernel could be used to prevent negative be-
haviors from happening if all actuator commands were required to pass through the safety
kernel. This type of system could not be used to to ensure positive behaviors of the sys-
tem. The approach provided a general description of a safety kernel structure, along with
some suggestions for enforcing event sequencing, but the ideas were not evaluated in a
real system implementation. Wika and Knight extended the ideas proposed by Rushby by
classifying safety policies by fault type [86, 87]. They also provided a mechanism for
weakened policies whereby some of the enforcement is transferred to the application. The
work included application of the approach to two case studies, a neurosurgical device and
a nuclear research reactor, and a dependability evaluation of the safety kernel. As with
Rushby’s design, the safety kernel requires exclusive control over application devices. As
a single point of failure, this requires the safety kernel to exhibit a high degree of depend-
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ability.
The safety kernel approach diﬀers from my work in a number of ways. First, the focus
of the safety kernel is enforcement of safety policies, not monitoring. A true enforce-
ment kernel requires exclusive control of system actuation, something that is not practical
in many distributed embedded systems. The automotive application domain, with its dis-
tributed design and development processes is not likely to transition to an architecture that
will permit this type of centralized control. A second diﬀerence is the fail-stop nature of
the safety kernel; safety policies are enforced by blocking unsafe commands to actuators.
Once again, this may not work in some application domains where complete loss of the
application may be worse than a potential hazard caused by an occasional incorrect com-
mand. Third, the safety kernel approach is centralized by principle, whereas my run-time
monitors are distributed across multiple subsystems. Finally, the approaches to safety ker-
nels leave identiﬁcation of the monitored properties to future work. As part of my results,
I provide speciﬁc techniques for identifying the safety invariants to be monitored.
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Emergence in Composite Systems
3.1 Overview
In general, emergence is problematic because the behaviors it produces are unexpected.
In telecommunications, emergence has been identiﬁed as the feature interaction problem,
when adding features to a system produces new behaviors not included in any single fea-
ture, or where the behavior of one feature is changed by the behavior of another [13]. For
example, features that hide call origination information may interfere with an automatic
call-back feature [15].
In safety-critical systems, emergence causes two types of problems. The ﬁrst occurs
when interaction among components produces hazardous behaviors that are previously
unidentiﬁed. In this situation, one or more system safety goals are missing, which means
the set of subgoals obtained by goal elaboration will also be incomplete. The second prob-
lem occurs when interaction among components produces emergent behaviors that violate
a known system safety goal (i.e., the system was designed and built to satisfy the goal but
ultimately did not). In this case, the parent goal is not fully satisﬁed by the set of subgoals
for the components and their relationships to each other. This thesis addresses the second
problem: emergence that prevents a known system safety goal from being satisﬁed.
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3.1.1 Motivation
Inordertounderstandandhandleemergenceinsystemsafety, itisusefultodeﬁneemergent
and composable system behaviors within the context of the formal speciﬁcation of the
safety goals because this makes explicit:
• uncertainty due to emergence from unknown dependencies or unrealizable goals
• goal redundancy to mitigate unknown emergence
• restriction tactics for handling unrealizable emergence
The aim of requirements elaboration is to precisely deﬁne the behavior of the system un-
der development. When formal deﬁnitions are used in the requirements speciﬁcation, these
requirements can be mathematically veriﬁed. However, in any requirements speciﬁcation
there is some degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty arises when assumptions supporting
the elaboration process fail, or when there are unanticipated dependencies between goals.
Formal speciﬁcation of emergence acknowledges the presence of this uncertainty in the
system.
In goal elaboration, particularly for system safety goals, it may be desirable for certain
behaviors to be redundantly met by the system design. Redundancy may come in the form
of redundant functional behaviors, or redundant constraints on diﬀerent functional behav-
iors. Formal speciﬁcation of emergence provides a platform for including goal redundancy
in the system design.
Some known subgoals for a decomposition of a parent goal may be unrealizable in the
system. To guarantee a goal is met, alternate restrictive goals may be chosen to remove the
emergence from the functional design. Formal speciﬁcation of emergent behaviors assists
in identifying these situations and alternative restrictive subgoals.
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Figure 3.1. Complete and-reduction {G1,G2,G3} of goal G
This chapter addresses the following questions posed in Chapter 1:
• What does it mean for a goal to be composable or emergent?
• When is it possible to decompose a system-level goal?
• Is partial decomposition possible, and if so, is it useful?
3.1.2 And-reductions
Darimontformallyspeciﬁedand-reductionsasarepresentationofdecompositionforpattern-
based goal reﬁnement [19]. In his deﬁnition of decomposition, goals {G1,G2,...Gn} are a
complete and-reduction of goal G iﬀ:
1. G1,G2,...Gn ⊢ G
The parent goal can be inferred from the conjunction of the subgoals.
2. (∀i, j)[∧j,iGj 0 G]
The subgoals are minimally suﬃcient for inferring the parent goal.
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Figure 3.2. And-reductions {G1
1,G2
1,G3
1} and {G1
2,G2
2} of goal G
3. G1,G2,...Gn 0 false
The subgoals are not mutually incompatible.
4. if (G ⇒ ∧1≤j≤nGj) then either n > 1 or the proof relies on some domain knowledge
Simple restatement of the parent goal is not a decomposition
Figure 3.1 shows the state space of a complete and-reduction of goal G consisting of
subgoals {G1,G2,G3}. Because one particular and-reduction is minimally suﬃcient, but
not necessary for satisfying the parent goal, there may be multiple and-reductions for the
same goal (i.e., other sets of subgoals that also satisfy the parent goal). Figure 3.2 shows the
state space of two complete and-reductions of goal G consisting of subgoals {G1
1,G2
1,G3
1}
and subgoals {G1
2,G2
2}.
The and-reductions are mapped over diﬀerent state variables. Suppose goal G in Fig-
ure 3.2 is (A ⇒ B). Table 3.1 shows possible values for subgoals G1
1,G2
1,G3
1,G1
2, and G2
2.
Note that {G1
1,G2
1,G3
1} maps over state space deﬁned by the state variables {A, B,C,D}, and
{G1
2,G2
2} maps over state space deﬁned by the state variables {A, B,E}.
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Table 3.1. Subgoals G1
1,G2
1,G3
1,G1
2,G2
2 for goal G
G: A  B
Goal
G1
1: A  C G1
2: C  D G1
3: D  B
G2
1: A  E G2
2: E  B G: A  B
Subgoals
Darimont further deﬁned a partial and-reduction of goal G as the set of subgoals
G1,G2,...Gm iﬀ:
1. ∃Gm+1,...Gn such that {G1,...Gm,Gm+1,...,Gn} is a complete and-reduction
Given (2) in the conditions for a complete and-reduction, the parent goal cannot be inferred
from a partial and-reduction alone. In Figure 3.1, if subgoal G2 is missing, G cannot be
inferred.
3.1.3 Scope
In this chapter, goals are deﬁned as propositional logic expressions of system state, using
the operators listed in Figure 2.5. Within the KAOS framework of goal-oriented speciﬁca-
tion, these deﬁnitions appear at the domain level (i.e., for a speciﬁc decomposition of the
parent goal in the application domain). The system decomposition should reﬂect all behav-
iors the system produces and should prohibit any additional behaviors that are unspeciﬁed.
This chapter presents formal deﬁnitions of goals that are:
1. fully composable
2. fully composable with redundancy
3. emergent
4. emergent but partially composable
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5. emergent but partially composable with redundancy
3.2 Composable goals
At the meta level of the KAOS framework [18], an and-reduction represents one decom-
position out of several possible decompositions of the parent goal. In pattern-based goal
decomposition, and-reduction patterns can be applied to generic goal patterns to identify
missing subgoal patterns. However, at the domain level of the KAOS framework [18], an
and-reduction representation is an inexact decomposition of the parent goal because the
decomposition it deﬁnes may not be realizable in the system, may not be chosen for a
given system design, or may be one of multiple redundant decompositions chosen by the
requirements engineers.
An exact decomposition of a goal in a requirements speciﬁcation not only deﬁnes when
thegoalissatisﬁed, butalsowhenthegoalisnotsatisﬁed. Inotherwords, itdeﬁnesboththe
behavior ofG and the behavior of ¬G. In and-reduction, if one subgoal is not satisﬁed (i.e.,
evaluatesto FALSE), thentheremaining subgoalsarenotsuﬃcientconditions to allowone
to infer the parent goal. It is undeﬁned whether or not the parent goal is satisﬁed, because
there may be other and-reductions that do satisfy the parent goal. As the design becomes
more complete, the number of possible alternative decompositions decreases. An exact
decomposition of a goal deﬁnes which particular decomposition, restrictive decomposition,
or combination of redundant decompositions is chosen by the requirements engineers for
the system design.
In some situations, inexact decomposition may not be problematic. In hazard detection,
for example, if the subgoals are unable to prove the system is in a safe state, a conservative
design approach would be to assume the system is in an unsafe state and commence hazard
mitigation and recovery actions. In essence, for hazard detection it is assumed that the
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and-reduction subgoals are not only minimally suﬃcient, but also necessary conditions for
satisfying the parent goal.
For other purposes, however, simply assuming the behavior is not occurring may be
a problem. For example, suppose one system goal requires a brake to be applied when
an object is detected in the vehicle path, and that an and-reduction is chosen that assigns
that functionality to a collision avoidance subsystem. Another subsystem may have the
capability to achieve the same goal (e.g., an adaptive cruise control system with object
detection and braking abilities), but it is not desirable to have that subsystem do so without
making it an explicit goal for that subsystem. This is problematic for two reasons. First,
analysis of the behavior would be incomplete if other components produced the behavior in
a manner that is unspeciﬁed. Second, other goals and subgoals dependent on the behavior
could be incorrect or incomplete. For a system requirements speciﬁcation, the deﬁnition of
decomposition should be more precise.
3.2.1 Fully composable
This thesis deﬁnes goal G to be fully composable if there exists a set of n subgoals
{G1,G2,G3,...Gn} that are realizable by one or more components, such that G is materi-
ally equivalent to the conjunction of the subgoals:
G1 ∧G2... ∧Gn ⇔ G (3.1)
which is equivalent to the conjunction of expressions:
G1 ∧G2... ∧Gn ⇒ G (3.2)
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Figure 3.3. Goal G, fully composable by goals {G1,G2,G3}
and
¬G1 ∨ ¬G2... ∨ ¬Gn ⇒ ¬G (3.3)
Thus, the parent goal is satisﬁed (evaluates to TRUE) when all subgoals are satisﬁed and
is violated (evaluates to FALSE) when any subgoal is violated. This means that the parent
goal is satisﬁed by exactly one and-reduction, and that other and-reductions are prohibited
in the system speciﬁcation. A goal G that is fully composable by goals {G1,G2,G3} is
illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Consider the goal that requires a brake to be applied when an object is in the vehicle
path:
ObjectInPath ⇒ StopVehicle (3.4)
Subgoals that fully compose the goal for a collision avoidance subsystem are:
ObjectInPath ⇔ CA.StopVehicle (3.5)
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and
CA.StopVehicle ⇒ StopVehicle (3.6)
These subgoals state that the collision avoidance always stops the vehicle when an object
is in the vehicle path, and only when an object is in the vehicle path.
3.2.2 Fully composable with redundancy
If redundant behaviors are required, that is if multiple and-reductions are chosen to satisfy
the parent behavior, a new deﬁnition for decomposition is required. Let G, Gi, and G
j
i be
goals such that:
Gi ∈ {G1,G2,...Gp} (3.7)
and
Gi ⇔ (G
1
i ∧G
2
i... ∧G
q
i) (3.8)
This thesis deﬁnes goal G to be fully composable with redundancy iﬀ:
G1 ∨G2... ∨Gp ⇔ G (3.9)
which is equivalent to the conjunction of expressions:
G1 ∨G2... ∨Gp ⇒ G (3.10)
and
¬G1 ∧ ¬G2... ∧ ¬Gp ⇒ ¬G (3.11)
If one or more and-reduction Gi is satisﬁed, then the parent goal will also be satisﬁed.
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Figure 3.4. GoalG, fully composable with redundancy by goals {G1
1,G2
1,G3
1}
and {G4
2,G5
2}
Likewise, if none of the and-reductions are satisﬁed, then the parent goal will not be satis-
ﬁed. All other possible and-reductions are prohibited in the system speciﬁcation. A goal
G that is fully composable with redundancy by and-reductions {G1
1,G2
1,G3
1} and {G4
2,G5
2} is
illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Again, consider the goal that requires a brake to be applied when an object is in the
vehicle path in Equation (3.4). The goal can be redundantly satisﬁed by both collision
avoidance and adaptive cruise control. The subgoals that fully compose the goal with
redundancy are:
ObjectInPath ⇔ CA.StopVehicle ∨ ACC.StopVehicle (3.12)
and
CA.StopVehicle ∨ ACC.StopVehicle ⇒ StopVehicle (3.13)
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These subgoals state that the collision avoidance and adaptive cruise control attempt to
stop the vehicle when an object is in the vehicle path, either of those attempts will cause
the vehicle to stop, and only collision avoidance or adaptive cruise control performs this
action.
3.3 Emergent goals
In an ideal world, all system-level goals could be fully composed, with or without re-
dundancy, by known and realizable subgoals. However, in reality systems are never fully
composed because some degree of uncertainty will remain in decomposition of any but
the simplest systems. For safety-critical systems that interface with or control other highly
complex systems, such as humans or the natural world, it may be impossible to remove
all emergence because doing so requires deﬁnitions of all possible state variables and their
relationships to the state variables in the safety goal. Emergence is a consequence of this
uncertainty.
We deﬁne goal G to be emergent if there is no set of subgoals realizable by any compo-
nent in the system that satisfy Equation (3.1).
3.3.1 Emergent but partially composable
Ifa safetygoal is notfully composable, itmay stillbe possible to isolate someportion ofthe
goal behavior that is partially composable. As discussed in Section 3.1.2, Darimont deﬁnes
a partial and-reduction as a partial decomposition [19]. In this thesis, partially composable
goals are similar to partial-and-reduction.
This thesis deﬁnes goal G to be emergent but partially composable if there exists a set
of m subgoals {G1,G2,...Gm} that are realizable by one or more components in the system,
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X
    G1
G2
G
Figure 3.5. Goal G, partially composable by goals {G1,G2} with emergent
behavior X
plus some undeﬁned or unrealizable goal(s) X, such that G is materially equivalent to the
conjunction of the realizable and undeﬁned subgoals:
G1 ∧G2... ∧Gm ∧ X ⇔ G (3.14)
which is equivalent to the conjunction of expressions:
G1 ∧G2... ∧Gm ∧ X ⇒ G (3.15)
and
¬G1 ∨ ¬G2... ∨ ¬Gm ∨ ¬X ⇒ ¬G (3.16)
Inthisdeﬁnition, emergenceexistsashiddenormissingsubgoalswithintheand-reduction.
A goal G that is partially composable by goals {G1,G2} with emergent behavior X is illus-
trated in Figure 3.5. If X evaluates to FALSE (i.e., there exists some unknown dependency
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Table 3.2. Subgoals G1
1,G2
1,G3
1,G1
2,G2
2 for goal G, with emergence X1 and X2
G: A  B
Goal
G1
1: A  C G1
2: C  D G1
3: D  B
G2
1: A  E G2
2: E  B G: A  B X2
Subgoals
X1
between the known subgoals and some unknown subgoal, and that unknown subgoal does
not evaluate to TRUE), then the parent goal is not satisﬁed, even if the deﬁned subgoals G1
and G2 are satisﬁed.
For emergent but partially composable goals, emergence works against goal satisfaction.
That is, some emergent behavior is required, in addition to satisfying the known subgoals,
in order to satisfy the parent goal. Darimont’s reduction patterns [19] can be used to iden-
tify missing subgoals in a partial and-reduction, based on the patterns of the previously
identiﬁed subgoals. However, even if a goal G seems to be a complete and-reduction that
is realizable in the system, there remains some probability that one or more of the subgoals
are not realizable for all possible system states due to unknown dependencies.
For example, consider the subgoals listed in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 shows the same sub-
goals with emergence acknowledged. Suppose state variable C is dependent on some other
state variable F, deﬁned by the expression (F ⇒ ¬C). If this dependency is unknown at
the time of goal elaboration, the partial and-reduction {G1
1,G2
1,G3
1} may appear to be a com-
plete and-reduction. However, the dependency between F and C becomes an assumption
of the decomposition, essentially serving as a subgoal (G4
1). With this added assumption, a
missing subgoal for the decomposition is q¬F, (G5
1). In Table 3.2, these two new subgoals
exist in X1.
Consider again the goal deﬁned in Equation (3.4). Uncertainty in object detection can
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be expressed as a latent dependency between the object position and collision avoidance:
ObjectInPath ⇔ CA.ObjectInPathDetected ∨CA.ObjectInPathNotDetected (3.17)
Now, the actual goals that must be met in the system are:
CA.ObjectInPathDetected ⇒ CA.StopVehicle (3.18)
CA.ObjectInPathNotDetected ⇒ CA.StopVehicle (3.19)
CA.StopVehicle ⇒ StopVehicle (3.20)
where Equation (3.19) exists in X.
In order for a goal to be fully composable, without emergence, all possible dependencies
between all possible state variables must be known and explicitly deﬁned.
3.3.2 Emergent but partially composable with redundancy
Emergence in a system not only appears as an inhibitor of goal satisfaction, but also some-
times serves as a redundant source of goal satisfaction. Let G, Gi, and G
j
i be goals, and Xi
and Y be some undeﬁned or unrealizable goal(s) such that:
Gi ∈ {G1,G2,...Gr} (3.21)
and
Gi ⇔ {G
1
i ∧G
2
i... ∧G
s
i ∧ Xi} (3.22)
This thesis deﬁnes goal G to be emergent but partially composable with redundancy
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Figure 3.6. Goal G, partially composable with redundancy by goals
{G1
1,G2
1,G3
1}, {G1
2,G2
2} with emergent behaviors X1,X2, and Y
iﬀ:
G1 ∨G2... ∨Gr ∨ Y ⇔ G (3.23)
which is equivalent to the conjunction of expressions:
G1 ∨G2... ∨Gr ∨ Y ⇒ G (3.24)
and
¬G1 ∧ ¬G2... ∧ ¬Gr ∧ ¬Y ⇒ ¬G (3.25)
Figure 3.6 illustrates a goal G that is emergent but partially composable with redundancy.
Whereas Xi represents hidden dependencies that make the and-reductions of G incomplete,
Y represents hidden dependencies and behaviors that satisfy G when no other deﬁned and-
reduction of G is satisﬁed. Intuitively, emergent behavior Y serves as an “angel” in the
system that satisﬁes the parent goal when the system speciﬁcation fails to do so, and emer-
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gent behavior Xi serves as a “demon” that prevents the parent goal from being satisﬁed,
even though all deﬁned system goals evaluate to TRUE.
In some cases, Y results when it is too diﬃcult to exclude all unspeciﬁed behavior in the
system design and implementation. In the example from Section 3.2.1, even if collision
avoidance is the only subsystem assigned to satisfy the goal, adaptive cruise control may
happen to stop the vehicle at the same time an object is in the vehicle path. It may be
possible to prevent adaptive cruise control from accidentally satisfying the goal, perhaps
by prohibiting adaptive cruise control from performing any action when an object is in the
vehicle path, but it may not always be practical to do so.
Consider again the goal deﬁned in Equation (3.4). Taking into account uncertainty in
object detection of both collision avoidance and adaptive cruise control (X1 and X2), and
uncertainty of other vehicle behaviors coincidentally causing the vehicle to stop when an
object is in the vehicle path, the new assumption is:
ObjectInPath ⇔
(CA.ObjectInPathDetected ∨CA.ObjectInPathNotDetected)
∧ (ACC.ObjectInPathDetected ∨ ACC.ObjectInPathNotDetected)
(3.26)
and the new subgoals are:
CA.ObjectInPathDetected ⇒ CA.StopVehicle (3.27)
CA.ObjectInPathNotDetected ⇒ CA.StopVehicle (3.28)
ACC.ObjectInPathDetected ⇒ ACC.StopVehicle (3.29)
ACC.ObjectInPathNotDetected ⇒ ACC.StopVehicle (3.30)
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CA.StopVehicle ∨ ACC.StopVehicle ∨ Unknown.StopVehicle ⇒ StopVehicle (3.31)
where Unknown.StopVehicle is Y and Equations (3.28) and (3.30) are X1 and X2
3.3.3 Usefulness of partial composability
Subgoals for a partially composable system goal are not very useful when the objective of
the goal is to produce a behavior. In order to produce behavior G in Equation (3.23), one
of the subgoals G1 through Gr (each is an and-reduction of G) or the unknown goal(s) in
Y would have to be satisﬁed. But to satisfy any Gi, Xi from Equation (3.22) also has to be
satisﬁed. Without knowing Xi it is impossible to say anything about whether or not Gi is
satisﬁed, and without knowing if any Gi is satisﬁed, it is impossible to say anything about
whether or not G is satisﬁed.
Alternatively, if the real objective is to prohibit a behavior, then a partially composable
system goal may be of some use. Safety goals specify the “safe” state of the system to
be maintained, but the real objective of system safety is to prevent a hazardous state from
occurring. If goal G is some safety goal and any G
j
i evaluates to FALSE, then Gi is not
satisﬁed. If there is no goal redundancy (i.e. r = 1 in Equation (3.23), or if no Gi is
satisﬁed, then the system may be in a hazardous state. In this situation it is useful to know
speciﬁc conditions that could lead goal G to be violated, even if it is impossible to know all
conditions required to satisfy the goal. Although it is impossible to guarantee the system
will always be safe without knowing and guaranteeing at least one Gi (i.e. ensuring all G
j
i
and Xi are TRUE for at least one value of i), it is possible to prevent some known conditions
that put the system into a hazardous state.
In other words, it may be possible to specify some, but not all component behaviors or
interactions thatcauseahazard. Forexample, it may beknown that avehicle will accelerate
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if a subsystem applies the throttle. However, there may be additional unknown interactions
in the vehicle that also cause vehicle to accelerate (e.g., loss of brake ﬂuid combined with
a slick, sloped road). If a safety goal restricts accelerations over a certain threshold, it is
important to prevent known sources of acceleration from violating the goal, in this case by
limiting the acceleration caused by a subsystem. Preventing or mitigating one hazard is
useful, even if the same cannot be done for others.
3.3.4 Conjunctive goals
In general, if a goal can be expressed as a conjunction of expressions, then it may be
partially composable. A parent goal of the form:
q(A ∧ X) (3.32)
can be divided into two subgoals:
qA (3.33)
and
qX (3.34)
Another goal of the form:
A ∨ X ⇒ B (3.35)
which is equivalent to:
q((¬A ∧ ¬X) ∨ B) (3.36)
can be divided into two subgoals:
A ⇒ B (3.37)
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and
X ⇒ B (3.38)
If X is unknown or unrealizable, the behaviors required by goals (3.33) and (3.37) may
still be ensured, even if all behaviors required by goals (3.32) and (3.36) cannot. Consider
a goal that requires a vehicle to be stopped whenever there is an object in the vehicle path.
If object detection is non-ideal, then the goal cannot be fully realized. This goal, including
the uncertainty, can be expressed in the same form as Equation (3.35):
InPathDetected ∨ InPathNotDetected ⇒ StopVehicle (3.39)
which can be divided into two subgoals:
InPathDetected ⇒ StopVehicle (3.40)
and
InPathNotDetected ⇒ StopVehicle (3.41)
In this example, subgoal (3.40) can be realized in the system, even if subgoal (3.41) cannot.
3.3.5 Disjunctive goals
An emergent goal with unknown or unrealizable subgoals may still be satisﬁed by making
it more restrictive in one of two ways. First, an OR reduction may be applied to disjunc-
tions [66]. A goal of the form:
q(A ∨ X) (3.42)
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where X is an unknown or unrealizable subgoal, can be satisﬁed by the more restrictive
goal:
qA (3.43)
Likewise, a goal of the form:
A ∧ X ⇒ B (3.44)
which is equivalent to:
q(¬A ∨ ¬X ∨ B) (3.45)
can be satisﬁed by the more restrictive goal:
A ⇒ B (3.46)
OR reduction is more restrictive because some functionality of the system that would
otherwise be acceptable is prohibited. In a system with goal (3.45), the state A ∧ ¬X ∧ ¬B
is acceptable, but in a system with goal (3.46) it is not.
Another way to make the goal more restrictive is to increase the safety envelope of a
given variable. Consider a goal that prohibits vehicle acceleration above a certain threshold
AccelerationLimit.
q(VehicleAcceleration < AccelerationLimit) (3.47)
A subgoal for subsystems that control vehicle acceleration might prohibit requests that
exceed a lower threshold, perhaps AccelerationLimit - SafetyEnvelope.
q(VehicleAccelerationRequests < (AccelerationLimit − SafetyEnvelope)) (3.48)
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In this example, some safe acceleration requests are prohibited.
3.4 Composability
In this thesis, composability of a goal is deﬁned as the extent to which emergent behaviors,
X and Y in Equations (3.14) and (3.23), are small. In all but the most simple systems, some
degree of emergence is unavoidable. There will always be a component whose behavior
cannot be fully speciﬁed or an unanticipated interaction among components. X and Y
could exist because you don’t know what to look for. Other times, they might occur if
observability and controllability requirements of the goal are not met by any subsystem or
combination of subsystems smaller than the entire system.
Just as it is impossible to determine whether a system is not emergent, it is also impossi-
ble to know if maximum composability has been extracted from an emergent but partially
composable goal. In other words, it is impossible to determine if X and Y are minimized. X
and Y could be estimated, however by run-time monitoring of the system goal and subsys-
tem subgoals. A violation of a subgoal that does not correspond to a violation of its parent
goal is considered a false positive (the subgoals indicate a hazardous state but the system
is not in a hazardous state). A violation of a goal that does not correspond to a violation
of one or more subgoals is considered a false negative (the subgoals do not indicate a haz-
ardous state but the system is in a hazardous state). False negatives can occur when the
unknown/unrealizable subgoal(s) are the cause of the goal violation (X in Equation (3.14)).
False positives can occur when the subgoals are more restrictive than the original safety
goal (Y in Equation (3.23)).
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3.5 Conclusion
This chapter proposed a formal representation of a system decomposition that includes
emergence, from both unrealizable and unknown sources, and goal redundancy. This rep-
resentation included deﬁnitions of composable and emergent but partially composable be-
haviors, with and without redundancy. In addition, the role of emergence in conjunctive
and disjunctive goal forms was discussed.
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Indirect Control Path Analysis
4.1 Overview
This chapter presents a new technique for decomposing system safety goals called Indi-
rect Control Path Analysis (ICPA) [11]. ICPA is a top-down search, similar to Fault Tree
Analysis [85]. Whereas FTA traces a top-level hazard to its lower-level causal events, ICPA
traces a top-level state variable through the design to all components that inﬂuence it. ICPA
uses a table structure similar to Failure Modes and Eﬀects Analysis (FMEA) [50] to record
these indirect control relationships. Agents along the trace path belong to the indirect con-
trol path and require further analysis of their relationships to the root variable. The indirect
control relationships are then used in conjunction with the goal coverage strategy to deﬁne
the safety subgoals and assign them to subsystems. The various aspects of the technique are
demonstrated using an example distributed elevator system used in a graduate embedded
systems course.
4.1.1 Motivation
The process of decomposing system safety goals into subgoals that are realizable by indi-
vidual agents should provide:
• systematic analysis of the system design to identify system components that directly
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or indirectly control state variables in the parent goal
• documentation of the goal decomposition process
• documentation of critical assumptions of the safety goal decomposition
• documentation of restriction and redundancy in the decomposition.
Existing goal elaboration tactics are insuﬃcient for system safety because although they
provide support for comparing alternative decompositions [19][46], none provides a frame-
work for guiding those comparisons and documenting the process. Unlike most functional
requirements, which typically deﬁne the actions the system must take to accomplish some
task, system safety goals often deﬁne what the system should do to avoid a hazardous state.
In goal elaboration it is important to try to identify as many behaviors in the system as pos-
sible that could prevent the parent goal from being satisﬁed. In addition, the safety-critical
system assurance process may require a safety case, deﬁned by Bishop and Bloomﬁeld
as “a documented body of evidence that provides a convincing and valid argument that a
system is adequately safe for a given application in a given environment” [8]. In order to
assure the system is safe, the process for decomposing system safety goals and assigning
them to components must be deliberate, directed, and documented.
Another reason additional goal elaboration tactics are needed for system safety is be-
cause in general, the primary aim of goal elaboration is to deﬁne subgoals that meet the
parent goal and are realizable by agents in the system [47]. Prior work in tactics for iden-
tifying missing goals [19][20] and resolving unrealizable goals [46][47] has focused on
identifying subgoals that satisfy the parent goal without being restrictive and without em-
ploying redundancy. If emergence cannot be removed from the system, then a diﬀerent
strategy for goal elaboration is required. In the presence of emergence due to uncertainty,
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G
(o = c) G{c|o}
G
p   q G{p|q}
AND
(a) introduce actuation goal on variable (b) introduce actuation goal on predicate
AND
Figure 4.1. Introduce accuracy/actuation goal elaboration tactic from [46]
it may be desirable to satisfy the goal with redundant subgoals. In the presence of emer-
gence due to unrealizability, it may not be practical, or even possible, to satisfy the parent
goal without restricting system behavior more than the parent goal requires. For safety
goal elaboration, where consequences of not satisfying the goal are severe, restriction and
redundancy in the decomposition may both be necessary.
This chapter addresses the following question posed in Chapter 1:
• How can full or partial decomposition of system safety goals be achieved?
4.1.2 Tactics for resolving goal unrealizability
ICPA relies upon the tactics developed by Letier and van Lamsweerde for identifying and
resolving goal unrealizability [46][47]. In particular, tactics associated with resolving lack
of monitorability and lack of control are used. An overview of the concept of realizability
can be found in Section 2.3.2. This section provides an overview of three speciﬁc goal
realizability tactics most-commonly used in ICPA: Introduce Accuracy/Actuation Goal,
Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability by Chaining, and Split Lack of Monitorabil-
ity/Controllability by Case. All three tactics attempt to identify subgoals that are each real-
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P   Q
P  M M  Q
AND
Figure 4.2. Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability by Chaining goal
elaboration tactic from [46]
izable by a single agent in the system by splitting the monitoring and control requirements
for each goal.
The ﬁrst tactic, introduce accuracy/actuation goal, is illustrated in Figure 4.1 from [46].
The basic idea of this tactic is to identify some other state variable in the system such that
one function of a state variable in the parent goal is equivalent to another function of the
other state variable in the system. In this case, the equivalence relationship between the
two functions is one subgoal for the system (e.g., q(o = c) in Figure 4.1), and the function
of the other state variable is the other subgoal (e.g., G{c|o} in Figure 4.1). For lack of
monitorability, the equivalent state variable function could be a sensor to monitor the state.
For lack of control, the equivalent state variable would map to an actuator that changes the
state.
The second tactic, split lack of monitorability/controllability by chaining [46], is shown
inFigure4.2. Thistacticisappliedtogoalsoftheform P ⇒ Q, where Pisthestatevariable
or function of state variables to be monitored, and Q is the state variable or function of
state variables to be controlled. The basic idea is to identify a sequence of subgoals of the
same form that satisfy the parent goal that are each realizable by diﬀerent agents. In other
56CHAPTER 4. INDIRECT CONTROL PATH ANALYSIS
P   Q
P   f(P)  Q
AND
Case 1: f(P) = TRUE
Case 2: g(P) = TRUE
 (f(P)   g(P))
P   g(P)  Q
Figure 4.3. Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability by Case goal elab-
oration tactic from [46]
words, this tactic employs coordination among agents that monitor and control diﬀerent
state variables.
The third tactic, split lack of monitorability/controllability by case [46], is shown in Fig-
ure 4.3. This tactic is applied when diﬀerent control actions are required to satisfy the goal
in diﬀerent situations.
4.1.3 Scope
In this chapter, goals are deﬁned as temporal, ﬁrst-order logic expressions of system state,
using the operators listed in Figure 2.5. In systems speciﬁed with these expressions, up-
dates to a state variable cannot be observed by agents that monitor the variable until the
subsequent state. Therefore, in order for a goal to be realizable, control actions in the goal
cannot depend on future values of monitored state variables. Control actions can depend on
present values of state variables, if the agent realizing the goal is also the agent controlling
those state variables.
In addition, it is assumed that the system safety goals under review belong to a system for
which a functional decomposition already exists. In other words, the system has already
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Actuator
Software Agent
Software Agent
Actuation Signal
System Response
Sensor
Shared Variable, Network Message
Indirect Control
Direct Control  
Sensed Variable
Figure 4.4. Indirect control paths
been divided into subsystems that have each been assigned a particular set of functional
behaviors, and that communication between subsystems is known. The safety goal elabo-
ration process may reveal the need to modify the functional decomposition, but this process
begins with some baseline functional design.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the notion of
indirect control to the KAOS framework. Section 4.3 describes the format of an ICPA
table. Section 4.4 discusses the procedure used to complete an ICPA. Finally, Section 4.5
deﬁnes the goal coverage strategies used in the ICPA process.
4.2 Indirect control
In the KAOS framework, goal realizability is driven by monitorability and controllability
of system state variables [46][47]. Monitorability means the ability to observe the value
of the state variable. Controllability means the ability to change the value of the state
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variable. Furthermore, the KAOS framework speciﬁes that only one agent may directly
change the value of a given state variable [46]. Thus, only one agent can control any given
state variable.
In composite systems, however, although one agent directly changes some state variable,
other agents may also inﬂuence that change. The terms direct control and indirect control
are introduced to distinguish between the ability to change and the ability to inﬂuence
change in variables. Figure 4.4 shows the direct and indirect control relationships for an
embedded system with sensing and actuation. Physical sources of indirect control may
includehardwareactuation, systemdynamics, andenvironmentalagentsthatchangesensed
state variables. The relationship between commands to an actuator and the actuator’s eﬀect
on sensed system variables is indirect and deﬁned by a function of the physical response
of the system to the actuator command. The actuator does not change the sensed value
directly. Rather, the sensor detects the sensed value from the system and environment.
Software agents directly control their own outputs, such as network messages, shared
variables, and actuation signals, and indirectly control the consumers of those outputs (e.g.,
an actuator’s response to an actuation signal). If one software agent Ag1 directly controls
state variable Z based on input from another software agent Ag2, then Ag2 may indirectly
control the system safety goal as well. If safety goal G restricts how Z can be controlled,
then both agents Ag1 and Ag2 must be analyzed to see if they require a safety subgoal.
Figure 4.5 shows a partial design for a distributed elevator system. In this system, soft-
ware agents DoorController and DriveController directly control the door motor and drive
actuators. In addition, separate software agents for each hall call button and car call button,
HallButtonControllerf,d and CallButtonControllerf, process Passenger agent requests for
ﬂoor f and direction d. Another software agent DispatchController contains a dispatch
algorithm that tells the DoorController and DriveController agents the next scheduled des-
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Figure 4.5. Partial design of a distributed elevator control system
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Goal: Maintain[DriveStoppedWhenOverweight]
InformalDef: If the elevator weight exceeds the weight threshold,
then the elevator speed shall be STOPPED.
FormalDef: ∀ ew: ElevatorWeight, es: ElevatorSpeed, wt: WeightThreshold
l (ew > wt) ⇒ IsStopped(es)
Figure 4.6. Goal restricting movement in an overweight elevator
tination. Sensors detect the elevator weight and speed, and whether the door is blocked or
closed.
ConsiderthegoalMaintain[DriveStoppedWhenOverweight], showninFigure4.6, which
restricts movement in the elevator when the elevator weight is over the limit for safe oper-
ation. In the distributed elevator system shown in Figure 4.5, ElevatorWeight is indirectly
controlled by the Passenger agent. ElevatorSpeed is indirectly controlled by the Drive
actuator, which is directly controlled via the actuation signal DriveCommand by the Drive-
Controller agent. DriveController, in turn, is inﬂuenced by the DispatchController agent
via the network message DispatchRequest.
Unlike the notion of controllability in the KAOS framework, the notion of direct control
in this thesis does not require strict controllability (i.e., more than one agent may directly
control a system state variable). In networked distributed systems, multiple agents may
send the same type of message. For example, in the distributed elevator system, hall button
controllers on each ﬂoor may each generate a hall call message to other agents on a broad-
cast network. A goal that constrains control of hall call messages would apply to all hall
call button controllers. Agent behaviors to generate the messages may be the same for all
agents, such as diﬀerent instantiations of the same car button controller, or they may diﬀer
by agent, depending on the system design.
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Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Goal Elaboration
Subsystem Safety Goals
System Safety Goal
Goal: ...
InformalDef: ...
FormalDef: 
Indirect Control Path Analysis
  Goal Scope
1
2
3
4
5
Figure 4.7. ICPA table format
4.3 ICPA format
One of the primary purposes of ICPA is documentation. It necessary to document not only
the subgoals themselves, but also the process used to deﬁne them, the critical assumptions
made during that process, and restriction or redundancy in the decomposition. Documen-
tation of the safety goal elaboration process is necessary for several reasons. First, in an
independent review of the safety goals and subgoals, perhaps during development of a
safety case for the system [8], there needs to be a clear record of the critical goals and
assumptions, as well as which subsystems and components were analyzed for indirect con-
trol during the goal elaboration process. In addition, as the development cycle progresses,
changes to the design can be checked against the critical assumptions to determine if those
changes impact the safety subgoals. Finally, it is important to document when subgoals
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are more restrictive than the parent goal, as well as which subgoals satisfy a parent goal
redundantly, to allow these decisions to be taken into account when future revisions to the
requirements speciﬁcation are made.
The basic layout of an ICPA table is shown in Figure 4.7. The ﬁrst major section contains
the system safety goal deﬁned in the basic KAOS format [18]. The goal deﬁnition includes
the goal name, an informal deﬁnition of the goal, and the formal deﬁnition in ﬁrst order
temporal logic.
The second major section includes ﬁelds for recording the state variables in the system
safety goal, the indirect control paths for those variables, and the indirect control relation-
shipsalongthosepaths. Indirectcontrolpathsincludethesubsystemsthatindirectlycontrol
the parent goal variable and the variables those subsystems control directly. Indirect control
relationships are formal propositional logic expressions that relate the subsystem variables
to the parent goal variables. Each relationship is numbered.
The third major section records the goal coverage strategy chosen for a particular goal.
This includes ﬁelds for the goal assignment and goal scope. Goal coverage strategies are
covered in more detail in Section 4.5.
The fourth major section contains the the indirect control relationships and restriction
tactics used to deﬁne them. The goal relationships and restriction tactics listed here become
critical assumptions of the subgoals. These critical assumptions, combined with the derived
subgoals, form the decomposition of the parent goal.
The ﬁnal section lists the subgoals themselves, using the same format as the parent goal
in the ﬁrst section.
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4.4 ICPA procedure
The other primary purpose of ICPA is to guide safety goal elaboration in a systematic way
that attempts to uncover all hidden dependencies related to the state variables in the parent
goal.
For functional requirements, the purpose of goal elaboration is usually creation of be-
havior. Functional goal elaboration is used to develop a system design that performs the
required actions. In contrast, the aim of safety goal elaboration is usually restriction. As
such, goal elaboration is used to to identify which system components that may aﬀect the
system safety goal, and identify subgoals for some of those components to prevent the sys-
tem from entering a hazardous state. In some situations new components are required in
order to satisfy the system safety goal. However, in most situations safety goal elabora-
tion occurs once a functional decomposition has been established, and is about constraint,
rather than creation. A process for functional goal elaboration may entail brainstorming
about types of components that can be included to perform the required task, whereas a
systematic process for safety goal elaboration requires directed examination of all subsys-
tems that may inﬂuence the behavior of state variables in the system safety goal.
In addition, the dependencies among the state variables produced by the indirect control
sources and the state variables contained in the parent goal must be formally deﬁned. These
dependencies serve as the starting point for applying tactics for pattern-based goal elabora-
tion [19][20] and resolving unrealizable goals [46][47]. In order to ensure the parent goal
is satisﬁed by the derived tactics, it is important to uncover all dependencies in the system.
This becomes more diﬃcult to do as the system design gets more complex. Although a
directed search may not guarantee all such dependencies are uncovered, it may uncover
more dependencies than an undirected search.
The ICPA approach to safety goal elaboration is fairly straightforward. First, indirect
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control sources are identiﬁed for each state variable in the parent goal, using the system’s
functional decomposition and subsystem inputs and outputs. Next, the relationships among
the state variables in the parent goal and the state variables controlled by agents in the
indirect control path are formally deﬁned. The following sections explain these steps in
greater detail.
4.4.1 Identifying indirect control sources
The ﬁrst step in ICPA is identifying the direct and indirect control sources of state variables
in the formally speciﬁed parent goal. To do this, the functional decomposition, including
communication paths between components, is reviewed. Depending on the stage of system
development, this decomposition may be documented in the functional requirements or the
design speciﬁcation. A graphical illustration of the indirect control paths can be useful
for this this step, such as the one shown in Figure 4.5. However, in complex systems a
complete diagram may be diﬃcult to construct. In these systems, other documentation of
the system design, such as input/output lists for each subsystem, may be used.
The ﬁrst stop along the indirect control path is identifying the subsystems or components
that directly produce the state variable in the system. If the state variable is a command to
an actuator, then the source of direct control is usually some software agent. In Figure 4.5,
the subsystem DriveConroller directly controls the signal DriveCommand to the Drive ac-
tuator. In some situations, an environmental agent may have direct control of actuator
commands. In the same elevator, the Passenger agent directly controls the CarButtonf and
DoorButtonf,d actuators. If the state variable in the parent goal is a sensed value in the sys-
tem, then there is no source of direct control. The nearest sources of indirect control are the
actuators that interact with the environment to change the system state variable detected by
the sensor, and those are directly controlled by set points. Once the source of direct control
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Goal: Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped]
InformalDef: At all times the door shall be closed or the elevator speed
shall be STOPPED
FormalDef: ∀ dc: DoorClosed, es: ElevatorSpeed
q (dc ∨ IsStopped(es))
Figure 4.8. Goal restricting door position and elevator movement in a
distributed elevator system
is known, input sources for that agent are examined, and the process repeats.
Consider the indirect control paths for the distributed elevator system shown in Fig-
ure 4.5. A safety goal that restricts state variables DoorClosed and ElevatorSpeed is shown
in Figure 4.8. In the system these state variables are directly controlled by motion detection
sensors. However, each is indirectly controlled by agents in the system.
The control path of ElevatorSpeed includes one branch, which contains Drive, Drive-
Controller, DispatchController, CarButtonControllerf, andHallButtonControllerf,d. Drive
is an actuator that controls the physical elevator speed, which is then detected by the eleva-
tor speed sensor to generate the ElevatorSpeed state variable. DriveController is a software
agent that commands the Drive to a certain speed. DispatchController is another agent that
tells DriveController the desired destination of the elevator. CarButtonControllerf and
HallButtonControllerf,d are software agents that tell DispatchController when a button is
pressed to request a speciﬁc destination.
The control path of DoorClosed is branched. The ﬁrst branch contains DoorMotor,
DoorMotorController, andDispatchController. ThesecondbranchisthePassenger. Door-
Motor is an actuator that controls door position, which includes the closed position de-
tected by a sensor to generate the DoorClosed state variable. DoorMotorController is
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a software agent that commands the DoorMotor to a certain speed. DispatchController
is another agent that tells DoorMotorController the desired destination of the elevator.
CarButtonControllerf and HallButtonControllerf,d are software agents that tell Dispatch-
Controller when a button is pressed to request a speciﬁc destination. Passenger is an en-
vironmental agent who interacts with the elevator control system. Passenger can inhibit
DoorClosed from being TRUE by physically blocking the doors.
Similar to fault paths in FTA, indirect control paths in ICPA may have many branches.
That is, each source along an indirect control path of a parent goal variable may have
multiple sub-paths of control. Likewise, one particular path may include many sources.
Depending on the system design, the number of indirect control sources may be quite
numerous or circular. To keep this analysis manageable, the second and third steps of the
ICPA, described in Sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 below, can be performed at each level in the
indirect control path. If a set of subgoals for that level is found to satisfy the parent goal,
then further analysis of the indirect control path is only necessary for identifying redundant
subgoal sets. If not, then the process is repeated at the next level along the indirect control
path, or additional components may be needed to satisfy the goal.
4.4.2 Deﬁning indirect control relationships
Once indirect control sources have been identiﬁed, their relationship to the original vari-
able must be deﬁned in such a way that the general agent-based elaboration tactic Intro-
duce Accuracy/Actuation Goal, and Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability by Chain-
ing from [46] can be applied. As described in Section 4.1.2 if these relationships can be
deﬁned in the form (o = c) or (p ⇔ q), then the goal G can be deﬁned as G{o|c} or G{p|q}.
In other words, goals can be deﬁned if the dependencies between state variables deﬁne
functions that relate the variable in the parent goal to the indirect control variables. If the
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parent goal is of the form (P ⇒ Q) and a relationship can be deﬁned such that (P ⇒ M), a
subgoal could be deﬁned (M ⇒ Q). In this situation, the entailment in the original goal is
achieved by a sequence of entailments in the subgoals.
For paths with a single branch, the indirect control relationship is deﬁned between state
variables controlled by each pair of agents along the path and state variables contained
in the parent goal. For paths with multiple branches, the indirect control relationship is
deﬁned among state variables controlled by agents at a given level in the indirect control
path and state variables contained in the parent goal.
Indirect control relationships for the ﬁrst indirect control path level of variables Door-
Closed and ElevatorSpeed in the goal Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped] from Fig-
ure 4.8 are presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The indirect control path for ElevatorSpeed has
one branch. Because ElevatorSpeed is a sensed value that is not directly changed by any
agent in the system, the closest indirect control source, Drive, is examined ﬁrst. The rela-
tionship between sensed value ElevatorSpeed and the actuated value DriveSpeed indicates
that when the drive is stopped the elevator will be stopped also:
IsStopped(DriveSpeed) ⇔ IsStopped(ElevatorSpeed) (4.1)
DriveSpeed, however, is not directly controlled by any software agent in the system,
either. Instead, it is indirectly controlled by DriveController using the actuation signal
DriveCommand. A drive that is commanded to stop will do so, but only after some delay:
ln<MaxStopDelay(DriveCommand = ‘STOP’) ⇒ IsStopped(DriveSpeed) (4.2)
(l¬IsStopped(DriveSpeed) ∧ l <MinStopDelay@(DriveCommand = ‘STOP’))
⇒ ¬IsStopped(DriveSpeed)
(4.3)
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Table 4.1. Indirect control paths for goal Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped] (1 of 2)
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships
dc DoorController,
DoorMotor
dmc: DoorMotorCommand
maxcd: MaxCloseDelay
mincd: MinCloseDelay
maxod: MaxOpenDelay
minod: MinOpenDelay
dms: DoorMotorSpeed
ssd: SingleStateDuration
#
04
07
S0 ⊫ dc  dmc = `OPEN’  
% In initial state, door is OPEN and commanded OPEN
( dc  (dmc = `CLOSE’))  dc
% Closed door that is commanded CLOSE remains closed
( dc  (dmc = `OPEN’))  dc
% Unclosed door commanded OPEN remains unclosed
01
05
06
( dc   < minod @(dmc = `OPEN’)   dc
% Closed door that is closed and whose command switched to 
OPEN from CLOSE within duration minod will be closed
 < maxcd (  db   (dmc = `CLOSE’))  dc
% Unblocked door commanded CLOSE for maxcd will be closed
 < maxod (dmc = `OPEN’)  dc
% Door commanded OPEN for maxod will be unclosed
( dc   < mincd @(dmc = `CLOSE’)  dc
% Unclosed door whose command switched to CLOSE from 
% OPEN within mincd will not be closed
02
03
System Safety Goal
Goal: Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped]
InformalDef: At all times the door shall be closed or the elevator speed shall be STOPPED.
FormalDef: dc: DoorClosed, es: ElevatorSpeed
 (dc   IsStopped(es))
maxcd > mincd >> ssd     % CLOSE delays are greater than state
maxod > minod >> ssd     % OPEN delays are greater than state
08
09
6
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Table 4.2. Indirect control paths for goal Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped] (2 of 2)
IsStopped(drs)  IsStopped(es)
% If the drive is stopped, the elevator is stopped, and vice versa
DriveController,
Drive
drc: DriveCommand
maxsd: MaxStopDelay
minsd: MinStopDelay
maxgd: MaxGoDelay
mingd: MinGoDelay
drs: DriveSpeed
ssd: SingleStateDuration
es S0 ⊫ IsStopped(es)  drc = `STOP’ 
% In initial state, elevator stopped and drive commanded STOP
(   IsStopped(drs)  < mingd @(drc = `GO’)  IsStopped(drs)
% Stopped drive whose command switched to GO from STOP 
% within duration mingd remains stopped
 < maxgd (drc = `GO’)  IsStopped(drs)
% Drive commanded GO for maxgd will be unstopped
 < maxsd(drc = `STOP’)  IsStopped(drs)
% Drive commanded STOP for maxsd will be stopped
(   IsStopped(drs) (drc = `STOP’))  IsStopped(drs)
% Stopped drive commanded STOP remains stopped
( IsStopped(drs)  < minsd @(drc = `STOP’) 
IsStopped(drs)
% Unstopped drive whose command switched to STOP from GO 
% within duration minsd remains unstopped
( IsStopped(drs) (drc = `GO’))  IsStopped(drs)
% Unstopped drive commanded GO remains unstopped
maxsd > minsd >> ssd     % STOP delays are greater than state
maxgd > mingd >> ssd     % GO delays are greater than state
14
15
12
13
16
17
18
19
20
21
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
db  dmc = `OPEN’
% if the door is blocked, the door shall be commanded OPEN
db  dc
% if the door is blocked, the door shall not be closed
Passenger db: DoorBlocked
10
11
dc
7
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Likewise, a drive that is commanded to go will do so, but only after some delay:
ln<MaxGoDelay(DriveCommand = ‘GO’) ⇒ ¬IsStopped(DriveSpeed) (4.4)
(lIsStopped(DriveSpeed) ∧ l <MinGoDelay@(DriveCommand = ‘GO’))
⇒ IsStopped(DriveSpeed)
(4.5)
Variables with multiple branches require relationship among branches to be deﬁned as
well. Sometimes, the branches represent independent control paths (i.e., one path traversed
at a time). In these situations each branch can be evaluated as if it were a single branch
path. Sometimes, however, the control paths in multiple branches are interdependent. In
the distributed elevator system of Figure 4.5, the door controller commanding the door
motor to close the doors should eventually set the DoorClosed sensor to ‘TRUE’. However,
objects or passengers blocking the doors can physically prevent the door from being closed,
as represented by the following relationship:
lDoorBlocked ⇒ ¬DoorClosed (4.6)
The relationship between blocking agents and the door motor is also constrained by a
related safety goal that requires a door reversal if the door is blocked.
lDoorBlocked ⇒ DoorMotorCommand = ‘OPEN’ (4.7)
As a design choice for this system, this safety goal is given priority over the safety goal
Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped]. In other words, if the elevator enters a state
where the door is blocked and the elevator is moving, the preferred action is to open the
doors.
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As a result, a door that is commanded to close will do so after some delay, provided no
agents or objects are blocking the door:
ln<MaxCloseDelay(¬DoorBlocked ∧ (DoorMotorCommand = ‘CLOSE’))
⇒ DoorClosed
(4.8)
(l¬DoorClosed ∧ l <MinCloseDelay@(DoorMotorCommand = ‘CLOSE’))
⇒ ¬DoorClosed
(4.9)
However, a door that is commanded to open will no longer be closed after some delay,
whether or not any agent or object is blocking the door:
ln<MaxOpenDelay(DoorMotorCommand = ‘OPEN’)
⇒ ¬DoorClosed
(4.10)
(lDoorClosed ∧ l <MinOpenDelay@(DoorMotorCommand = ‘OPEN’))
⇒ DoorClosed
(4.11)
4.4.3 Applying elaboration tactics and goal coverage strategies
The next step in ICPA is to use the indirect control relationships deﬁned in the previous step
to identify subgoals for subsystems that satisfy the parent goal. This is done by application
of the goal realizability tactics deﬁned by Letier and van Lamsweerde [46][47], and by
choosing and applying a particular goal coverage strategy. Goal coverage strategies are
discussed in more detail in Section 4.5. An overview of the concept of goal realizability
can be found in Section 2.3.2. That section provides descriptions of two speciﬁc goal
realizability tacticsmost-commonly usedinICPA:Introduce Accuracy/ActuationGoal, and
Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability by Chaining. Further detail on those and other
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tactics can be found in [46][47].
As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, a state variable in a system safety goal may be large
in breadth (number of branches) or depth (number of stops along each branch). ICPA
approaches goal coverage by starting from the indirect control level nearest the parent goal
variable, and working outward along the branches. When a particular level of indirect
control is branched, sources on all branches must be included in the examination. If a
goal decomposition that satisﬁes the parent goal can be obtained, further analysis along the
control path can be halted. However, if redundant goal coverage is required, the analysis
should continue outward along the branches from the parent goal variable.
Table 4.3 records the goal coverage strategy and goal elaboration for the indirect control
paths of the goal Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped] from Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The
goal coverage strategy used to satisfy the parent goal includes a goal assignment of shared
responsibility between DoorController and DriveController, and a restrictive goal scope
(worst-case actuation delays are exploited to ensure the goal is satisﬁed). Further details
about the goal coverage strategy used in this example can be found in Section 4.5.
The goal elaboration section of the table includes the speciﬁc goal realizability tactics
and indirect control relationships used to determine the missing subgoals. These indirect
control relationships become critical assumptions that must be ensured in the system, in
addition to the newly deﬁned subgoals, in order to satisfy the parent goal. For the goal
Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped], the ﬁrst critical assumption used in goal elab-
oration is the speciﬁcation of the initial system state. That allows the goal, which requires
control of two diﬀerent actuators, to to be made realizable by applying the split lack of
monitorability/controllability by case tactic shown in Figure 4.3. The ﬁrst case is the initial
state, which is deﬁned by critical assumptions (1) and (10). The second case includes all
subsequent states. In this second case, separate goals restrict control actions performed on
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Table 4.3. Goal Elaboration for goal Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped]
Goal Elaboration
 (dc   IsStopped(es)) Indirect Control Relationships
dc   IsStopped(es))  IsStopped(es)   dc)  01, 12  – Goal satisfied in initial state,
 Split lack of monitorability/control by case
IsStopped(es)   dc 
     ( IsStopped(es)    (drc = `GO’))   db ))   (dmc = `CLOSE’) 07, 09 – Minimum delay to open door
10 – Door reversal safety goal
13  – Introduce accuracy goal tactic
02 – Remain closed w/ CLOSE command
19, 21  – Minimum delay to move elevator
dc   IsStopped(es)
dc    dmc = `OPEN’))   (drc = `STOP’) 07, 09  – Minimum delay to open door
13  – Introduce actuation goal tactic
14  – Remain stopped w/ STOP command
19, 21  – Minimum delay to move elevator
System Safety Goal
Goal: Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped]
InformalDef: At all times the door shall be closed or the elevator speed shall be STOPPED.
FormalDef: dc: DoorClosed, es: ElevatorSpeed
 (dc   IsStopped(es))
Shared Responsibility (DoorController & DriveController)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case actuator response times; real response may be slower.)   Goal Scope
7
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DriveController and control actions performed on DoorController. This elaboration also
relies on actuation delays for both DoorMotor and Drive being much greater than a single
state.
Depending on the tactic used in goal elaboration, the goal elaboration ﬁeld of an ICPA
may contain a proof showing how the subgoals and critical assumptions entail the parent
goal. In particular, the goal realizability tactics Introduce Accuracy/Actuation Goal, and
Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability by Chaining from [46][47] are amenable to this
approach.
If other tactics are used, particularly when the goal assignment requires coordinated con-
trol, the goal elaboration ﬁeld may not contain a formal proof. ICPA uses formal speciﬁca-
tion of system goals to guide goal elaboration, but the intent of formal speciﬁcation is not
necessarily to provide a formal proof of all subgoal decompositions. Rather, the primary
intent is to ensure that the safety goals and critical assumptions are precisely deﬁned and
documented. The goal elaboration ﬁeld should contain a list of the critical assumptions and
elaboration tactics used to deﬁne the subgoals. The parent goals could be veriﬁed against
the subgoals and indirect control relationships with model-checking [17], or monitored at
run-time along with the subgoals to detect when they become invalid.
4.4.4 Iteration and completion
Like the system development process in general, the ICPA process is not purely linear. The
products of previous stages are revisited during later stages and modiﬁed as necessary. For
example, a goal coverage strategy may be chosen or changed when goal realizability tactics
are applied.
Deﬁning indirect control sources and the relationships among them is somewhat open-
ended. Each state variable in the parent goal has some indirect control path, with one or
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more branches and one or more stops along the path. At a minimum, all indirect control
sources at the stops closest to the parent goal along all branches should be analyzed. For
goal redundancy, more stops along the path may be included in the analysis.
Indirect control relationships are gleaned from examination of the functional require-
ments, the control architecture, the design speciﬁcation, and the implementation. There-
fore, the state of these artifacts during the ICPA inﬂuences how many indirect control rela-
tionships are deﬁned. In general, the intent is to identify all dependencies among the state
variables identiﬁed as indirect control sources or included in the parent goal. As the de-
velopment cycle progresses, newly deﬁned dependencies are added to the table of indirect
control relationships.
4.5 Goal coverage strategies
In any system design, there are often alternative subgoal decompositions that will satisfy
a given parent goal. Subgoals may or may not be required for every indirect control agent
in order to satisfy the parent goal. The system safety goal may be satisﬁed by one agent
in the system, or may require coordination among agents. The subgoals may exactly meet
the system safety goal, or may be more restrictive of functional behavior. Sometimes,
redundant goal coverage may be desirable.
A goal coverage strategy is a plan for allocating subgoals to ensure that a high-level
goal is met. Each goal coverage strategy is deﬁned by goal assignment and goal scope. In
this section, diﬀerent classiﬁcations of goal assignment and goal scope are deﬁned. Sec-
tion 4.5.1 describes single responsibility, redundant responsibility, and shared responsibil-
ity goal assignments. In Section 4.5.2, nonrestrictive and restrictive goal scope are deﬁned.
In both sections, subgoal patterns for common hazard reduction techniques are also pre-
sented.
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Goal: Maintain[ElevatorBelowHoistwayUpperLimit]
InformalDef: The top of the elevator shall never exceed the upper limit
of the hoistway.
FormalDef: ∀ etp: ElevatorTopPosition, hul: HoistwayUpperLimit
q (etp ≤ hul)
Figure 4.9. Goal restricting elevator position in the hoistway
4.5.1 Goal assignment
Goal assignment deﬁnes which indirect control sources have subgoals and how those sub-
goals relate to each other. It may be driven by physical limitations of the system (e.g.,
actuation delays described in Section 4.4.2). It may also be inﬂuenced by potential loss
of monitorability and controllability by agents in the system. The three categories of goal
assignment presented in this section are single responsibility, redundant responsibility, and
shared responsibility.
Single responsibility. In the base case for general goal elaboration, the safety goal is met
by assigning one or more subgoals to a single agent. For system safety, a single responsibil-
ity goal assignment facilitates isolation of safety-critical behaviors from other non-critical
components. It also allows more rigorous (and expensive) development processes to be
applied to those isolated, fewer agents. The agent responsible for meeting the goal may
also be responsible for other, non-critical functionality. Alternately, an agent’s behaviors
may be limited to simply satisfying the safety goal (e.g., a safety monitor).
Consider a safety goal in a distributed elevator system that restricts elevator position
relative to the end of the hoistway, as shown in Figure 4.9. In the elevator control system
depicted in Figure 4.5, the goal could be met by requiring the drive controller to stop the
elevator before the hoistway limit is reached, as shown in Figure 4.10.
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Goal: Achieve[StopBeforeHoistwayUpperLimit]
InformalDef: If the elevator nears the upper hoistway limit,
then the drive shall be stopped.
FormalDef: ∀ etp: ElevatorTopPosition, hul: HoistwayUpperLimit,
msd: MaxStoppingDistance, drc: DriveCommand
l(etp ≥ (hul - msd)) ⇒ drc = ‘STOP’)
Figure 4.10. Goal restricting elevator drive movement in the hoistway
Single responsibility requires an agent or group of agents to monitor or control all state
variables in the deﬁned subgoals.
Redundant responsibility. A single responsibility strategy may be desirable for reduc-
ing development costs, but it also provides a single point of failure for the safety goal.
Functional redundancy is a common strategy for fault tolerance in which diﬀerent agents
perform the same set of required functions [50]. This redundant functionality may be iden-
tical, such as duplicate networks for tolerating dropped messages, or diﬀerent, such as a
backup that provides a minimal set of functions when the primary fails.
Goal redundancy is achieved by assigning primary responsibility to one group of agents;
secondary, to another group. If at least one group of agents satisfy their subgoals, the parent
goal will also be satisﬁed. Redundant subgoals may have the same goal scope, or may have
varying degrees of restriction compared to the original system safety goal. If subgoals vary
in restriction, agents with primary responsibility have the most restrictive subgoals and
agents with secondary responsibility have less restrictive subgoals (i.e., normal behavior
has a greater safety margin than emergency backup behavior). Goal scope is discussed in
Section 4.5.2.
In the elevator system, drive controller reliability may be too low or too unmeasurable to
ensure the safety goal is met, particularly for complex software control. Physical compo-
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Goal: Achieve[EmergencyStopBeforeHoistwayUpperLimit]
InformalDef: If the elevator nears the upper hoistway limit,
then the emergency brake shall be applied.
FormalDef: ∀ etp: ElevatorTopPosition, hul: HoistwayUpperLimit,
mebd: MaxEmergencyBrakingDistance, eb: EmergencyBrake
l(etp ≥ (hul - mebd)) ⇒ eb = ‘APPLIED’)
Figure 4.11. Goal requiring emergency braking to avoid exceeding the
hoistway limit
nent reliability, such as a physical emergency brake trigger, is better known. A goal for an
emergency brake agent in the system is shown in Figure 4.11.
However, relying on the emergency brake alone to meet the safety goal is also undesir-
able because of equipment wear and harm to passengers with emergency braking stops. By
assigning primary responsibility to the elevator drive controller and secondary responsibil-
ity to the emergency brake, the safety goal may be more reliably met while largely avoiding
application of the physical emergency brake.
Shared responsibility. Sometimes a safety goal may require coordination among agents
if physical system dynamics limit variable controllability and observability. In shared re-
sponsibility, two or more agents have subgoals that must be met in order to meet the parent
goal.
The goal Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped] deﬁned in Section 4.4.2 cannot be
assignedtothedrivecontrollerordoorcontrolleralonebecauseofphysicalactuationdelays
andtheinabilitytomonitorandcontrolinthesamestate. Inordertoachievethegoal, which
prohibits states in which the door is open and the elevator is moving, a single agent must
have the ability to control both the door motor and the drive. If an agent can only monitor
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Goal: Achieve[CloseDoorWhenElevatorMoving]
InformalDef: If the elevator is moving,
then the door shall be commanded to ‘CLOSE’.
FormalDef: ∀ dmc: DoorMotorCommand, es: ElevatorSpeed,
db: DoorBlocked
(l¬IsStopped(es) ∧ l¬ db) ⇒ (dmc = ‘CLOSE’)
Figure 4.12. Goal restricting elevator door movement
the behavior of one actuator while controlling the other, the goal cannot be satisﬁed for
two reasons. First, monitored values are only known for the previous state. Any goal that
requires a value to be monitored in the same state in which the control action occurs is not
realizable. Second, control actions by the agent are subject to actuator delays.
Suppose the door controller alone is given responsibility for the goal with the subgoal
deﬁned in Figure 4.12. Operationalization of this goal prohibits opening the door while the
elevator is in motion and prescribes closing the door if the elevator moves, except when a
passenger is blocking the doors. If the drive controller activates the drive motor while the
doors are already open, the safety goal will be violated during the actuation delay required
to close the doors.
Now, suppose another subgoal is deﬁned to prevent the drive controller from moving the
elevator while the doors are open, as shown in Figure 4.13. Operationalization of this goal
prohibits moving the drive while the doors are open and prescribes stopping the drive if the
elevator moves.
Even though the behavior of both controllers is restricted, the parent safety goal may
be violated when the elevator is stopped and the doors are closed, if the door controller
attempts to open the doors at the same time as the drive controller attempts to move the
elevator. In this situation, it is important to monitor both the sensed value of the parent goal
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Goal: Achieve[StopElevatorWhenDoorOpen]
InformalDef: If the door is open,
then the drive shall be commanded to ‘STOP’.
FormalDef: ∀ drc: DriveCommand, dc: DoorClosed
(l¬dc) ⇒ (drc = ‘STOP’)
Figure 4.13. Goal restricting elevator drive movement
and its indirect control actuation source.
Table 4.4 shows the subgoals for the door controller and drive controller deﬁned during
the ICPA of the parent goal Maintain[DriveStoppedWhenOverweight]. The door controller
monitors both elevator motion and drive commands. The drive controller monitors both the
door closed sensor and the drive actuator commands. If a) the initial state of the system is
known and does does not violate the system safety goal, b) monitored values are delayed
one state, and c) the physical actuation delays are much greater than a single state, then
each controller will be able to cancel its own actuation command if it observes the other
controller commanding actuation, before the doors or drive have actually begun to move.
Sometimes physical actuation and network delays are insuﬃcient for ensuring the goal
is met. An interlock [50] is a common solution for enforcing sequencing of coordinated
actions in systems. Suppose a safety goal coordinating two actions takes the form q (A ∨
B)), where A is indirectly controlled by agent agA and B, by agB. The basic patterns of the
primary subgoals are:
l¬B ⇒ A (4.12)
l¬A ⇒ B (4.13)
Before negating A, agA must set a variable LA and check that agB’s interlock variable
LB is not set. This is similar to a mutex or semaphore [24] used in software programs to
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Table 4.4. Subgoals of Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped] for DoorController and DriveCon-
troller]
Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: DoorController
Controls: DoorMotorCommand
Observes: ElevatorSpeed, DriveCommand, DoorBlocked
Goal: Achieve[CloseDoorWhenElevatorMovingOrMoved]
InformalDef: If the door is not blocked and the elevator a) is moving or b) has been commanded to move,
then the door shall be commanded to CLOSE.
  FormalDef:  drc: DriveCommand, dmc: DoorMotorCommand, es: ElevatorSpeed
( IsStopped(es)    drc = `GO’))   db ))   (dmc = `CLOSE’)
Subsystem: DriveController
Controls: DriveCommand
Observes: DoorClosed, DoorMotorCommand
Goal: Achieve[StopElevatorWhenDoorOpenOrOpened]
InformalDef: If the doors a) are not closed or b) have been commanded open, then the drive shall be commanded to STOP.
  FormalDef:  drc: DriveCommand, dmc: DoorMotorCommand, dc: DoorClosed
dc    dmc = `OPEN’))   (drc = `STOP’)
System Safety Goal
Goal: Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped]
InformalDef: At all times the door shall be closed or the elevator speed shall be STOPPED.
FormalDef: dc: DoorClosed, es: ElevatorSpeed
 (dc   IsStopped(es))
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coordinate the use of shared resources. Basic patterns of subgoals using an interlock are:
l(¬LA ∨ LB) ⇒ A (4.14)
l(¬LB ∨ LA) ⇒ B (4.15)
Now suppose A and B have actuation delays, where A1 causes A to be set after some
delay, and A2 causes A to be unset after some delay. The indirect control relationships for
setting and unsetting A are deﬁned as:
ln<MaxDelayAA1 ⇒ A (4.16)
(l¬A ∧ l <MinDelayA@A1) ⇒ ¬A (4.17)
ln<MaxDelay¬AA2 ⇒ ¬A (4.18)
(lA ∧ l <MinDelay¬A@A2) ⇒ A (4.19)
q¬(A1 ∧ A2) (4.20)
If all variables shared between agents also have communication delays, the new subgoals
for agA are:
l <MinComDelay(¬B ∨ B2) ⇒ A1 ∧ ¬A2 (4.21)
l <MinComDelay(¬LA ∨ LB) ⇒ A1 ∧ ¬A2 (4.22)
q(MinComDelay < MaxDelay¬A) (4.23)
The subgoals for agB are analogous.
A lockout coordinates enforcement of safety goals by prohibiting an action from occur-
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ring [50]. For example, a bus guardian [33] is used to prevent faulty nodes on a network
from interfering with communication by others. In time-triggered networks a bus guardian
will enable transmission access only during the node’s allotted time slot [81]. Suppose a
safety goal takes the form l <T (D ⇒ ¬C), where C is indirectly controlled by agent agA
and D is observed by agent agA. The control relationship of C by agA is deﬁned by:
lA ⇒ C (4.24)
l¬A ⇒ ¬C (4.25)
and the safety goal for agent agA is:
l <TD ⇒ ¬A (4.26)
If a lockout agent agB is added to the system to prevent agent agA from violating the
safety goal, the new shared indirect control relationship would be:
l(A ∧ B) ⇒ C (4.27)
l(¬A ∨ ¬B) ⇒ ¬C (4.28)
The safety goal for agents agA and agB would be:
l <TD ⇒ ¬A (4.29)
l <TD ⇒ ¬B (4.30)
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4.5.2 Goal scope
Goal scope deﬁnes how closely the safety subgoals meet the system safety goal. It may
be possible for agents to meet the original safety goal without restriction. However, it may
sometimes be necessary or desirable to assign subgoals that are more restrictive than the
original safety goal. This section identiﬁes two categories of goal scope: nonrestrictive and
restrictive.
Nonrestrictive. Nonrestrictive subgoals meet the parent goal with no additional limita-
tions on functional behavior, other than what is deﬁned in the parent goal. This is the base
case where the system-level goal is fully realizable as deﬁned. Subgoals Achieve [StopBe-
foreHoistwayUpperLimit] and Achieve [EmergencyStopBeforeHoistwayUpperLimit] from
Section 4.5.1 are nonrestrictive if both the drive and emergency brake dynamics ensure the
elevator will stop at the very end of the hoistway when the emergency brake is triggered,
allowing full use of the hoistway.
Restrictive. In most systems, however, some amount of restriction is required to take into
account uncertainty in system behaviors. A restrictive subgoal meets the parent goal but
places additional limitations on system functionality. The most common restrictive subgoal
is achieved with a safety margin, a hazard reduction technique for handling variability in
failure rates of components [50]. Restrictive subgoals, which are usually less complex
and easier to implement correctly and analyze than the parent goal, may be necessary if
variables are not controllable, or if control delays are great.
In subgoals Achieve [StopBeforeHoistwayUpperLimit] and Achieve [EmergencyStop-
BeforeHoistwayUpperLimit], MaxStoppingDistance and MaxEmergencyBrakingDistance
could be increased so that the the elevator stops some distance before the hoistway limit,
rather than at the end of the hoistway limit. The elevator would have less use of the full
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hoistway, but the safety goal could be satisﬁed in the presence of jitter in Drive and Emer-
gencyBrake actuation. In addition, the safety margin for the drive controller, the primary
redundant subgoal, is usually designed to be even more restrictive than the safety margin
for the emergency brake, to prevent the emergency brake from being activated frequently.
If a safety goal has the form q (A ≤ B), then a subgoal with a safety margin C would be:
q(A ≤ (B −C)) (4.31)
In the goal elaboration of Maintain[DoorClosedOrElevatorStopped] shown in Table 4.3,
the subgoals are more restrictive than the parent goal because they rely on worst-case actu-
ation delays. Assume that DoorController and DriveController simultaneously issue com-
mandstoDoorMotorandDriveactuatorsrespectively. If, inthefollowingstate, acontroller
sees that the combined commands could violate the goal, it can cancel its own actuation
command before the actuation occurs. Technically, the safety goal would not have been
violated until both actuation delays had ﬁnished, but the subgoals cancel the commands
much earlier. This is an example of a type of safety margin used to restrict behavior.
OR reductions [66] are another common application of restriction. A goal of the form
q(A ∨ B) is always satisﬁed if subgoal A is always satisﬁed. A is more restrictive than the
parent goal because it excludes some functional behaviors that are non-hazardous: when A
is false and B is true. OR reductions are common when one or more state variables in the
parent goal are not observable or controllable by any agent in the system.
Restriction, though necessary, has its own limits (e.g., if the restrictions make the ﬁnal
product unusable). The goalMaintain[ElevatorBelowHoistwayUpperLimit] can always be
met if the elevator is always stopped, but this trivial solution prevents functionality required
in an elevator.
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4.5.3 Controllability, observability, and alternative/restrictive goals
Choosingwhichvariablestomonitorandwhichtocontroltosatisfytheparentgoaldepends
on what sources of actuation and sensing are available, what software agent variables can
be shared, and the general pattern of the goal. It may be possible to represent a particular
goalwithseveraldiﬀerent, butlogicallyequivalent, goalpatterns. Thebestrepresentationis
one that more-closely represents the intended observability and control relationships of the
goal. For example, a goal pattern that uses a logical implication, such as (A ⇒ B), is better
forrepresentingagoalthatrestrictsthecontrolledvariableBbasedontheobservedvariable
A, whereas the logically equivalent goal pattern q(¬A ∨ B) is a better for representing a
goal that restricts two variables controlled by the same agent.
Figure 2.5 lists all of the temporal logic operators that may be used the formal deﬁnition
of the goals, subgoals, and indirect control relationships. However, some of these operators
are used more often than others. In order for a goal to be realizable, its observed state
variables must be observed at least one state prior to its controlled state variables.
In general it is most useful to deﬁne the goal such that controlled state variables are
represented in the present state, and observed state variables are represented in some prior
state. For example, the l, ln<T, and l <T operators are often used to represent values
that are observed one state prior, for some duration T prior, and at least once in duration T
prior to control of another state variable, respectively. Operators n and   may also be used
to represent observed variables, but are somewhat more diﬃcult to operationalize because
their duration of observation is unbounded. Variables that are intended to be controlled are
usually represented in the present state, but may also be represented by operators m and q.
Goals that contain ♦ are not realizable because they refer to some unbounded time in the
future [46].
Table 4.5 shows the controllability and observability requirements for some common
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Table 4.5. Goal controllability and observability requirements for realiz-
ability of goals of the form A ⇒ B
A    B A
Controllable Pattern Observable
 A
Alternative Goal
 A
Restrictive
A B
 B B
B A
A, B
A    B A  A
 A A B
 B B
B A
A, B
 B
A   B A  A
A B
 B B
B A
A, B
 B
B   A
B   A
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
entailment goals. When the goal takes the form A ⇒ B, both variables in the goal are in
the same state. This means that both variables must be controllable by the same agent in
order for that agent to satisfy the goal. This goal form is equivalent to ¬A ∨ B. If only
one variable is controllable, an OR reduction is formed on the goal to produce an alternate
restrictive, but realizable goal.
When a goal takes the form lA ⇒ B, then the goal is realizable without restriction
if both A and B are controllable, or if A is observable and B is controllable. Otherwise,
restricted goals are required.
When the goal takes the form A ⇒ lB, then the goal is realizable without restriction
if both A and B are controllable, or if B is observable and A is controllable. In the latter
situation, the alternate goal ¬ lB ⇒ ¬A is not restrictive. Rather, it is an equivalent
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representation of the goal expression.
Common goal patterns and their controllability/observability requirements and alterna-
tive goals can be found in Appendix 7.2.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposed the ICPA technique for safety goal elaboration. The concepts of
direct and indirect control were deﬁned with respect to the KAOS goal elaboration frame-
work. In addition, the ICPA format and procedure were explained and illustrated with
examples from a distributed elevator-control system. The chapter also contained a catego-
rization of goal coverage strategies to use in safety goal elaboration, and an explanation of
controllability and observability requirements for goal realizability, including goal patterns
for those requirements and for alternative goals.
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Evaluation
5.1 Overview
In this Chapter, the ICPA technique is evaluatedon arealsemi-autonomous automotive sys-
tem from a commercial automotive research lab. The system safety goals and the subgoals
generated by applying ICPA are monitored at run-time in a simulation-based implemen-
tation of the automotive system in CarSim
R   and Simulink
R  . The results show that some
system safety goal violations are detected in the subsystem monitors, but some are not, in-
dicating that the subgoals produced with ICPA only partially compose the parent goals. In
addition, monitoring at both the system and subsystem levels revealed defects in the system
design and implementation and detected hazards that may be imperceptible to the driver.
5.1.1 Motivation
Evaluation of the ICPA technique should answer the following questions:
• Can ICPA be applied to a real system of non-trivial complexity?
• Do the subgoals represent a full or partial decomposition of the system safety goal?
• Are the subgoals produced by ICPA useful?
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Any analysis technique related to system safety ultimately must be evaluated in a real
complex safety critical system because the issues related to emergence are too easily ab-
stracted away in a toy example. In a real system, it may not be possible to identify a full
decomposition of a particular system safety goal. Guaranteeing that all emergence has
been removed from the parent goal is not possible. The usefulness of the technique de-
pends on how well it can be applied to a real safety critical system, with a believable level
of complexity.
A working implementation is required, as well, for the same reason. The requirements
and design speciﬁcation are abstractions of the system that is actually built. The aim is for
those abstractions to reﬂect the behavior of the true system. In reality, the built system may
not conform to the requirements or design, or the requirements and design themselves may
be incorrect. In order to evaluate the ICPA technique, it must be applied to a real system
design, and the subgoals generated from it must be veriﬁed against a system implementa-
tion.
This chapter addresses the following question posed in Chapter 1:
• How do we evaluate the value of a partial decomposition?
5.1.2 Evaluation method
The method used to evaluate the ICPA technique in this thesis is proof of concept by case
study. The application used in the case study was a semi-autonomous automotive vehicle.
At the time the case study was performed, this automotive system was under development
at a commercial automotive research lab. Requirements, design, and a simulation-based
implementation of the automotive system were all partially complete. These materials
were used to perform the following steps:
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1. Deﬁne the system safety goals.
2. Apply ICPA to the system safety goals to deﬁne subgoals for the primary subsystems.
3. Add monitors of the safety goals and subgoals to the system implementation.
4. Monitor the safety goals and subgoals at run-time in a suite of driving scenarios.
Although deﬁning the system safety goals is not oﬃcially part of the ICPA process, at
the time of the study there were no requirements for the system under review that were
speciﬁcally designated “system safety.” Before ICPA could be applied, these safety goals
were obtained by review of the functional requirements, design, and implementation.
Monitoring of the goals and subgoals during run-time scenarios was used to determine
whether the subgoals represented a full or partial decomposition. In this thesis, a hit occurs
when a goal violation is detected and a corresponding subgoal violation is detected. A false
positive occurs when a subgoal violation is detected but no corresponding goal violation
is detected. A false negative occurs when a goal violation is detected but no correspond-
ing subgoal violations are detected. False negatives give an indication of the degree of
emergence still remaining in the system. False positives either indicate the subgoals do not
partially compose the parent goal, or redundant or restrictive goal coverage strategies are
in use.
Run-time monitoring of safety goals and subgoals, in general, is useful for several pur-
poses. Safety goal monitoring indicates whether or not the system is in a hazardous state.
As noted before, a hazard implies that an accident could eventually occur, but does not nec-
essarily indicate that an accident has occurred [50]. Subgoal monitoring indicates whether
or not the subsystem is conforming to its safety subgoals. In combined monitoring, false
positives can occur when subgoals are more restrictive than the parent goals, or if there
remains some emergent behavior, Y in equation 3.23, that also satisﬁes the goal. False
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negatives can occur when critical assumptions of the subgoals are violated, or when emer-
gent behaviors remain in the system, Xi in equation 3.23, that prevent the subgoals from
satisfying the goal.
5.2 Evaluation system
In Chapter 4, the various aspects of the ICPA technique were illustrated using a distributed
elevatorsystemfromagraduateembeddedsystemscourse. Thischapterpresentstheresults
from applying ICPA to a distributed embedded system under development at a commercial
automotive research lab that is more complex than the distributed elevator example. This
automotive system was being developed to study the use of advanced sensors and sensor
fusion for a suite of semi-autonomous automotive features, not for a speciﬁc end-user com-
mercial product. Although the implementation used for this thesis was fully simulated,
subsequent implementations included hardware-in-the-loop and test vehicles.
5.2.1 Semi-autonomous automotive system
ICPA was applied to an automotive vehicle with safety-critical semi-autonomous features
from an automotive research lab. At the time of this work, the system design, implementa-
tion, and simulation environment were functional but incomplete. The vehicle subsystems
included in this study are shown in Figure 5.1. Other vehicle subsystems were excluded
from this study.
The feature subsystems include two active safety features and three driver convenience
features. Collision Avoidance(CA)detectsobjectsintheforwardpathandstopsthevehicle
before a collision occurs. Rear Collision Avoidance (RCA) performs a similar function
when the vehicle is moving in reverse, with the added behavior of detecting and stopping
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Figure 5.1. Semi-autonomous automotive system
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for cross traﬃc behind the vehicle. Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) commands the vehicle
to a speed set by the driver, or to a set following distance behind a slower lead vehicle. Lane
Change Assist (LCA) works in conjunction with ACC to perform a lane change maneuver
when requested by the driver. Park Assist (PA) ﬁnds a parking space and parks the vehicle,
also when requested by the driver.
In addition to the feature subsystems, the arbitration logic was included in this study as
another subsystem along the indirect control path of the system safety goals. In the sys-
tem implementation, this arbitration logic was distributed across multiple processors, with
separate arbitration of acceleration and steering. For the purposes of this study, the Arbiter
was treated as a single subsystem, rather than as a distributed subsystem. In other words,
the behavioral decomposition, rather than the structural decomposition was used [41]. The
behaviors of the feature subsystems were also distributed across a diﬀerent structural de-
composition in a similar manner.
This automotive system is semi-autonomous because subsystems control vehicle mo-
tion under driver supervision. The driver enables and disables the features, and is able to
override feature control via the Human Machine Interface (HMI) or by application of the
brake pedal, throttle pedal, or steering wheel. In CA and RCA, the driver has primary re-
sponsibility for detecting imminent collisions and avoiding them by some means, such as
slowing, stopping, or steering the vehicle. In this case, CA and RCA provide backup safety
behavior if the driver fails to stop the vehicle in time to avoid the collision. In ACC, LCA,
and PA, the driver is responsible for monitoring the feature behaviors and intervening if
needed (e.g., if a deer is heading toward the road but not yet detectable in the vehicle path).
The driver may override any feature behavior except an emergency stop, in which case the
driver is only permitted to brake harder than the feature.
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5.2.2 Simulation platform
The vehicle system was implemented in the CarSim
R   simulation environment from Me-
chanical Simulation [64][1]. CarSim
R   is a software system for simulating vehicle dynamic
responses to diﬀerent acceleration and steering inputs. The software itself contains built-
in models of vehicle systems and driving environments. For customized designs, models
from other simulation environments such as Matlab
R   Simulink
R   [2] or Labview
TM [3] can
be added to the CarSim
R   models.
The system under review was implemented in a Simulink
R   model by the automotive
research lab that designed it. Although some of the features were more fully implemented
thanothers, nofeaturesubsystemwascomplete. ThismodelwasthenexecutedinCarSim
R  .
The scenarios used in this thesis were performed on the vehicle model in CarSim
R   release
7.01 and Simulink
R   release r2008a running on Microsoft Windows XP.
5.2.3 Vehicle-level safety goals
In general, the system requirements were incomplete at the time of the study. In addition,
none of the requirements for the research vehicle were written in a formal speciﬁcation
language and there were no requirements identiﬁed as system safety requirements. Thus,
the ﬁrst step that had to be completed before ICPA could be applied was to identify the
system safety goals and deﬁne them formally. These safety goals were derived from in-
spection of the functional requirements, the hazard analysis that had been performed on the
preliminary system requirements, and an incomplete system design and implementation.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 list the eight safety goals identiﬁed for this study.
The system safety goals deﬁne the safety-critical behaviors relevant to semi-autonomous
vehicle motion. This includes both longitudinal acceleration and lateral steering. In this
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Table 5.1. Safety goals for a semi-autonomous vehicle (1 of 2)
Goal: Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: Vehicle acceleration caused by autonomous vehicle control shall not 
exceed 2 m/s
2.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration
IsSubsystem(va.source)   va.value   2 m/s
2
Goal: Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: Vehicle jerk caused by autonomous vehicle control shall not exceed 
2.5 m/s
3.
FormalDef: vj: VehicleJerk
IsSubsystem(vj.source)   vj.value   2.5 m/s
3
Goal: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
InformalDef: If a subsystem a) requests control of acceleration and steering and b) is 
granted control of either acceleration or  steering, then the subsystem shall 
control both acceleration and steering.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, vst: VehicleSteering, sn: SubsystemName
RequestingAcceleration(sn)  RequestingSteering(sn) 
 (( va.source = sn)   (vst.source = sn))  (va.source = vst.source = sn)
Goal: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
InformalDef: If a) the vehicle is stopped for a duration of StoppedTime and
b) the throttle pedal has not been applied within the preceding GoTime and
c) a subsystem is controlling acceleration and
d) the HMI has not sent a go signal to the controlling subsystem within the 
preceeding AccelerationTime,
then there shall be no vehicle acceleration
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, vsp: VehicleSpeed, sn: SubsystemName, 
hmi: HumanMachineInterface, tp: ThrottlePedal, st: StoppedTime, gt: GoTime
( <st IsStopped(vsp.value)  <gt @IsApplied(tp)   (va.source = sn) 
<gt @Go(hmi, sn))  IsAccelerating(va.value) 
1.
2.
3.
4.
System Safety Goals for a Semi-Autonomous Automotive System (1 of 2)
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Table 5.2. Safety goals for a semi-autonomous vehicle (2 of 2)
Goal: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
InformalDef: If the driver is turning the steering wheel, then no subsystem shall control 
vehicle steering
FormalDef: vst: VehicleSteering, sn: SubsystemName, sw: SteeringWheel
(sw.active)  (vst.source = sn)
Goal: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
InformalDef: If the vehicle is moving forward, then the subsystem RCA shall not control 
vehicle acceleration or steering
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, vst: VehicleSteering, vsp: VehicleSpeed
InForwardMotion(vsp.value) 
((va.source = `RCA’)   (vst.source = `RCA’))
Goal: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
InformalDef: If the vehicle is moving backward, then the subsystems CA, ACC, and 
LCA shall not control vehicle acceleration or steering.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, vst: VehicleSteering, vsp: VehicleSpeed
InBackwardMotion(vsp.value) 
((va.source   {CA, ACC, LCA})   (vst.source   {CA, ACC, LCA}))
5.
9.
7.
8.
System Safety Goals for a Semi-Autonomous Automotive System (2 of 2)
Goal: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
InformalDef: If  a) the vehicle is moving in the forward direction and
b) the driver is applying the brake pedal or the throttle pedal and
c) a subsystem is requesting a vehicle acceleration greater than or equal to 
-2 m/s
2 (i.e., not requesting a “hard” stop of the vehicle),
then the subsystem shall not control vehicle acceleration.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, sn: SubsystemName, bp: BrakePedal, 
tp: ThrottlePedal
(InForwardMotion(vsp.value)    (bp.active   tp.active ) 
 RequestingAcceleration(sn)   (RequestedAcceleration(sn)  -2 m/s
2)) 
(va.source = sn)
Goal: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
InformalDef: If  a) the vehicle is moving in the backward direction and
b) the driver is applying the brake pedal or the throttle pedal and
c) a subsystem is requesting a vehicle acceleration less than or equal to 2 m/s
2
(i.e., not requesting a “hard” stop of the vehicle),
then the subsystem shall not control vehicle acceleration.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, sn: SubsystemName, bp: BrakePedal, 
tp: ThrottlePedal
(InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)    (bp.active   tp.active ) 
 RequestingAcceleration(sn)   (RequestedAcceleration(sn)    2 m/s
2)) 
(va.source = sn)
6.
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system, all features attempt to control acceleration, and LCA and PA attempt to control
steering. CA, ACC, and LCA are only operational when the vehicle is in forward motion,
RCA is only operational in reverse, and PA operates in both.
In semi-autonomous automotive systems, the driver remains engaged in the driving pro-
cess, even when subsystem features are controlling the vehicle. Autonomous control is
both initiated and overridden by the driver. As a result, many of the safety goals for
semi-autonomous driving constrain behaviors that interfere with the ability of the driver
to properly supervise the vehicle. Autonomous behaviors must be performed in a way that
allows the driver enough time to identify what is happening and intervene if necessary.
One historic concern for general automotive systems is unintended, or sudden accelera-
tion [71] [77]. Although most incidents of unintended acceleration have been attributed to
incorrect pedal application (hitting the throttle instead of the brake pedal), as vehicles move
closer to fully autonomous control, it becomes increasingly possible for such accelerations
to be caused by system defects.
The ﬁrst guard against unintended accelerations is safety goal number 1, which prohibits
autonomous vehicle acceleration that exceeds 2 m/s2. The second is safety goal number
2, which prohibits autonomous vehicle jerk that exceeds 2.5 m/s3. These are reasonable
limits of comfortable acceleration and jerk in vehicle motion [58]. Note that the vehicle
is allowed to cause uncomfortable levels of negative acceleration (deceleration) because
the vehicle may need to perform a sudden, uncomfortable stop to avoid a collision. Fea-
tures that increase vehicle speed, such as ACC, LCA, or PA, are limited to more gradual
accelerations, to give the driver time to override if necessary.
Another guard against unintended accelerations is safety goal number number 4, which
prohibits autonomous accelerations when the vehicle is stopped (e.g., if ACC brings the
vehicle to a stop behind a stopping lead vehicle or if CA stops the vehicle to avoid an object
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in the road). In these situations the driver is required to initiate acceleration by sending a
“Go” signal from the Human-Machine Interface (HMI), or by pressing the throttle pedal.
This ensures that the driver is aware the vehicle will begin moving from a stopped position.
Another concern is feature interaction [13], which was discussed in more detail in Sec-
tion 2.4.1. A feature interaction occurs when the combined behavior of two features is
undeﬁned in the speciﬁcation of either and must be diﬀerent than the linear superposition
of the individual features. In the semi-autonomous automotive system under review, sev-
eral diﬀerent features may attempt to control vehicle acceleration or steering, all at the
same time. If one feature controls steering while another controls acceleration, a behavior
may occur that is undeﬁned by either, or by the system speciﬁcation. Safety goal number 3
prohibits control of acceleration and steering by diﬀerent subsystems if either is attempting
to control both.
Safety goals 5, 6, and 7 ensure the driver is allowed to override acceleration and steering.
Driver brake and throttle commands override acceleration control, unless the subsystem
feature is attempting a very hard brake of the vehicle. Because prior analysis of sudden
acceleration incidents has shown that drivers sometimes hit the accelerator pedal instead of
the brake pedal [71] [77], the features used for collision avoidance are allowed to override
driver throttle or brake pedal commands.
Finally, safety goals 7 and 8 prohibit features from controlling vehicle acceleration or
steering when the vehicle is moving in a direction in which the features were not intended
to operate. These goals essentially deﬁne which subsystems are allowed to perform vehicle
control actions in both the forward and reverse directions.
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5.3 ICPA and subsystem subgoals
Once the system safety goals were determined, ICPA was applied to identify subgoals for
the subsystems. Appendix C contains the ICPA for all nine goals listed in Tables 5.1 and
5.1.
The goal coverage strategy contains a redundant responsibility goal assignment for eight
of the nine goals (1-2 and 4-9) As the ﬁnal source of system acceleration and steering
commands, theArbiterbecomestheprimarysourceformeetingthesystemsafetygoal. The
secondary safety goals of the feature subsystems provide protection against some single-
point failures of the Arbiter. If the Arbiter fails by choosing an acceleration or steering
command from the wrong feature subsystem source, then the system should still meet the
safety goal. However, if the Arbiter fails in a diﬀerent way (e.g., summing requests from
diﬀerent features), then the features will not provide backup protection against the failure.
The goal coverage strategy for goal 3 is single responsibility, with the Arbiter as the
only source satisfying the goal. This goal prohibits behaviors that mix acceleration and
steering control from diﬀerent feature subsystems. An alternative redundant responsibility
strategy could require one feature subsystem to monitor the other feature subsystem control
requests and cancel their requests when higher-priority features request control. However,
this requires the arbitration logic to be maintained in each feature subsystem, which is
impractical in this distributed development environment.
The goal scope for all the goals is restrictive in some way or another. In all goals, worst-
case actuation delays are used for deﬁning the subgoals. In some goals, OR-reduction is
used to limit the behavior of the feature subsystems. For example, goals 1 and 2 use OR-
reduction. The subgoals for the feature subsystems limit the value of acceleration requests
when those acceleration requests are the source of vehicle acceleration. However, it is
simpler to always prohibit the subsystems from requesting excessive vehicle acceleration
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or jerk, rather than prohibiting it only when those requests are used to control vehicle
acceleration.
5.3.1 Goal and subgoal monitoring locations
The monitoring locations for the goals and subgoals are presented in Table 5.3. For goals
1, 2, and 4, the actual goal that is monitored at the system level is diﬀerent from the goal
that is monitored for the Arbiter. For goals 3 and 5-8, the actual goal that is monitored
at the system level is the same as the goal that is monitored at the Arbiter level. This is
because the goals constrain state variables that have some source of direct control in the
subsystem. For example, there is no way to sense which subsystem is the source of vehicle
acceleration. The only way to monitor this is to monitor the source tag on the acceleration
command. However, vehicle acceleration is not directly controlled by any subsystem, and
can be monitored by an accelerometer. A goal can be monitored at the system level if
it constrains one or more sensed state variables or two or more state variables directly
controlled by diﬀerent subsystems.
5.3.2 Lessons from applying ICPA
Applying the ICPA revealed the following information about the semi-autonomous auto-
motive system:
• Arbitration of feature subsystem control requests is divided between longitudinal
acceleration and steering. This complicates actions that coordinate the two types of
vehicle control.
• Prioritization of feature subsystem control requests in steering arbitration is the re-
verse of the prioritization in the acceleration arbitration. This can lead to feature
102C
H
A
P
T
E
R
5
.
E
V
A
L
U
A
T
I
O
N
Table 5.3. Monitoring locations of goals and subgoals.
  Goal/Subgoal
Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
Arbiter CA ACC RCA LCA PA
Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteeringRequest]
Vehicle
Achieve[AutoAccelCommandBelowThreshold]
Maintain[AutoAccelRequestBelowThreshold]
Maintain[AutoJerkRequestBelowThreshold]
Achieve[AutoJerkCommandBelowThreshold]
Achieve[NoAutoAccelCommandFromStop]
Achieve[NoAutoAccelRequestFromStop]
Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringCommandAgreement]
Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverrideAccelCommand]
Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverrideAccelRequest]
Achieve[DriverSteeringOverrideSteeringCommand]
Achieve[DriverSteeringOverrideSteeringRequest]
Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteeringCommand]
Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteeringRequest]
Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteeringCommand]
Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X X X X
X X X X X
X
X X X X X
X X X X X
X
X
X
X
X
Monitored In:
1
1A
1B
2
2A
2B
4
4A
4B
5
5A
5B
6
6A
6B
7
7A
7B
8
8A
8B
3
3A
Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverrideAccelCommand]
Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverrideAccelRequest]
X
X X X X X
9
9A
9B
1
0
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interaction problems if diﬀerent feature subsystems are chosen to control accelera-
tion and steering.
• TheArbiterindicatesifafeaturesubsystemorthedriverhascontroloverlongitudinal
acceleration with separate ‘selected’ ﬂags. This could allow control actions to be
attributed to multiple sources, making it diﬃcult to identify the true source of vehicle
control.
• ACC performs the longitudinal control for LCA. Thus ACC and LCA share accelera-
tion requests. Monitoring of subgoals that limit acceleration requests is not necessary
for LCA, if the same subgoals are monitored for ACC.
Applying the ICPA revealed the following information about the ICPA process itself, as
well as the subgoals it produced:
• Almost all safety subgoals are restrictive, often in multiple ways. Most goal restric-
tion comes from variability, or jitter, in the values monitored or controlled by the
system agents.
• Some goals can only be monitored at the subsystem level. If the goal restricts control
of a state variable directly controlled by some agent in the system, then the highest
level in the system hierarchy at which the goal can be monitored is the level contain-
ing the subsystem that controls the variable. If the goal restricts two or more state
variables directly controlled by diﬀerent agents in the system, or one or more sensed
from system dynamics or the environment, then the goal can be monitored separately
from the subgoals.
• Goal redundancy between levels in a system’s behavioral hierarchy can only protect
against defects that occur in subsystems located earlier in the control ﬂow. It does
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not protect against defects in the subsystems located later in the control ﬂow. If goal
redundancy is not used at the latest stage in control ﬂow (i.e., the direct control source
or indirect control source closest to it), then goal redundancy does not protect against
single-point failures.
5.4 Evaluation scenarios and results
Althoughitisimpossibletodetermineiftheunknown/unrealizablepartofthesystemsafety
goal has been minimized, it is possible to determine whether or not the subgoals produced
by ICPA partially compose the parent goal. The purposes of goal elaboration are twofold.
First, it is important to identify subsystem behaviors that contribute to hazards at design-
time so that the subsystem development team can design and build the subsystem to help
satisfy the system goal. A second aim is to monitor the subsystem behaviors at run-time
to determine whether a subsystem is violating its safety goals. Violations of subgoals may
be predictors of system-level goal violations. In this thesis, the safety goals and subgoals
were monitored in an implementation of a vehicle in a simulation environment.
Atthetimethisevaluationwasperformed, althoughallfeatureswerepartiallyfunctional,
no feature was fully complete. In addition, the features were implemented independently
of the process for deﬁning and elaborating the system safety goals. That is, the formal
speciﬁcation of the safety goals and subgoals was not available to the teams designing
and implementing the system. The safety goals were obtained by the author of this thesis
by analysis of the functional requirements, hazard analysis, and partial implementation.
As such, this work cannot determine whether applying ICPA to obtain subgoals helps in
the design and implementation of the system. Rather, the purpose of this analysis is to
determine whether system safety in this case is partially, if not fully, composed by the
set of subgoals obtained from ICPA. To do this, we monitored the system safety goals
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and subgoals at run-time in ten diﬀerent driving scenarios, conﬁgured in CarSim
R   and
Simulink
R  .
The following ten scenarios were chosen to test the goal and subgoal monitors. They are
representative of real driver behaviors, both those that the driver is expected to do regularly,
such as engage ACC at a reasonable speed, and those that the driver might do in error, such
as engage PA in the middle of an emergency braking action. Each scenario was scheduled
for a simulation time of 20 s. The goal and subgoal violations for all ten scenarios are listed
in Tables D.1-D.11 in Appendix 7.2. Descriptions of each scenario and evaluations of their
results are presented below.
5.4.1 Scenario 1: CA enabled, ACC enabled, stopped vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is traveling forward, starting from a stop 20 m behind an-
other stopped vehicle. ACC is enabled (“turned on” by the driver), but not engaged (oper-
ating in an internal state in which vehicle control actions are performed). CA is enabled.
CA is expected to initiate a hard braking action to stop the host vehicle before a collision
occurs.
Results. Table D.1 lists the goal violations for the ﬁrst scenario. CA attempted to stop the
hostvehicleuponitsapproachtothestoppedvehicleinitspath. Thisresultedinviolationof
vehicle safety goals 1 and 2 shortly before early termination of the simulation, at simulation
time 12.681 s. The longest violation was 8 ms, and the shortest was 1 ms (the time interval
of one state). Vehicle acceleration exceeded its threshold for 4 ms, at time 12.589 s, 92 ms
before early termination. Although the vehicle acceleration threshold was exceeded once,
no violations of the corresponding subgoals were also detected.
Vehicle jerk was exceeded six times, for 8, 2, 1, 4, 6, and 1 ms, at 98, 83, 29, 20, 9, and
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1 ms before early termination of the system. Similarly, although the vehicle jerk threshold
was exceeded six times, only violations in corresponding subgoals for CA and PA were
detected. The CA jerk threshold was violated only once for 1 ms, starting 80 ms before
early termination of the system. In addition, the jerk threshold for PA was violated once,
once for 1 ms at time 0.001 s, and once for 1ms at time 9.624 s, 3.057 s before early
termination of the system.
These results indicate that the subgoals do not fully compose the parent goal. Although
there was one violation of goal 1, there were no corresponding violations of subgoals 1A
and 1B. In addition, there were six violations of goal 2, but no violations of subgoal 2A,
and only three violations of 2B.
The results also indicate that there is restriction or redundancy built into the subgoals.
The subgoal 4B, no autonomous acceleration from a stop, was violated for PA at the start of
simulation time, but no violations were detected in 4 or 4A. The violations of 2B for park
assist appear to be false negatives; they do not appear to correspond to any of the violations
of 2.
A closer look at the acceleration requests for CA and PA illustrate what is happening in
the vehicle. Figure 5.2 shows the value of CA’s acceleration request at the end of simulation
time. It indicates that CA requests a hard brake of the system, but immediately releases it.
This violates the jerk goal for CA, but only for one state. The jerk goal for the Arbiter was
not violated, because when CA released the brake, control was also transferred back to the
driver. To the Arbiter, the jerk was violated by the driver’s throttle and brake pedal inputs
that took over when CA released the brake, not CA releasing the brake itself.
In actuality, a step-increase in the acceleration request alone should not violate the sys-
tem level safety goal because the vehicle response dynamics (e.g., inertia of the physical
mass of the vehicle) would make the transition from the current acceleration to the newly
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Figure 5.2. Scenario 1: CA begins a braking action, but cancels it brieﬂy
before beginning it again.
requested acceleration more gradual. In this case, the subgoal is perhaps too restrictive for
what is practical to design. However, the sudden release of the hard stop, is incorrect CA
behavior. CA should continue braking until the vehicle stops, and then hold the vehicle at
that position until the driver initiates motion by applying the throttle pedal. It is possible
that the vehicle dynamics, in response to this sudden brake application and release, behaved
in a way that caused the other vehicle safety goals to be violated (the acceleration threshold
and jerk thresholds), because all of those violations occurred after this action by CA.
Further inspection of the PA acceleration requests, shown in Figure 5.3, also reveals
incorrect behavior by the PA. In this scenario, PA requests an acceleration of 2 m/s2 from
the start of simulation time to time 2.186 s, at which time PA requests no acceleration. At
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Figure 5.3. Scenario 1: PA requests acceleration without being enabled.
time 9.33 s, PA then requests an acceleration of -2 m/s2 until 9.624 s, when it again requests
an acceleration of 0 m/s2. Subgoal 4B was violated by this behavior because at the start
of simulation time the vehicle is stopped. The jerk thresholds were also violated each time
the acceleration requests switched from low to high. PA was never selected by the Arbiter
to control vehicle acceleration because PA never signaled that it was active. However, this
behavior is incorrect and potentially unsafe if a fault occurs that ﬂips the PA active signal,
or if the Arbiter passes along the acceleration request without looking at the PA active ﬂag.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• PA is sending out acceleration requests when it is not enabled.
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• Goal redundancy in the Arbiter blocks the improper acceleration requests from PA.
• The vehicle exceeds the acceleration limit for autonomous control shortly before
the simulation terminates in error. The two behaviors may be related to the same
underlying design or implementation defect.
Run-time monitoring in this scenario also revealed the following additional information
about the subgoals and ICPA:
• The jerk threshold goal is too restrictive to be implemented practically. A revised
goal would allow jerk thresholds to be violated for a single state.
• Goal 1 is not fully composed by subgoals 1A and 1B. This may indicate some of the
indirect control relationships used in the ICPA are incorrect.
5.4.2 Scenario 2: CA engaged, ACC enabled, PA enabled, stopped
vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is traveling forward, starting from a stop 20 m behind an-
other stopped vehicle. ACC is enabled, but not engaged. CA is enabled. Just after CA
begins to perform a hard braking action at time 12.55 s to avoid the stopped vehicle, the
driver engages PA at time 12.56 s. CA is expected to remain in control of vehicle accelera-
tion and stop the host vehicle.
This scenario was chosen to verify a design defect in the arbitration logic found while
reviewing the system requirements and design for the ICPA. In the design, acceleration and
steering were arbitrated separately. Inspection during ICPA indicated that prioritization of
feature requests in steering arbitration was reversed. The vehicle should continue to stop
and remain stopped, despite application of PA
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Results. Table D.2 lists the goal violations for Scenario 2. As in Scenario 1, CA attempted
to stop the host vehicle upon its approach to the stopped vehicle in its path. Scenario 2,
however, resulted in violation of vehicle safety goals 1-3, also before early termination
of the simulation, this time at simulation time 12.588 s. In this situation, vehicle accel-
eration was exceeded for 1 ms at time 12.587 s, vehicle jerk was exceeded for 20 ms at
time 12.561 s, and the acceleration-steering agreement goal was violated for 27 ms at time
12.561 s. Each vehicle safety goal was still in violation at the time of early termination,
which occurred 93 ms earlier than early termination in the ﬁrst scenario.
Similar to the ﬁrst scenario, no subgoals for goal 1 were violated. In addition, subgoal
2A for the Arbiter was violated only once for 1 ms at time 12.561 s, 7 ms before vehicle jerk
was exceeded and 27 ms before early termination of the system. As in the ﬁrst scenario,
the jerk subgoal 2B for PA was violated twice, once at the start of simulation and once at
time 9.624 s.
The acceleration/steering agreement subgoal 3A for the Arbiter was the same as the
system-level goal, as noted in Section 5.3.1, thus violations of the Arbiter’s goal corre-
sponded to those of the system.
Plots of the arbiter’s acceleration command, CA’s acceleration request, and CA’s ‘se-
lected’ tag are shown in Figure 5.4. CA was selected as the source of the acceleration
command at time 12.551 s, and remained selected until the simulation terminated. The ac-
celeration command was set to CA’s requested acceleration at time 12.551 s, but was reset
to 0 m/s2 at time 12.561, 1 ms after PA was enabled (one system state later). Thus, the
Arbiter was indicating that CA was chosen to be the source of the acceleration command,
but was choosing PA’s acceleration request as the actual source.
This conﬁrmed the design defect in the arbitration logic discovered during the ICPA. In
the design, arbitration was divided by acceleration and steering, with acceleration arbitra-
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Figure 5.4. Scenario 2: CA is not the source of the acceleration command
when PA is enabled, even though CA is selected to be in control of
acceleration.
tion occurring ﬁrst. In the steering component of arbitration, the prioritization order was
reversed. Although arbitration of acceleration determined how the CA Selected tag was
set, arbitration of steering actually determined what values of both acceleration requests
and steering requests were passed along as acceleration commands. Thus, the Arbiter was
selecting CA as the source, but sending out PA’s requests.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• The reverse arbitration logic found during application of the ICPA was conﬁrmed.
• The Arbiter is a potential source of single-point failures of the system.
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5.4.3 Scenario 3: CA engaged, ACC enabled, throttle pedal applied,
stopped vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is traveling forward, starting from a stop 20 m behind an-
other stopped vehicle. ACC is enabled, but not engaged. CA is enabled. Just after CA
begins to perform an emergency braking action at time 12.55 s to avoid the stopped vehi-
cle, the driver applies the throttle pedal at time 12.56 s. CA is expected to remain in control
of vehicle acceleration and stop the host vehicle.
Results. Table D.3 lists the goal violations for the third scenario. In this scenario, CA
began to stop the host vehicle, but canceled its braking request, allowing the vehicle to
‘hit’ the parked vehicle, and the simulation terminated normally at 20s. (CarSim
R   does not
simulate vehicle collisions, therefore, in the simulation the host vehicle passed through the
stopped vehicle in its path).
Goal 1, the acceleration threshold, was violated once at time 13.652 s for a duration of
3 ms. Goal 2, the jerk threshold, was violated three times, at times 12.565 s for 2 ms,
at time 12.902 s for 3 ms, and at time 12.913 s for 4 ms. Subgoal 2A was not violated.
Subgoal 2B was violated four times for CA, from time 12.6 s to time 13.85 s, each for a
duration of 1 ms. Subgoal 2B was violated 47 times by ACC/LCA, for a duration of 1 ms
each, starting at time 12.75 s and ending at time 15.6 s.
PA experienced the same violations of goals 2B and 4B as in the ﬁrst two scenarios.
Goal 5, which allows the driver to override acceleration if the subsystem is not performing
a hard brake, was violated four times between times 12.562 s, with durations ranging from
4 ms to 61 ms. Its subgoal, 5B was violated ﬁve times by CA, between times 12.6 s and
13.85 s, with durations ranging from 50 to 200 ms. PA experienced the same violations of
goals 2B and 4B as in the ﬁrst two scenarios.
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Figure 5.5. Scenario 3: CA engages to stop the host vehicle, even though
throttle pedal is applied. The CA braking action is intermittent, however,
and fails to stop the host vehicle before ‘hitting’ the parked vehicle in its
path.
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Plots of the throttle pedal position, vehicle acceleration, acceleration command, CA ac-
celeration request, and CA selected variables are shown in Figure 5.5. Each time CA
applies the brake, it is selected by the Arbiter as the source of the acceleration command.
However, its request of -10 m/s2 is not achieved by the vehicle because acceleration is de-
layed by the vehicle response. During the time that the vehicle acceleration is not below -2
m/s2, safety goal 5 is violated. This corresponds to the four times CA is actively requesting
a hard brake. The Arbiter’s subgoal 5A is not violated because the Arbiter never sends
acceleration commands for CA greater than -2 m/s2. Subgoal 5B is violated ﬁve times
by CA. This occurs in-between the hard brake requests, when CA is engaged but entering
a preparation state in which no deceleration is requested. In these situations, CA is not
selected as the winner of arbitration over the driver, even though CA is engaged, because
CA’s requested acceleration is not less than -2 m/s2.
Plots of the throttle pedal position, vehicle speed, acceleration command, ACC accel-
eration request, and ACC selected are shown in Figure 5.6. The data show that ACC is
sending out requests to control the vehicle to a set speed of 0 m/s, even though ACC has
only been enabled, not engaged. When the CA braking action completes, ACC decreases
this deceleration request gradually back to zero acceleration. During this time, the vehicle
is stopped. Once the vehicle has been stopped for some time, ACC should wait for another
throttle application (i.e., a switch from not applied to applied) or a go signal from the HMI.
The results from this scenario show that both PA and ACC are sending acceleration
requests when they are not engaged. Although they both have ‘active’ tags to indicate
whether or not these requests are intentional, it would be better to not request acceleration
when it is not really needed. The results also show that the vehicle correctly continues to
perform the emergency stop when CA requests it, even though the driver is pressing the
throttle pedal. However, the braking actions performed by CA are insuﬃcient to stop the
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Figure 5.6. Scenario 3: ACC sends acceleration requests to control the
vehicle to a set speed of 0 m/s, even though ACC is not engaged.
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vehicle.
The only diﬀerence between this scenario and the ﬁrst is the application of the throttle
pedal. It is possible that CA begins the same type of intermittent braking action in both sce-
narios, but in this scenario the added application of the throttle pedal allows the simulation
to continue. In this case, perhaps the intermittent braking action alone causes instability in
the vehicle dynamics. It is also possible that the application of the throttle pedal causes the
intermittent nature of the braking action. In either situation, a closer examination of CA is
required to troubleshoot the problem.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• CA appears to continue to execute a hard brake when the driver applies the throttle
pedal. This is the intended behavior of the system.
• CA appears to execute the hard brake in a manner that is intermittent, rather than
continuous. This may be insuﬃcient for braking the vehicle in time to avoid the
collision.
Run-time monitoring in this scenario also revealed the following additional information
about the goals obtained from ICPA:
• The nature of when CA performs its braking actions was misunderstood during the
ICPA. There are some states in which CA is engaged, but not performing a braking
action. These states should be excluded from the analysis of when CA is active.
• The indirect control relationships between the CA acceleration request, Arbiter ac-
celeration command, and resulting vehicle acceleration do not perform as deﬁned in
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the ICPA. There is a greater delay between the acceleration command and the re-
sulting acceleration. System goal 5 should be adjusted to account for these delays.
Subgoals 5A and 5B, however, seem to be correct. In this case, monitoring revealed
a parent goal that is too restrictive to be satisﬁed while still satisfying the functional
behavior of the CA feature subsystem.
5.4.4 Scenario 4: throttle pedal applied, ACC engaged, CA enabled,
slow vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is traveling forward, starting 25m behind another vehicle
that is traveling between 10-25 k/h (2.78-6.94 m/s). The driver accelerates the host vehicle
by applying the throttle pedal from time 0.5 s to 8.5 s. At time 2.0 s, ACC is engaged by
the driver. As the host vehicle approaches a slower lead vehicle, ACC is expected to slow
the host vehicle to follow a set distance behind the slower lead vehicle.
Results. Table D.4 lists the goal violations for the fourth scenario. In this scenario, ACC
attempted to slow down the host vehicle when it approached the slower lead vehicle, but
the simulation terminated early at time 13.142 s.
Goal 1, the vehicle acceleration threshold, was violated ten times between time 12.987 s
and time 13.127 s. The longest violation was 67 ms, and the shortest violation was 1 ms.
No subgoals for this goal were violated for the Arbiter or features. Goal 2 was violated
98 times between time 8.617 s and time 9.529 s. Its subgoal 2A was violated 48 times
between time 9.051 s and 13.051 s. Subgoal 2B was violated 49 times by ACC/LCA, from
time 2.05 s to time 13.05 s, and twice by PA at times 0.001 s and 3.906 s. Once again,
PA violated subgoal 4B, but this time only at the start of the simulation. Goal 5, which
allows the driver to override all but hard brake requests, was also violated at time 2.052 s.
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Figure 5.7. Scenario 4: ACC acceleration request and jerk proﬁle.
Its subgoals 5A and 5B for the Arbiter and ACC were also violated, at times 2.051 s and
2.0 s, respectively. Finally, the two goals that block certain subsystems from controlling
the vehicle in forward and backward motion, goals 8 and 9 respectively, were each violated
once for 1 ms. Goal 9 was violated at time 13.074 s, withs subgoals 9A for the Arbiter and
9B for ACC were also violated at time 13.074 s.
Figure 5.7 shows ACC’s requested acceleration, the resulting jerk of that acceleration,
and the jerk threshold goal for ACC. All jerk violations were 1 ms violations. That is, they
occurred from a change in acceleration that occurred in a single state. Although it may be
possible to design out most of these jerk violations, it is probably not practical to do so.
Rather, this seems to indicate that the subgoal is too restrictive for normal vehicle use.
Figure 5.8 shows throttle pedal position, vehicle acceleration, Arbiter acceleration com-
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Figure 5.8. Scenario 4: ACC is engaged while the driver is applying the
throttle pedal. ACC brieﬂy takes control of vehicle acceleration, but loses
controlagainuntilthedriverreleasesthethrottlepedal. ACCdecelerates,
then accelerates the vehicle twice before the simulation terminates.
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mand, ACC acceleration request, and ACC selected over the course of the simulation. The
driver begins to apply the throttle pedal at time 0.5 s. At time 2 s, the ACC is engaged,
and its target speed is set to the vehicle speed. ACC gains control of the vehicle accelera-
tion for 50 ms, the duration of one state in its internal state machine (the state duration of
the system state machine is 1ms). Because the driver continues to press the throttle pedal,
ACC then releases control of acceleration back to the driver on the next cycle. Although
this behavior brieﬂy violates the safety goal that allows the driver to override control in the
forward direction, it is probably the desired behavior for an adaptive cruise control system.
Thus, for this particular situation, the safety goal may be too restrictive.
Later, at simulation time 8.5 s, the driver releases the throttle pedal and the ACC gains
control of the vehicle acceleration command. Note that ACC continues to produce accel-
eration requests during the time it is not selected by the Arbiter to control the acceleration
command. When ACC gains control, it brieﬂy cycles through deceleration and acceleration
requests until at time 12.958 s the vehicle acceleration begins to spike erratically between
very low and very high values. ACC’s requested acceleration drops suddenly at time 13.1 s.
The sudden, signiﬁcant changes in vehicle acceleration are likely due to wheel slip,
thoughitisunclearwhythiswouldoccur. Wheelslip, combinedwithadecelerationrequest
from ACC, is likely to have caused the vehicle speed sensor to read a negative value, thus
causing the goal 9 and its subgoals 9A for the Arbiter and 9B for ACC to be violated. It is
clear at this point that the vehicle is in an unsafe state, regardless of the cause.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• ACC appears to brieﬂy engage, even when the driver continues to press the accel-
erator pedal. This behavior could be modiﬁed to satisfy safety goal 5B by allowing
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the driver to set the ACC set speed while pressing the throttle pedal without allow-
ing ACC to become engaged at that point (i.e., record the set speed value but do
not request acceleration yet). Alternatively, the goal could be modiﬁed to allow this
speciﬁc behavior.
Run-time monitoring in this scenario also revealed the following additional information
about the goals obtained from ICPA:
• Some subgoals violations may be caused by error in a monitored state variable in the
goal, such as the vehicle acceleration sensor, rather than by a defect in an agent’s
control of another state variable.
• When subgoals are made more restrictive, there may be some situations that you
want to exclude. These may be handled by goal realizability tactic Split Lack of
Monitorability/Controllability by Case [46].
5.4.5 Scenario 5: throttle pedal applied, ACC engaged, CA enabled,
brake pedal applied, slow vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is traveling forward, starting 25m behind another vehicle
that is traveling between 10-25 k/h (2.78-6.94 m/s). The driver accelerates the host vehicle
by applying the throttle pedal from time 0.5 s to 2.5 s. At time 2.0 s, ACC is engaged by
the driver. The driver applies the brake pedal from time 4.0 s to time 9.0 s. As there are
neither subsequent ‘go’ signals nor throttle pedal applications by the driver, the host vehicle
is expected to remain stopped.
Results. Table D.5 lists the goal violations for the ﬁfth scenario. After the vehicle is
brought to a stop by the driver’s braking action, it remains stopped until the simulation
terminates normally at time 20 s.
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Goal 1, the acceleration threshold, was violated six times between time 2.641 s and
2.731 s, with durations ranging from 5-9 ms. None of its corresponding subgoals were also
violated. Goal 2, the jerk threshold, was violated 28 times between time 2.638 s and 3.41 s,
with durations raging from 1-8 ms. Goal 2A was violated 28 times between time 2.651 s
and 4.001 s, each with a duration 1 ms. Goal 2B was violated 30 times by ACC/LCA
between time 2.05 s and 4 s, and by PA at times 0.01 s and 4.123 s, each for 1 ms. Goal 4B,
which prohibits autonomous acceleration requests from a stopped position, was violated by
ACC/LCA at time 5.916 s for 103 ms and at time 6.302 s for 48 ms. It was, once again,
also violated by PA at time 0.01 s for 167 ms. Goal 5, which allows the driver to override
all autonomous acceleration except hard braking events, was violated at time 2.052 s for
50 ms and at time 4.02 s for 50 ms. Its subgoal 5A was violated at time 2.051 s for 50 ms
and at time 4.001 s for 50 ms. Subgoal 5B was violated once at time 2 s for 50 ms.
A closer look at acceleration and jerk for the vehicle, the Arbiter’s acceleration com-
mand, and ACC’s acceleration request, as well as the ACC Selected tag are shown in Fig-
ure5.9. ACCisgrantedcontroloftheaccelerationcommandattime2.601, afterthethrottle
pedal is released at time 2.5 s. At this time, some residual jerk from the release of the throt-
tle pedal is still being experienced by the vehicle. Thus, the vehicle-level safety goal is
violated, even though the jerk was not necessarily caused by ACC. The gradual changes
in acceleration command between times 2.601 s and 4.01 s cause many 1 ms violations of
its jerk threshold. Once again, this is an artifact of sampling, and are likely not signs of a
signiﬁcant problem.
As in Scenario 4, ACC gains control of acceleration for one state when it is enabled at
time 2.0 s. ACC also stops requesting control when the brake pedal is applied at time 4.0 s.
Although ACC updates on a 50 ms cycle, the Arbiter updates its acceleration commands
and acceleration source tags every 1 ms. The Arbiter is not immediately releasing control
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Figure 5.9. Scenario 5: The driver releases the throttle pedal. Control of
acceleration is gained by ACC 0.101 seconds later.
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of acceleration when a brake pedal is applied, rather it is waiting for ACC to stop requesting
acceleration. The diﬀerence in state transition times between the two causes the Arbiter’s
goal to be violated for the duration of one ACC state.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• The Arbiter appears to not be enforcing subgoal 5A. Rather, it relying on the feature
subsystems to enforce subgoal 5B.
• Diﬀerent subsystems have diﬀerent state transition times. This may complicate goal
satisfaction if a subsystem updates controlled state variables at a slower rate than the
overall system state period.
Run-time monitoring in this scenario also revealed the following additional information
about the goals obtained from ICPA:
• Transitions of control from one agent to another may have unavoidable residual de-
lays in jerk and acceleration that cause goals restricting those values to be violated.
More work needs to be done understanding what durations of jerk and acceleration
thresholds are acceptable in these situations.
5.4.6 Scenario 6: throttle pedal applied, ACC engaged, CA enabled,
LCA engaged, slow vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is traveling forward, starting 25m behind another vehicle
that is traveling between 10-25 k/h (2.78-6.94 m/s). The driver accelerates the host vehicle
by applying the throttle pedal from time 0.5 s to 2.5 s. At time 2.0 s, ACC is engaged by
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Figure 5.10. Scenario 6: LCA is enabled at time 5.0 s, and gains control
of acceleration and steering at time 5.001 s. At time 5.051, LCA requests
steering, but the steering command remains unchanged.
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the driver. LCA is enabled by the driver at time 4.0 s, and engaged at time 6.0 s. LCA is
expected to perform the lane change maneuver as requested.
Results. Tables D.6 and D.7 list the goal violations for the sixth scenario. After LCA is
engaged by the driver, the vehicle continues moving in the same path. ACC attempts to
slow the vehicle behind the slower lead vehicle, but the simulation terminates early at time
13.954s.
Goal 1, the acceleration threshold, was violated 17 times, between time 2.641 s and
13.953 s, with durations ranging from 1 ms to 9 ms. As with all prior simulations, none of
its subgoals were violated. Goal 2, the jerk threshold was violated 108 times, between time
2.651 s and 13.951 s. Subgoal 2A was violated 83 times from time 2.651 s and 13.951 s.
Subgoal 2B for ACC/LCA was violated 85 times, from time 2.05 s to time 13.95 s. Goal
3 and the identical subgoal 3A, acceleration and steering agreement, was violated at time
5.052 for 8.902 sec. Goals 5, 5A, and 5B were again violated when ACC was engaged at
time 2 s. Also as before, PA violates subgoal 2B at times 0.001 s and 4.12 s, and subgoal 4B
at 0.01 s for 167 ms. Goals 9, 9A, and 9B (for ACC and LCA), which prohibits subsystems
from controlling acceleration and steering outside their intended vehicle directions, were
all violated at time 13.905 s.
A plot of the Arbiter’s acceleration command and steering command, LCA’s requested
accelerationandrequestedsteering, andtheLCA SelectedandACC Selectedtagareshown
in Figure 5.10. LCA is enabled at time 5.0 s, and is granted control at time 5.001 s. In the
system design, LCA is only enabled when ACC is also enabled and engaged. When the
LCA Selected tag is set, the ACC Selected tag remains set. This means that two separate
features, one that requests no steering and the other that requests no acceleration, combine
to form the lane change functionality. However, when LCA changes its steering request
at time 5.051 s, the Arbiter’s steering command does not change, violating the accelera-
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Figure 5.11. Scenario 6: Vehicle speed becomes negative, LCA and ACC
are still active and selected to control vehicle acceleration.
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tion/steering agreement subgoal.
A plot of the vehicle acceleration, acceleration command, and ACC/LCA acceleration
request is shown in Figure 5.11. Even though the vehicle speed has become negative,
indicating the vehicle is moving in the reverse direction, ACC and LCA continue to request
control, and the Arbiter continues to provide it. This results in violation of goal 9 and
subgoals 9A and 9B. It is unclear why the vehicle speed suddenly becomes negative. Once
again, this could be due to wheel slip during deceleration. If this is the case, it may be
desirable to allow the feature subsystem causing the deceleration to continue. However,
the simulation does terminate shortly after the vehicle speed becomes negative. This may
be due to the way the vehicle subsystems are handling this system condition.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• LCA is not given control of steering, even though the Arbiter selected LCA for con-
trol. At the time of the study, LCA was less developed than ACC or CA, so this may
be simply a result of incomplete implementation or subsystem integration.
• The diﬀerent tags indicating which subsystem is selected may a source of confusion
with regards to the acceleration/steering agreement goal. If both ACC and LCA are
selected, perhaps the ACC’s steering request (i.e., no steering) is overriding LCA’s
steering request.
Run-time monitoring in this scenario also revealed the following additional information
about the goals obtained from ICPA:
• Goals that prohibit certain features from gaining control of the vehicle when vehicle
is moving in the forward or reverse direction may need to be examined further to
consider what is the proper behavior when wheel slip occurs.
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Figure 5.12. Scenario 7: RCA is enabled at the simulation start, but never
engages to stop the host vehicle before reaching the stopped vehicle
behind it.
5.4.7 Scenario 7: in reverse, RCA enabled, stopped vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is traveling in reverse, 30 m in front of another stopped
vehicle, with RCA enabled. RCA is expected to perform a hard braking action to stop the
host vehicle.
Results. Table D.8 lists the goal violations for the seventh scenario. The vehicle makes no
attempt to stop and ‘collides’ with the parked vehicle in its rear path.
There were no goal violations for the vehicle. PA behaved as before in the previous sce-
narios, and continued to output acceleration requests, violating subgoal 2B at time 0.001 s
and 6.264 s, each for 1 ms. Because PA’s acceleration requests began when the vehicle
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was still stopped, its subgoal 4B was also violated, for a duration of 44 ms. ACC and LCA
both also sent out acceleration requests, even though neither was enabled, causing 42 jerk
violations from 8.45 s to 15.6 s, each 1 ms in duration.
Figure 5.12 shows RCA’s acceleration request, internal state, and RCA Select tag. RCA
never engages to stop the host vehicle. This is most certainly due to an unﬁnished imple-
mentation.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• ACC, LCA, and PA send out acceleration requests continuously, not only when they
are disabled, but also when the vehicle is traveling in the reverse direction.
• RCA implementation is not complete enough to evaluate.
Run-time monitoring in this scenario also revealed the following additional information
about the goals obtained from ICPA:
• There were no vehicle-level goal violations, even though the vehicle ‘collided’ with
the vehicle in its path. If the simulation environment were able to simulate vehicle
collisions, some vehicle-level violations might occur. However, any monitored val-
ues that would be detected from such a situation may only provide information for
post-accident analysis, not prevention.
5.4.8 Scenario 8: in reverse, ACC engaged, stopped vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is traveling in reverse, 30 m in front of another stopped
vehicle. ACC is enabled and engaged by the driver at time 2.0 s. The host vehicle is
expected to ignore the driver’s request and continue moving backward.
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Figure 5.13. Scenario 8: After ACC is engaged at time 2.0 s, it is selected
as the source of the acceleration command at time 2.05 s.
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Results. Table D.9 lists the goal violations for the eighth scenario. Shortly after ACC is
engaged, the simulation terminates early.
In this scenario, Goal 1, the acceleration threshold, is violated once at time 2.08 s, until
termination of the simulation 3 ms later. None of its subgoals were violated. Goal 2, the
jerk threshold, is violated at time 2.055 s for 8 ms, at time 2.07 s for 11 ms, and at time
2.083 s for 1 ms. Subgoal 2A was not violated, but subgoal 2B was for ACC/LCA at time
2.05, just after they were engaged. Once again, subgoals 2B and 4B were violated for PA
at the start of simulation. Goal 9 and subgoal 9A, restriction on subsystem control in the
backward direction, were violated at time 2.051 s for 32 ms. Subgoal 9B was violated by
ACC at time 2 s for 83 ms.
Figure 5.13 shows the vehicle speed, ACC’s acceleration command, ACC’s state, and
the ACC Selected ﬂag. After ACC is engaged at time 2.0 s, the Arbiter selects ACC to be
in control of acceleration at time 2.05 s. The simulation terminates in error 33 ms later.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• ACC can be engaged by the driver when the vehicle is moving in reverse. This should
not be allowed
• The Arbiter selects ACC as the source of acceleration commands when the vehicle is
moving in reverse. This also should not be allowed.
Run-time monitoring in this scenario also revealed the following additional information
about the goals obtained from ICPA:
• Goal redundancy does not protect against failure of both subsystems to satisfy the
goal.
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5.4.9 Scenario 9: stopped, PA engaged, stopped vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is stopped 20 m behind another stopped vehicle. PA is
enabled and engaged by the driver at time 2.0 s. PA is expected to initiate a parking action.
Results. Table D.10 lists the goal violations for the ninth scenario. The simulation termi-
nates early 113 ms after PA is engaged by the driver.
Goal 1, the acceleration threshold, was violated at time 2.098 s for 15 ms. Goal 2 was
violated six times between time 2.003 s and 2.112 s, for durations ranging from 1 ms to
46 ms. Its subgoal 2B was violated by park assist again at time 0.001 s for 1 ms. Goal 3 and
3A, acceleration and steering agreement, was violated at time 2.001 s for 112 ms. Subgoal
4B was again violated by park assist at time 0.01 s.
Figure 5.14 shows the vehicle speed, vehicle acceleration, Arbiter acceleration com-
mand, PA acceleration request, PA state, and PA Selected ﬂag. At time 2.001 s PA is
selected as the source of the acceleration command, but the acceleration command is not
set to the PA acceleration request. This causes Goal 3 and subgoal 3A to be violated, and
is likely to be a contributing factor to the early termination at time 2.113 s.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• When PA is engaged while the vehicle is stopped, it is selected as the source of
vehicle acceleration and steering, but its acceleration request is not used to determine
the Arbiter’s acceleration command.
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Figure 5.14. Scenario 9: When PA is engaged, it is selected as the source
of the acceleration command, but the acceleration command is not equal
to the PA acceleration request.
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5.4.10 Scenario 10: stopped, ACC engaged, stopped vehicle in path
Description. The host vehicle is stopped 20 m behind another stopped vehicle, ACC is
enabled and engaged by the driver at time 2.0 s. ACC may either ignore the request or
accelerate the vehicle. If the driver initiates ACC control, then acceleration is acceptable
for safety goal 4. However, it is also safe for the vehicle to remain stopped.
Results. Table D.11 lists the goal violations for the tenth scenario. Although the driver
attempts to engage ACC, it neither enters an engaged state nor controls the acceleration
command. However, the vehicle begins to accelerate anyway, until CA engages to try to
stop the host vehicle before hitting the stopped vehicle in its path. The simulation termi-
nates early at 14.625 s during this hard brake attempt from CA.
Goal 1 is violated once at time 14.589 for 4 ms. None of its subgoals were violated. Goal
2, the jerk threshold, is violated at time 14.583 s for 8 ms and at time 14.598 s for 2 ms. Its
subgoal 2B was violated once for CA at time 14.6 s, for a duration of 1 ms. Once again,
PA experienced violations of subgoals 2B and 4B at time 0.01 s.
Figure 5.15 shows vehicle speed, vehicle acceleration, the Arbiter’s acceleration com-
mand, the ACC acceleration request, the ACC state, and the ACC Selected ﬂag. Although
the driver attempts to engage ACC while the vehicle is stopped, ACC does not enter an
active state, and the Arbiter does not select ACC for the acceleration command. This is
within the bounds of safe system behavior. However, the vehicle begins to accelerate, and
it is unclear where the source of that acceleration is. Perhaps the ACC set speed is being
used, even though ACC is not requesting it to be.
Summary. Run-time monitoring in this scenario revealed the following additional infor-
mation about the semi-autonomous automotive system:
• Even though ACC is neither active nor selected as the source of the acceleration
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Figure 5.15. Scenario 10: When the driver attempts to engage ACC at
time 2.0 s, ACC does not become active, nor is it selected by the Arbiter
to control steering. The vehicle, however, does begin to accelerate.
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command, the vehicle begins to accelerate when the driver attempts to engage ACC.
Run-time monitoring in this scenario also revealed the following additional information
about the goals obtained from ICPA:
• Perhaps there is some relationship between the driver’s request to engage ACC and
vehicle acceleration that bypasses the Arbiter and ACC. This indicates the indirect
control relationships deﬁned in ACC are incorrect or incomplete.
5.5 Conclusion
ICPA was applied to nine system safety goals for a semi-autonomous automotive system
developed in a commercial automotive research lab. The goals and resulting subgoals were
then monitored at run-time in ten diﬀerent driving scenarios. Although not all goal vi-
olations were detected in the subgoal monitors, subgoal monitoring did reveal a number
of design defects in the incomplete system implementation, sometimes when the hazard
was not yet visible at the system level. Monitoring at both the system and subsystem level
revealed some goal violations that may not be detectable by the driver. These results are
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
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Discussion
Even though the automotive system under review was a research system and not a commer-
cial product, it was a real automotive vehicle. Subsequent implementations of the system
included hardware-in-the loop simulation and a drivable test vehicle. There are several ad-
vantages to using a real system built in a commercial lab instead of a toy system developed
by an academic lab. First, the system under review in this thesis was designed and built
by application domain experts. This makes the system more representative of commercial
vehicles.
Second, although information about the system learned from ICPA was passed back to
development, ICPA and monitoring were done separately from design and development.
That is, the same engineers who built the system did not perform the ICPA and monitoring.
In addition, the system was incomplete when ICPA was performed. The system was rela-
tively functional, but certainly incomplete. These factors combined to provide a platform
that had real design defects, not ones that were added just for ICPA, but was functionally
complete enough to do run-time testing.
6.1 Lessons learned about the system
Some design issues were discovered during review of the system requirements and design
for ICPA, such as the reverse arbitration logic. Others were discovered during monitoring.
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This section describes the information learned about the system under review from the
ICPA and goal and subgoal monitoring.
6.1.1 Desired behaviors conﬁrmed
ICPA and subgoal monitoring conﬁrmed the following desired behaviors in the system
under review:
1. Goal redundancy in the Arbiter appears to block the improper acceleration requests
from PA, as intended. This was conﬁrmed in all scenarios, except Scenario 9, when
PA was engaged and expected to take control of the vehicle.
2. CA appears to continue to execute a hard brake when the driver applies the throttle
pedal. This is the intended behavior of the system, and was conﬁrmed in Scenario 3.
3. The RCA and LCA implementations are not complete enough to evaluate. This was
discovered in Scenario 6 and Scenario 7
6.1.2 Problems identiﬁed
ICPA and subgoal monitoring identiﬁed the following speciﬁc problems in the system un-
der review:
1. Prioritization of feature subsystem control requests in steering arbitration is the re-
verse of the prioritization in the acceleration arbitration. This defect was discovered
during the ICPA process and conﬁrmed by subgoal monitoring when it caused 3A
to be violated in Scenario 2. This particular subgoal was assigned as a single re-
sponsibility subgoal to the Arbiter, so no subgoal violations occurred for the feature
subsystems. In addition, it was discovered that its parent goal 3 cannot actually be
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monitored in the subsystem. Thus, subgoal monitoring is the only way to identify
when violations of the goal occur.
2. PA is sending out acceleration requests when it is neither engaged nor even enabled.
This caused subgoal 4B to be violated in every scenario. As mentioned above, the
Arbiter appears to be blocking these commands, so the redundant subgoal 4A and
the parent goal 4 are not violated.
3. ACC and LCA often send out acceleration requests regularly, not only when they
are disabled or enabled but not engaged, but also when the vehicle is traveling in the
reverse direction. This causes goal 4B to be violated in scenario 5 for both.
4. The vehicle violates goal 1, the acceleration limit for autonomous control, shortly
before the simulation terminates in error in 7 out of 10 scenarios. This sudden spike
in acceleration may be caused by wheel slip. Early termination may occur because
the vehicle has entered an unsafe state, or may simply signify that the system imple-
mentation does not handle these type of extreme sensor values. When this occurs,
sometimes the vehicle direction suddenly changes. This causes subgoal 9A for the
Arbiter and 9B for ACC to be violated in scenarios 4, 6, and 8. Although in this in-
stance the subgoals are violated due to some error in the speed sensor or wheel slip,
and not necessarily due to the subsystem whose goal was violated, the subgoals do
identify an unsafe vehicle state.
5. CA appears to execute the hard brake in a manner that is intermittent, rather than
continuous. All CA braking scenarios resulted in early termination of the simulation,
or a ‘collision’ with the vehicle in the forward path. Each time CA releases and then
re-engages the brake, Goal 2, the autonomous jerk threshold, is violated for longer
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than one state in scenario 3. Subgoal 2A for the Arbiter and 2B for CA are also
violated, but only for one state.
6. If ACC is engaged by the driver while the driver is also accelerating, ACC engages
for one state, before releasing control back to the driver. This violates subgoals 5A
for the Arbiter and 5B for ACC in scenarios 4, 5, 6, and 8. This behavior could be
modiﬁed to satisfy the safety goal by allowing the driver to set the ACC set speed
while pressing the throttle pedal without actually allowing ACC to become engaged
at that point (i.e., record the set speed value but do not request acceleration yet).
Alternatively, the goal could be modiﬁed to allow this speciﬁc behavior.
7. The Arbiter appears to not be enforcing subgoal 5A. Rather, it is relying on the
feature subsystems to satisfy 5B. This is seen when subgoals 5A and 5B are violated
in scenarios 4, 5, 6, and 8.
8. LCA is not given control of steering when the Arbiter has selected LCA for control.
This violates goal 3 in scenario 6. At the time of the study, the implementation
of LCA was less developed than ACC or CA, so this may be simply a result of
incomplete implementation or subsystem integration.
9. ACC can be engaged by the driver when the vehicle is moving in reverse. This causes
goal 9B to be violated in scenario 8.
10. The Arbiter appears to not be enforcing subgoal 9A. It selects ACC as the source of
acceleration commands when the vehicle is moving in reverse and ACC is engaged.
This causes subgoal 9A to be violated in scenario 8.
11. When PA is engaged while the vehicle is stopped, it is selected as the source of vehi-
cle acceleration and steering, but its acceleration request is not used to determine the
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Arbiter’s acceleration command. This causes subgoal 3A to be violated in scenario 9.
These defects might be identiﬁed in regular system test. In testing, if the simulation
terminates in error or a simulated collision occurs, the design and simulation data would be
analyzed to identify the root cause of the fault. In these situations, safety goal and subgoal
violations aid root cause analysis by immediately identifying certain state variables that
may be related to the incorrect behavior.
Sometimes the feature subsystem subgoals are violated but faulty system behavior would
not be readily apparent to system testers, either because the fault is so transient it goes
unnoticed, such as when the ACC engages while the driver is still pressing the throttle
pedal, or because the subgoal violation is masked by goal redundancy in the Arbiter, such
as when PA, ACC and LCA continue to send acceleration requests without being engaged
or active.
6.1.3 General design insights
Applying ICPA and monitoring of goals and subgoals also led to the following insights
about design and implementation of this type of system, in general:
1. Divided arbitration of longitudinal acceleration and steering can complicate goals
that restrict coordinated behavior between the two types of vehicle control.
2. Using separate ﬂags to indicate when a subsystem is selected for control makes it
possible to attribute control actions to multiple sources. This may make the actual
source of acceleration and steering commands ambiguous to subsystems that use that
information.
3. A centralized Arbiter is a potential source of single-point failures of the system.
143CHAPTER 6. DISCUSSION
4. Using diﬀering state transition times in diﬀerent subsystems may complicate goal
satisfaction if a subsystem updates controlled state variables at a slower rate than the
overall system state period.
5. It is probably safer to not output any control requests when the subsystem is not
engaged, even if ﬂags are used to indicate whether or not the request is active.
By discovering this information during system development, these issues can be cor-
rected prior to integration testing. After the system is complete, run-time monitors may be
able to provide diagnostic services for safety-related system and subsystem errors.
6.2 Lessons learned about ICPA
In addition to ﬁnding speciﬁc design defects in the system design and implementation, the
process of applying the ICPA and monitoring the goals and subgoals also provided insight
into the ICPA itself. The following information was learned about the ICPA and subgoals
it produced:
1. Monitoring of the goals and subgoals during subsystem and integration testing can
help identify potential defects in the design and implementation. The defects found
in this analysis are listed in Section 6.1.2.
2. Some goals can only be monitored at the subsystem level. If the goal restricts control
ofastatevariabledirectlycontrolledbysomeagentinthesystem, suchasacommand
to an actuator or a network message, then the highest level in the system hierarchy at
which the goal can be monitored is the level containing the subsystem that controls
the variable. If the goal restricts two or more state variables directly controlled by
diﬀerentagentsinthesystem, oroneormorestatevariablethatissensedfromsystem
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dynamics or the environment, then the goal is monitored independently from a single
subsystem. This is applicable to any system with closed-loop control of physical
actuation and sensing. For example, vehicle goal monitors for goals 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and
9arethesameastheArbitersubgoalmonitors, becausetheyrestrictwhichsubsystem
iscontrollingaccelerationorsteering. Thiscannotbedetectedbyasensorinthesame
manner as the actual vehicle acceleration or jerk, but must be read from the ﬂag set
by the arbiter.
3. When a subgoal is violated at one level, violations in subsystem goals may be able
to point toward a root cause. For example, when ACC is engaged by the driver as the
vehicle is traveling backward, the subgoal violation in 9B is also seen in the violation
of subgoal 9A.
4. In any system that employs a redundant goal coverage strategy, monitoring all the
subgoals as well as the safety goal can help identify when inappropriate subsystem
behaviors are being masked by other subsystems. Subgoal 4B is violated by ACC
and PA whenever the vehicle is stopped because those subsystems send accelera-
tion requests when they are not engaged. However, subgoal 4A and goal 4 are not
violated.
5. Almost all safety subgoals are restrictive, often in multiple ways. Most goal restric-
tion comes from variability, or jitter, in the values monitored or controlled by the
system agents. Any system with physical actuation or sensing will experience this
variability, and will require restrictive subgoals. All goals analyzed with ICPA in this
study had restrictive subgoals. For example, all feature subsystems restricted their
acceleration and steering requests to meet the threshold, whether or not they were
selected as the winner of arbitration. If a feature subsystem is not selected as the
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winner of arbitration, its requests that violate the acceleration threshold will not have
an aﬀect on the vehicle acceleration. However, it is easier to implement the more
restrictive behavior.
6. Goal redundancy along a single indirect control path in a system’s behavioral hi-
erarchy can only protect against defects that occur in subsystems located earlier in
the control ﬂow (i.e., more removed from the actual source of direct control). Goal
redundancy does not protect against defects in the subsystems located later in the
control ﬂow, where single-point failures may still occur. For the particular auto-
motive system used in this evaluation, this means that the arbiter can guard against
failures in the feature subsystems, but is itself a source of single-point failures (as
seen in scenario 6 when it selects LCA as the winner of arbitration, but does not
actually use the steering request from LCA to control the vehicle). An example of
a type of goal redundancy at the same level in the control hierarchy is the elevator
control system from Chapter 4. In that example, the drive controller and emergency
brake have indirect control paths from the elevator position state variable.
7. The jerk threshold goal is too restrictive to be implemented practically. Every time
a diﬀerent acceleration is requested by a feature subsystem or commanded by the
Arbiter, the jerk threshold subgoals are violated for at least one state. This occurs in
every scenario except scenario 7, where no subsystem engaged to control the vehicle
because RCA was incomplete. A revised goal would allow jerk thresholds to be
violated for a single state. This might be true of any type of digital control system.
8. Transitions of control from one agent to another may have unavoidable residual de-
lays in jerk and acceleration that cause goals restricting those values to be violated.
More work needs to be done understanding what durations of jerk and acceleration
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thresholds are acceptable in these situations. This residual jerk and acceleration is
likely to occur in any system with physical actuation and sensing. This occurs in
scenario 3, when CA engages and applies and releases the brake four times.
9. Goals 1 and 2 should be split by case, where the goal for forward motion is diﬀerent
from the goal for backward motion (as was done for goals 5-6 and 8-9). This did not
actually cause any goal or subgoal violations in the evaluation because RCA never
engaged as it should to stop the vehicle in reverse. This was just something that came
up while uncovering the root cause of some violations of subgoals 5 and 9.
10. Goal 1 is not fully composed by subgoals 1A and 1B. The acceleration threshold for
autonomous control was exceeded just prior to early termination of the simulation
in scenarios 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9. This may indicate the indirect control relationships
used to deﬁne acceleration response that were used in the ICPA are incorrect, or that
the vehicle has entered an unsafe state due to wheel slip.
11. Some subgoals violations may also be caused by an error or exceptional value in
a monitored state variable in the goal, such as the vehicle acceleration sensor that
experience wheel slip, rather than by a defect in an agent’s control of another state
variable. In scenarios 4, 6, and 8, the sudden spike in acceleration and violations
of subgoal 9A for the Arbiter and 9B for ACC appear to be caused by wheel slip.
In the ICPA, the possibility of wheel slip was not considered when deﬁning goals
and subgoals that restrict acceleration, speed, or movement in a particular direction.
Thus, these goals and subgoals were violated any time wheel slip occurred in simu-
lation. However, wheel slip itself may indicate an unsafe system state. Issues related
to intense spikes in speed and acceleration need to be examined further during ICPA
for this system.
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12. The nature of when CA performs its braking actions was misunderstood during the
ICPA. There are some states in which CA is engaged, but not performing a braking
action. These states should be excluded from the analysis when CA is active. This
was seen in scenario 3, when CA continued to be selected as in control, but transi-
tioned four times from a hard brake to a preparation state. CA failed to stop the host
vehicle before reaching the stopped vehicle in its path, so this may actually be incor-
rect system behavior. The nature of this brake preparation state should be examined
further to see if CA should continue to override the driver when CA is engaged but
not performing a hard brake.
13. The indirect control relationships between the CA acceleration request, Arbiter ac-
celeration command, and resulting vehicle acceleration do not perform as deﬁned in
the ICPA. There is a greater delay between the acceleration command and the result-
ing vehicle acceleration response. System goal 5 should be adjusted to account for
this delay. Subgoals 5A and 5B, however, seem to be correct. In this case, monitor-
ing revealed a parent goal that is too restrictive to be satisﬁed while still satisfying
the functional behavior of the CA feature subsystem. This was seen in scenario 3,
when CA requested a hard brake, and the Arbiter commanded a hard brake, but there
was a delay in the vehicle response performing the hard brake.
14. When subgoals are made more restrictive, there may be certain operational behaviors
that violate the goal but are desirable in the system. These may be handled by goal
realizability tactic Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability by Case [46] (i.e., have
separate safety goals for each type of situation). For example, it may be desirable to
allow ACC to brieﬂy engage when selected by the driver while the driver is also
accelerating. This situation caused subgoals 5A and 5B to be violated in scenarios 4,
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5, 6, and 8. The goal could be modiﬁed to exclude the case when the driver presses
the ACC engage button.
15. There were no vehicle-level goal violations in scenario 7, even though the vehicle
‘collided’ with the vehicle in its path. If the simulation environment were able to sim-
ulate vehicle collisions, some goals and subgoals may have been violated. However,
any monitored values that would be detected from such a situation may only pro-
vide information for post-accident analysis, not prevention. In this scenario, RCA
is not implemented completely enough to provide the needed functionality to stop
the vehicle. The unsafe situation occurs, not because the vehicle is violating any
of the deﬁned safety goals, but because the feature itself is not performing its in-
tended functionality. Even though the driver is supposed to remain active and alert
in semi-autonomous automotive systems, perhaps the functional behavior of features
considered to provide ‘active safety,’ as opposed to those that provide ‘driver conve-
nience,’ should also be included in the set of system safety goals.
16. In scenario 10, there appears to be a relationship between the driver’s request to en-
gage ACC and vehicle acceleration that bypasses the Arbiter and ACC. This indicates
the indirect control relationships deﬁned in ACC are incorrect or incomplete.
These results indicate that ICPA must be an iterative process, similar to hazard analysis
and requirements engineering. Subgoals deﬁned before system design and implementation
may be found to be incorrect or impractical during those stages of the system development
cycle. This is true for any distributed embedded system with reasonable complexity.
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6.3 Conclusion
The primary purpose of this evaluation was to determine whether or not the ICPA technique
and resulting subgoals were useful. In a large-scale real automotive system, applying ICPA
and monitoring the subgoals it produced uncovered eleven critical design defects while the
system was still under development, which are listed in Section 6.1.2. In addition, goal
and subgoal monitoring revealed some of the limitations of ICPA, including impracticality
of some goal reductions, the unidirectional nature of some goal redundancy strategies, and
the inability to monitor some goals at the system level. These results show that ICPA
can be applied to large-scale embedded systems with closed-loop control that use physical
actuation and sensing.
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Conclusion
System safety, as an emergent system property, is diﬃcult to handle in an hierarchical,
distributed design process because traditional decomposition tactics are not always appli-
cable. As safety-critical embedded systems become more pervasive and more complex, a
good requirements process becomes more and more essential for handling this emergence.
As part of that process, design and analysis of the system safety requirements should be
systematic and fully documented.
7.1 Thesis contributions
To address the problem of deﬁning safety goals for subsystems in a composite system, this
thesis makes the following contributions:
7.1.1 Formal deﬁnition of emergent and composable behaviors
I provided a formal deﬁnition of emergence within a framework of goal decomposition.
The main idea used in creation of this deﬁnition is that emergence exists as residual
undeﬁnedbehaviorsinAND-reductionsandOR-reductionsofcompositegoals. Thisbuilds
on prior work in goal elaboration that deﬁned goal decomposition, but did not account
for emergence in the missing subgoals of a partial decomposition. Emergence in AND-
reductions indicates unknown or unrealizable behaviors that could cause the goal to be
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violated, as deﬁned in Equation 3.14. Emergence in OR- reductions indicates unknown or
unrealizable behaviors that could cause the goal to be satisﬁed, as deﬁned in Equation 3.23.
Chapter 3 presents the formal representation of a system decomposition and emergence.
The scope of this representation is limited to system goals and subgoals deﬁned within the
temporal logic goal speciﬁcation framework used by ICPA, which comes from Goal Ori-
ented Requirements Engineering and the KAOS framework. It is also limited to describing
a single decomposition of the system, not all possible decompositions. Formal deﬁnitions
are presented for behaviors that are fully composable, emergent, and emergent but par-
tially composable, with or without goal redundancy. In addition, the role of emergence in
conjunctive and disjunctive goal forms is explained.
These deﬁnitions are generic mathematical representations that can be applied to any
system requirements speciﬁcation that can be deﬁned by goals to be achieved at the system
level and subgoals to be achieved by the subsystem. However, this means the formal def-
initions rely on the assumption that the system behaviors can be speciﬁed as expressions
of temporal logic in a state transition system. This may limit its application in continuous
systems, or systems with mixed continuous and discrete control.
For goal elaboration, particularly for system safety goals, formal representation of emer-
gence within a composite system helps identify where emergence may occur in system
decomposition, and how emergence may be handled. It also helps identify special cases in
which an emergent behavior may be partially composable. Although the partial decomposi-
tionmaynotensurethegoalisalwayssatisﬁed, itmayidentifybehaviorsthatwilldeﬁnitely
violate the goal, which is useful for safety. In this situation, it helps guide engineers in ‘best
eﬀort’ design.
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7.1.2 Indirect Control Path Analysis (ICPA)
I created a technique for guiding system safety goal elaboration in a directed and docu-
mented way.
The main idea of ICPA is to combine familiar techniques from hazard analysis, such as
the top-down approach of FTA and the table structure of FMEA, for system safety goal
elaboration. Instead of tracing hazards back to potential faults, ICPA traces system safety
goals to their indirect and direct control sources, guided by control ﬂow of system state
variables. The technique was applied to goals from an academic research system and a real
system of signiﬁcant complexity. Run-time monitoring of the subgoals in the latter system
demonstrated that subgoals produced by ICPA partially compose the parent goals.
Chapter 4 proposed the ICPA technique for safety goal elaboration. The concepts of
direct and indirect control were deﬁned in Section 4.2, with respect to the KAOS goal
elaboration framework. In addition, the ICPA format and procedure were explained in Sec-
tions 4.3 and 4.4, and illustrated with examples from a distributed elevator control system
used in a graduate distributed embedded system course. ICPA uses a top-down analysis
approach to trace state variables in a system safety goal to their indirect control sources in
the system control architecture. Relationships among agents along the trace path and from
agents to the parent state variable are deﬁned. Goal coverage strategies, including a goal as-
signment and goal scope are used guide this process. The result of an ICPA is both a set of
subsystem safety goals that satisfy the parent goal, and a record of the critical assumptions,
goal realizability tactics, and goal coverage strategies used to deﬁne them. Section 4.5.3
also contained an explanation of controllability and observability requirements for goal
realizability, including goal patterns for those requirements and for alternative goals.
In Chapters 5 and 6, ICPA was applied to a semi-autonomous automotive system devel-
oped by a commercial automotive research lab. The system safety goals and set of subgoals
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produced by ICPA were then monitored in an implementation of the system in the CarSim
R  
and Simulink
R   simulation environment. During monitoring, some goal violations were de-
tected in the subgoal monitors, but some were not. This demonstrates that the subgoals
produced in ICPA partially compose the parent goal, but not fully.
The techniques used in ICPA have been shown to be applicable to two types of dis-
tributed embedded systems, an elevator control system and an automotive system, and
should be generally applicable to systems with the same type of closed loop control of
physical actuation and sensing. ICPA relies on the assumption that the set of safety goals
deﬁned at the system level is complete and correct. That is, if the system safety goals are
incorrect, the subgoals produced by ICPA will not ensure system safety. Another limita-
tion of the technique is that in complex systems with many state variables or state variables
with wide ranges of values, it is impossible to know if all indirect control relationships have
been deﬁned. In these systems, ICPA assists in best-eﬀort design and implementation. The
beneﬁt of ICPA is that it presents a structured approach to identifying these indirect control
sources and relationships among state variables. It also provides a format for documenting
the design decisions used in deﬁning the subgoals for the subsystems.
7.1.3 Hierarchical safety monitoring
I demonstrated that monitoring of system safety goals and subgoals can detect hazards at
run-time.
Monitoring not only can indicate whether or not the subgoals produced with ICPA par-
tially compose the parent goal, but also can identify key design defects that remain in the
system at run-time. By building monitors for the automotive goals and subgoals to test
ICPA, I also identiﬁed important design defects in the system under review, enumerated in
Section 6.1.2.
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Chapters 5 and 6 present the results of monitoring goals and subgoals produced by ICPA
for asemi-autonomous automotive system. This wasa realvehicle, though one intended for
research and not as a commercial product. Run-time monitoring of the system safety goals
and subgoals identiﬁed eleven design defects while the system was still under development.
In some situations, subgoals were violated that did not result in parent goal violations, due
to redundant goal coverage, or were so transient they may not be observable to the driver.
Run-time monitoring allowed these design defects to be discovered and corrected when
they otherwise might have been missed.
In addition, the process of deﬁning the monitors revealed that some system safety goals
cannot actually be monitored at the system level. In order to be monitored at the system
level, the goal must constrain control of a state variable that cannot be sensed, or the goal
must constrain control of state variables that are directly controlled by diﬀerent subsystems.
This would be true of any similar closed-loop control of physical actuation and sensing.
One limitation of the contribution was that run-time monitoring was only performed in
one of the two systems used to illustrate the ICPA technique. Another limitation is that
run-time monitoring required observability of all state variables in the goals and subgoals.
In some system designs, this may require subgoal monitoring to be done locally in the sub-
systems. Despite these limitations, the system that was used for run-time monitoring was a
real commercial automotive system, rather than an academic system designed for course-
work. The issues uncovered with the system and information learned about ICPA during
run-time monitoring reﬂect the issues that might be encountered in real safety-critical sys-
tem development.
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7.2 Future work
Evaluation of the ICPA raised the following issues that could be investigated in future
research:
Physical sensing and actuation delay patterns. In the evaluation, any time acceleration
changed, the jerk threshold was exceeded for at least one system state. This is character-
istic of digital control, which uses sampled values rather than continuous values, and is
reasonably easy to factor into temporal logic-based goals. However, changes in actuation
have some residual delay in the resulting sensed values. Application of ICPA requires this
delay to be accurately characterized and included in the goal elaboration process. It is
likely that diﬀerent types of actuation and sensing have characteristic delays. If so, perhaps
these characteristics could be generalized into speciﬁc patterns for deﬁning indirect control
relationships in the ICPA, or perhaps a ﬁltered value could be used instead.
Human factors of ICPA. One possible direction for future work would be to examine the
human-factors issues involved with applying the ICPA. As mentioned in Section 5.4, the
evaluation of ICPA in this thesis demonstrated that the technique can be applied to a real
safety-critical distributed embedded system with closed-loop control of physical actuation
and sensing to produce subgoals that partially compose the parent goal. This evaluation
was done by the author of this thesis, and not the system engineers who designed, built and
analyzed the system under review. As such, this evaluation does not show how well the
ICPA can be applied by engineers in a real industrial development environment.
Human factors evaluation, in general, is diﬃcult because it requires access to many peo-
ple and many systems, preferably real developers working on real industrial products. For
this thesis, it was extremely diﬃcult to gain access to a single system of reasonably realistic
complexity. In addition, the developers working on the system were too busy to participate
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much in any of the steps used to perform this evaluation. As such, this future work direction
would be extremely diﬃcult without extensive participation by a speciﬁc organization.
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A.1. Temporal logic operators
P true in current state
¬P false in current state
lP true in previous state
 P true in some previous state
nP true in all previous states
mP true in next state
♦P true in current or some future state
qP true in current and all future states
P ∧ Q P AND Q
P ∨ Q P OR Q
P → Q P implies Q in current state
P ⇒ Q q(P → Q); P implies Q in all states
P ⇔ Q P iﬀ Q in all states
ln<TP true for duration T in previous state
l <TP true at least once in duration T in previous state
@P l¬P ∧ P; true in current state, false in previous state
S0 ￿ P True in the initial state
Γ ⊢ P P is syntactically derivable from the premises Γ
Γ 0 P P is not syntactically derivable from the premises Γ
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A.2. Acronyms
ACC: Adaptive Cruise Control
CA: Collision Avoidance
FMEA: Failure Modes and Eﬀects Analysis
FTA: Fault Tree Analysis
GORE: Goal Oriented Requirements Engineering
ICPA: Indirect Control Path Analysis
KAOS: Knowledge Acquisition in autOmated Speciﬁcation
LCA: Lane Change Assist
PA: Park Assist
RCA: Rear Collision Avoidance
STPA Systems-Theoretic accident model and Process Analysis
160APPENDIX A. LOGIC OPERATORS, ACRONYMS, AND DEFINITIONS
A.3. Deﬁnitions
direct control: ability to change a state variable directly; direct control may be limited
to one individual subsystem (e.g., one subsystem sends signals to an actuator) or
may be shared among subsystems (e.g., multiple subsystems send the same type of
request)
false negative: occurs when a goal violation is detected but no corresponding subgoal
violations are detected
false positive: occurs when a subgoal violation is detected but no corresponding goal
violation is detected
goal assignment: deﬁnes which indirect control sources have subgoals and how those
subgoals relate to each other; categories include single responsibility, redundant
responsibility, and shared responsibility.
goal coverage strategy: a plan for allocating subgoals to ensure that a high-level goal is
met; it includes the goal assignment and goal scope.
goal scope: deﬁnes how closely the safety subgoals meet the system safety goal; categories
include nonrestrictive and restrictive.
hit: occurs when a goal violation is detected and a corresponding goal violation is detected
indirect control: ability to inﬂuence change in a state variable; sources include hard-
ware actuation, system dynamics, and environmental agents that change sensed
state variables, or inputs from other subsystems
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Table B.1. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for A ⇒ B,
lA ⇒ B, and A ⇒ l B
A    B A
Controllable Pattern Observable
 A
Alternative Goal
 A
Restrictive
A B
 B B
B A
A, B
A    B A  A
 A A B
 B B
B A
A, B
 B
A   B A  A
A B
 B B
B A
A, B
 B
B   A
B   A
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
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Table B.2. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for A ∨ B ⇒ C
A  B   C
A, B C
C
C A
C B
C A, B
A, B
A, C B
A, C
B, C A
B, C
A, B, C
 C
 C
 C
 C
(A  B)
(A  B)
 C
 C
 C
 C
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
A
A B
A C
A B, C
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
B
B A
B C
B A, C
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
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Table B.3. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for lA∨B ⇒ C
A  B   C
A, B C
C
C A
C B
C A, B
A, B
A, C B
A, C
B, C A
B, C
A, B, C
 C
 C
 C
 C
(A  B)
(A  B)
 C
 C
 C
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
A
A B
A C
A B, C
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
B
B A
B C
B A, C
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
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Table B.4. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for A ∨ B ⇒ l
C
A  B  C
A, B C
C
C A
C B
C A, B
A, B
A, C B
A, C
B, C A
B, C
A, B, C
 C
 C
 C
 C
C  (A  B)
 C
 C
 C
 C
(A  B)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
C  (A  B)
A
A B
A C
A B, C
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
B
B A
B C
B A, C
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
166APPENDIX B. GOAL REALIZABILITY PATTERNS AND ALTERNATIVE GOALS
Table B.5. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for A ∧ B ⇒ C
A  B   C
A, B C
C
C A
C B
C A, B
A, B
A, C B
A, C
A, B, C
 C
 C
 C
 C
(A  B)
A   C
A   C
(A  B)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
A
A B
A C
A B,C
A
A
A
A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B
B A
B C
B A,C
B
B
B
B
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B, C A
B, C
B   C
B   C Yes
Yes
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Table B.6. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for lA∧B ⇒ C
A  B  C
A, B C
C
C A
C B
C A, B
A, B
A, C B
A, C
A, B, C
 C
 C
 C
 C
C  (A  B)
A   C
A   C
(A  B)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
A
A B
A C
A B,C
A
A
A
A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B
B A
B C
B A,C
B
B
B
B
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B, C A
B, C
B   C
B   C Yes
Yes
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Table B.7. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for A ∧ B ⇒ l
C
A  B   C
A, B C
C
C A
C B
C A, B
A, B
A, C B
A, C
A, B, C
 C
A   C
 C
A   C
( A  B)
A   C
A   C
( A  B)
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
A
A B
A C
A B,C
A
A
A
A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B
B A
B C
B A,C
B
A  B
B
A  B
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B, C A
B, C B   C Yes
No
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
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Table B.8. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for A ⇒ B ∧C
A  B  C
B
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
A
A B
A C
A B,C
A
A
A
A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
A
C
A,C
A
B
A,C
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
C
Yes
Yes A, B
A, B
A, C
A, C
A, B, C
B, C
B, C
A
A
A
A
A
 (B  C)
 (B  C)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
170APPENDIX B. GOAL REALIZABILITY PATTERNS AND ALTERNATIVE GOALS
Table B.9. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for lA ⇒ B∧C
A  B  C
B
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
A
A B
A C
A B,C
A
A
A
A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
A
C
A,C
A
B
A,C
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
C
Yes
Yes A, B
A, B
A, C
A, C
A, B, C
B, C
B, C
A
A
A
A
A
 (B  C)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
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Table B.10. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for A ⇒ l
B ∧C
A  B  C
B
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
A
A B
A C
A B,C
A
A
A
A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
A
C
A,C
A
B
A,C
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
Not realizable with or without restriction
C
Yes
Yes A, B
A, B
A, C
A, C
A, B, C
B, C
B, C
A
A
A
A
A
 ( B  C)
 ( B  C)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
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Table B.11. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for A ⇒ B∨C
A  B  C
A, C B
C
C A
C B
C A, B
A, C
B, C A
B, C
A, B, C
 C
 C
 C
 C
A   C
 (B  C)
 (B  C)
A   C
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
A
A B
A C
A B,C
A
A
A
A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B
B A
B C
B A,C
 B
 B
 B
 B
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
A, B C
A, B
A   B
A   B Yes
Yes
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TableB.12.Goalrealizabilitypatternsandalternativegoalsforl A ⇒ B∨C
A  B  C
A, C B
C
C A
C B
C A, B
A, C
B, C A
B, C
A, B, C
 C
A   C
 C
A   C
A   C
 (B  C)
A   C
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
A
A B
A C
A B,C
A
A
A
A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
B
B A
B C
B A, C
 B
A   B
 B
A   B
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
A, B C
A, B
A   B
A   B Yes
Yes
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Table B.13. Goal realizability patterns and alternative goals for A ⇒ l
B ∨C
A  B  C
A, B C
C
C A
C B
C A, B
A, B
A, C B
A, C
A, B, C
 C
 C
B  C
B  C
B  A
A   C
A  B  C
B  A
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
A
A B
A C
A B,C
A
B  A
A
B  A
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B
B A
B C
B A,C
B
B
B
B
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
B, C A
B, C B  C
B  C
Yes
Yes
Controllable Pattern Observable Alternative Goal Restrictive
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ICPA for a Semi-autonomous
Automotive System
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Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships
va Arbiter ac: AccelerationCommand  (va.value =  ac.value)
% Acceleration is equal to the previous acceleration command value
#
01
System Safety Goal
Goal: Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: Vehicle acceleration caused by autonomous vehicle control shall not exceed 2 m/s
2.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration
IsSubsystem(va.source)   va.value   2 m/s
2
ICPA for Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold] (1 of 4)
 (va.source =  ac.source)
% The source of acceleration is equal to the source of the previous 
acceleration command
 (ac.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration command is either the driver or one 
% of the feature subsystems
02
03
Figure C.1. ICPA for Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold] (1 of 4)
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ICPA for Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold] (2 of 4)
ac.source =  ar.source  ac.value =  ar.value
% If the source of an acceleration command is the source of a 
% previous acceleration request, then the value of the acceleration 
% command is equal to the value of the previous acceleration request
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
IsSubsystem(ac.source)   (  ar: ac.source =  ar.source)
% If the source of the acceleration command is a subsystem, then 
% there exists an acceleration request such that the source of the 
% acceleration command is the source of that acceleration request,
% and vice versa
 (ar.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration request is one of the feature 
% subsystems
04
05
06 IsSubsystem(ar.source)
% The source of the acceleration request is a subsystem
07
va
Figure C.2. ICPA for Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold] (2 of 4)
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ICPA for Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold] (3 of 4)
Goal Elaboration
IsSubsystem(va.source)   va.value   2 m/s
2
IsSubsystem(ac.source))    (ac.value   2 m/s
2)
ac.source =  ar.source)  ac.value   2 m/s
2)
ac.source =  ar.source)    (ar.value   2 m/s
2)
ar.value   2 m/s
2)
Indirect Control Relationships
01, 02 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
Assumes worst-case actuation delays for source 
of acceleration and acceleration value (built-in to 
definition of 01, 02)
05 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
04 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
OR-Reduction
Redundant Responsibility (Primary: Arbiter; Secondary: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case vehicle response to acceleration command; real response may be different.  
Also, OR reduction is used for CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, and PA goals.)
  Goal Scope
Figure C.3. ICPA for Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold] (3 of 4)
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Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: Arbiter
Controls: AcelerationCommand
Observes: AccelerationRequest
Goal: Achieve[AutoAccelCommandBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: Vehicle acceleration commands caused by autonomous vehicle control shall not exceed 2 m/s
2.
FormalDef: ac: AccelerationCommand, ar: AccelerationRequest
(ac.source =  ar.source)  ac.value   2 m/s
2) 
Subsystem: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA
Controls: AcelerationRequest
Observes:
Goal: Maintain[AutoAccelRequestBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: Vehicle acceleration requests caused by autonomous vehicle control shall not exceed 2 m/s
2.
FormalDef: ar: AccelerationRequest
( ar.value   2 m/s
2)
ICPA for Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold] (4 of 4)
Figure C.4. ICPA for Achieve[AutoAccelBelowThreshold] (4 of 4)
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Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships
vj Arbiter ac: AccelerationCommand  (vj.value = VehicleJerkResponse( ac.value,  ac.value))
% Jerk is equal to the jerk response caused by the values of the 
% previous two acceleration commands
#
01
System Safety Goal
Goal: Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: Vehicle jerk caused by autonomous vehicle control shall not exceed 2.5 m/s
3.
FormalDef: vj: VehicleJerk
IsSubsystem(vj.source)   vj.value   2.5 m/s
3
ICPA for Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold] (1 of 4)
 (vj.source =  ac.source)
% The source of jerk is the source of the previous acceleration
% command
02
03
 (ac.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration command is either the driver or one 
% of the feature subsystems
Figure C.5. ICPA for Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold] (1 of 4)
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CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
04
05
06
07
ac.source =  ar.source  ac.value =  ar.value
% If the source of an acceleration command is the source of a 
% previous acceleration request, then the value of the acceleration 
% command is equal to the value of the previous acceleration request
IsSubsystem(ac.source)   (  ar: ac.source =  ar.source)
% If the source of the acceleration command is a subsystem, then 
% there exists an acceleration request such that the source of the 
% acceleration command is the source of that acceleration request,
% and vice versa
 (ar.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration request is one of the feature 
% subsystems
IsSubsystem(ar.source)
% The source of the acceleration request is a subsystem
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
vj
ICPA for Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold] (2 of 4)
Figure C.6. ICPA for Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold] (2 of 4)
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Goal Elaboration
ICPA for Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold] (3 of 4)
Redundant Responsibility (Primary: Arbiter; Secondary: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case vehicle response to acceleration command; real response may be different.  
Also, OR reduction is used for CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, and PA goals)
  Goal Scope
IsSubsystem(vj.source)   vj.value   2.5 m/s
3
IsSubsystem(ac.source)
VehicleJerkResponse( ac.value,  ac.value)   2.5 m/s
3)
ac.source =  ar.source) 
VehicleJerkResponse(ac.value,  ac.value)   2.5 m/s
3)
ac.source =  ar.source) 
VehicleJerkResponse( ar.value,  ar.value)    2.5 m/s
3)
VehicleJerkResponse(ar.value,  ar.value)   2.5 m/s
3)
Indirect Control Relationships
01, 02 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
Assumes worst-case actuation delays for source 
of acceleration and acceleration value (built-in to 
definition of 01, 02)
05 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
04 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
OR-Reduction
Goal Elaboration
Figure C.7. ICPA for Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold] (3 of 4)
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Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: Arbiter
Controls: AcelerationCommand
Observes: AccelerationRequest
Goal: Achieve[AutoAccelCommandJerkBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: Vehicle acceleration commands caused by autonomous vehicle control shall not produce jerk that exceeds 2.5 m/s
2.
FormalDef: ac: AccelerationCommand, ar: AccelerationRequest
ac.source =  ar.source)  VehicleJerkResponse( ar.value,  ar.value)    2.5 m/s
3)
Subsystem: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA
Controls: AcelerationRequest
Observes:
Goal: Maintain[AutoAccelRequestJerkBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: Vehicle acceleration requests caused by autonomous vehicle control shall not produce jerk that exceeds 2.5 m/s
2.
FormalDef: ar: AccelerationRequest
VehicleJerkResponse(ar.value,  ar.value)   2.5 m/s
3)
ICPA for Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold] (4 of 4)
Figure C.8. ICPA for Achieve[AutoJerkBelowThreshold] (4 of 4)
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System Safety Goal
Goal: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
InformalDef: If a subsystem a) requests control of acceleration and steering and b) is granted control of either acceleration or 
steering, then the subsystem shall control both acceleration and steering.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, vst: VehicleSteering, sn: SubsystemName
RequestingAcceleration(sn)  RequestingSteering(sn)   (( va.source = sn)   (vst.source = sn))
(va.source = vst.source = sn)
ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (1 of 5)
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
sn Arbiter
((ar.source = sn)   ar.active)   RequestingAcceleration(sn)
% If an acceleration request is active, then the source of that 
% acceleration request is requesting acceleration, and vice versa 
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
01
02
 (sn  {Arbiter, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% A subsystem is either the arbiter or one of the feature subsystems
((sr.source = sn)   sr.active)   RequestingSteering(sn)
% If a steering request is active, then the source of that steering 
% request is requesting steering, and vice versa
sr: AccelerationRequest
03
Figure C.9. ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (1 of 5)
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Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships
ar.active  (ac.source =  ar.source)
% If a previous acceleration request is not active, then the source of 
% an acceleration command is not the source of that previous 
% acceleration request
#
va Arbiter ac: AccelerationCommand  (va.value =  ac.value)
% Acceleration is equal to the previous acceleration command value 04
 (va.source =  ac.source)
% The source of acceleration is equal to the source of the previous 
acceleration command
 (ac.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration command is either the driver or one 
% of the feature subsystems
ac.source =  ar.source  ac.value =  ar.value
% If the source of an acceleration command is the source of a 
% previous acceleration request, then the value of the acceleration 
% command is equal to the value of the previous acceleration request
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
 (ar.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration request is one of the feature 
% subsystems
05
06
07
08
09
ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (2 of 5)
Figure C.10. ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (2 of 5)
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11
12
13
14
15
10
vst Arbiter sc: SteeringCommand  (vst.value =  sc.value)
% The value of steering is equal to the value of the previous steering 
% command
 (vst.source =  sc.source)
% The source of steering is the source of the previous steering 
% command
 (sc.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of a steering command is either the driver or one of the 
% feature subsystems
sc.source =  sr.source  sc.value =  sr.value
% If the source of a steering command is the source of a previous 
% steering request, then the value of the steering command is equal 
% to the value of the previous steering request
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
sr: SteeringRequest
 (sr.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of a steering request is one of the feature subsystems
sr.active  (sc.source =  sr.source)
% If a previous steering request is not active, then the source of a 
% steering command is not the source of that previous steering 
% request
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (3 of 5)
Figure C.11. ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (3 of 5)
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ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (4 of 5)
Single Responsibility (Arbiter)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case vehicle response to acceleration command; real response may be different.  
Also, scope of the goal is expanded by incorporating critical assumption.)
  Goal Scope
Goal Elaboration
( RequestingAcceleration(sn)  RequestingSteering(sn) 
 (( va.source = sn)   (vst.source = sn)))
(va.source = vst.source = sn)
( RequestingAcceleration(sn)  RequestingSteering(sn) 
 (( ac.source = sn)   (sc.source = sn)))
(ac.source = sc.source = sn)
( ((ar.source = sn)   ar.active)  ((sr.source = sn)   sr.active) 
 (( ac.source =  ar.source)   (sc.source =  sr.source)))
(ac.source = sc.source =  ar.source =  sr.source = sn)
( ((ar.source = sn)   ar.active)  ((sr.source = sn)   sr.active) 
 (( ac.source =  ar.source)   (sc.source =  sr.source)))
(ac.source = sc.source =  ar.source =  sr.source = sn)
  (ac.value = sc.value =  ar.value =  sr.value = sn))
Indirect Control Relationships
05, 11 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
02, 03 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
07, 13  – Expanding scope by incorporating 
critical assumption into the subgoal
Figure C.12. ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (4 of 5)
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Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: Arbiter
Controls: AcelerationCommand, SteeringCommand
Observes: AccelerationRequest, SteeringRequest
Goal: Achieve[AccelSteeringCommandAgreement]
InformalDef: If subsystem a) requests control of both the acceleration command and the steering command and
b) is granted control of either the acceleration command or the steering command,
then the subsystem shall be granted control of both the acceleration command and the steering command.
FormalDef: ac: AccelerationCommand, ar: AccelerationRequest, sc: SteeringCommand, sr: SteeringRequest
( ((ar.source = sn)   ar.active)  ((sr.source = sn)   sr.active) 
 (( ac.source =  ar.source)   (sc.source =  sr.source)))
(ac.source = sc.source =  ar.source =  sr.source = sn)
  (ac.value = sc.value =  ar.value =  sr.value = sn))
ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (5 of 5)
Figure C.13. ICPA for Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement] (5 of 5)
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System Safety Goal
Goal: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
InformalDef: If a) the vehicle is stopped for a duration of StoppedTime and
b) the throttle pedal has not been applied within the preceding GoTime and
c) a subsystem is controlling acceleration and
d) the HMI has not sent a go signal to the controlling subsystem within the preceeding AccelerationTime,
then there shall be no vehicle acceleration
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, vsp: VehicleSpeed, sn: SubsystemName, hmi: HumanMachineInterface, tp: ThrottlePedal
st: StoppedTime, gt: GoTime
( <st IsStopped(vsp.value)  <gt @IsApplied(tp)   (va.source = sn)  <gt @Go(hmi, sn)) 
IsAccelerating(va.value) 
ICPA for Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop] (1 of 4)
Figure C.14. ICPA for Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop] (1 of 4)
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Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
va Arbiter ac: AccelerationCommand
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
 (va.value =  ac.value)
% Acceleration is equal to the previous acceleration command value 01
 (va.source =  ac.source)
% The source of acceleration is equal to the source of the previous 
acceleration command
 (ac.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration command is either the driver or one 
% of the feature subsystems
ac.source =  ar.source  ac.value =  ar.value
% If the source of an acceleration command is the source of a 
% previous acceleration request, then the value of the acceleration 
% command is equal to the value of the previous acceleration request
 (ar.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration request is one of the feature 
% subsystems
02
03
04
05
ICPA for Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop] (2 of 4)
sn
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
06
07
 (ar.source = sn)
% The source of an acceleration request is a subsystem
Arbiter
ar: AccelerationRequest
 (sn  {Arbiter, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% A subsystem is either the arbiter or one of the feature subsystems
Figure C.15. ICPA for Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop] (2 of 4)
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Goal Elaboration
( <st IsStopped(vsp.value)  <gt @IsApplied(tp)) 
 (va.source = sn)  <gt @Go(hmi, sn)))
IsAccelerating(va.value) 
( <st-1 IsStopped(vsp.value)  <gt-1 @IsApplied(tp)) 
 (ac.source = sn)  <gt-1 @Go(hmi, sn)))
IsAccelerating(ac.value)
( <st-2 IsStopped(vsp.value)  <gt-2 @IsApplied(tp)) 
<gt-2 @Go(hmi, sn)))
IsAccelerating(ar.value)
Indirect Control Relationships
01, 02 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
Assumes worst-case actuation delays for source 
of acceleration and acceleration value (built-in to 
definition of 01, 02}
04 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic
Redundant Responsibility (Primary: Arbiter, Secondary: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case vehicle response to acceleration command, worst-case delays between 
features & arbiter.)
  Goal Scope
ICPA for Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop] (3 of 4)
Figure C.16. ICPA for Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop] (3 of 4)
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Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: Arbiter
Controls: AcelerationCommand
Observes: VehicleSpeed, SubsystemName, ThrottlePedal, HumanMachineInterface, StoppedTime, GoTime
Goal: Achieve[AutoAccelCommandBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: If a) the vehicle is stopped for a duration of StoppedTime and
b) the throttle pedal has not been applied within the preceding GoTime and
c) a subsystem is controlling acceleration and
d) the HMI has not sent a go signal to the controlling subsystem within the preceeding GoTime,
then the vehicle acceleration command shall be set to 
FormalDef: ac: AccelerationCommand, vsp: VehicleSpeed, sn: SubsystemName, hmi: HumanMachineInterface, 
tp:ThrottlePedal, st: StoppedTime, gt: GoTime
( <st-1 IsStopped(vsp.value)  <gt-1 @IsApplied(tp))   (ac.source = sn)  <gt-1 @Go(hmi, sn)))
IsAccelerating(ac.value)
Subsystem: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA
Controls: AcelerationRequest
Observes: VehicleSpeed, SubsystemName, ThrottlePedal, HumanMachineInterface, StoppedTime, GoTime
Goal: Achieve[AutoAccelRequestBelowThreshold]
InformalDef: If a) the vehicle is stopped for a duration of StoppedTime and
b) the throttle pedal has not been applied within the preceding GoTime and
c) a subsystem is controlling acceleration and
d) the HMI has not sent a go signal to the controlling subsystem within the preceeding GoTime,
then the vehicle acceleration command shall be set to 
FormalDef: ar: AccelerationRequest, vsp: VehicleSpeed, sn: SubsystemName, hmi: HumanMachineInterface, 
tp:ThrottlePedal, st: StoppedTime, gt: GoTime
( <st-2 IsStopped(vsp.value)  <gt-2 @IsApplied(tp))  <gt-2 @Go(hmi, sn)))
IsAccelerating(ar.value)
ICPA for Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop] (4 of 4)
Figure C.17. ICPA for Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop] (4 of 4)
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Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
System Safety Goal
Goal: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
InformalDef: If  a) the vehicle is moving in the forward direction and
b) the driver is applying the brake pedal or the throttle pedal and
c) a subsystem is requesting a vehicle acceleration greater than or equal to -2 m/s
2 (i.e., not requesting a “hard” stop of
the vehicle),
then the subsystem shall not control vehicle acceleration.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, sn: SubsystemName, bp: BrakePedal, tp: ThrottlePedal
(InForwardMotion(vsp.value)    (bp.active   tp.active )   RequestingAcceleration(sn) 
 (RequestedAcceleration(sn)  -2 m/s
2))  (va.source = sn)
ICPA for Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride] (1 of 4)
va Arbiter ac: AccelerationCommand  (va.value =  ac.value)
% Acceleration is equal to the previous acceleration command value 01
 (va.source =  ac.source)
% The source of acceleration is equal to the source of the previous 
acceleration command
 (ac.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration command is either the driver or one 
% of the feature subsystems
02
03
Figure C.18. ICPA for Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride] (1 of 4)
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CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest ac.source =  ar.source  ac.value =  ar.value
% If the source of an acceleration command is the source of a 
% previous acceleration request, then the value of the acceleration 
% command is equal to the value of the previous acceleration request
 (ar.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration request is one of the feature 
% subsystems
04
05
ar.active  (ac.source =  ar.source)
% If a previous acceleration request is not active, then the source of 
% an acceleration command is not the source of that previous 
% acceleration request
06
va
ICPA for Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride] (2 of 4)
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
sn Arbiter
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
07
08
09
((ar.source = sn)   ar.active) 
 (RequestedAcceleration(sn) = ar.value)
% If an acceleration request is active, then the requested acceleration 
% of the source of the acceleration request is the value of the 
% acceleration request.
((ar.source = sn)   ar.active)   RequestingAcceleration(sn)
% If an acceleration request is active, then the source of that 
% acceleration request is requesting acceleration, and vice versa 
 (sn  {Arbiter, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% A subsystem is either the arbiter or one of the feature subsystems
Figure C.19. ICPA for Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride] (2 of 4)
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Goal Elaboration
(InForwardMotion(vsp.value)   (bp.active   tp.active) 
RequestingAcceleration(sn)   (RequestedAcceleration(sn)  -2.5 m/s
2))
(va.source = sn)
(InForwardMotion(vsp.value)  (bp.active   tp.active)   ((ar.source = sn) 
 ar.active)   (ar.value  -2.5 m/s
2))
(ac.source =  ar.source)
  (InForwardMotion(vsp.value)  (bp.active   tp.active)) 
ar.active  (ar.value < -2 m/s
2))
Indirect Control Relationships
01, 02, 08, 09 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal 
tactic. Assumes worst-case actuation delays for 
source of acceleration and acceleration value 
(built-in to definition of 01, 02)
OR reduction.  Also restricts acceleration requests 
one state earlier than necessary.
ICPA for Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride] (3 of 4)
Redundant Responsibility (Primary: Arbiter, Secondary: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case vehicle response to acceleration command; real response may be different. 
Also, OR reduction is used for CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, and PA goals, and restricts acceleration requests one 
state earlier than necessary.)
  Goal Scope
Figure C.20. ICPA for Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride] (3 of 4)
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Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: Arbiter
Controls: AcelerationCommand
Observes: AccelerationRequest, BrakePedal, ThrottlePedal
Goal: Acheive[DriverForwardAccelOverrideAccelCommand]
InformalDef: If  a) the vehicle is moving in the forward direction and
b) the driver is applying the brake pedal or the throttle pedal and
c) a subsystem is requesting a vehicle acceleration greater than or equal to -2 m/s
2 (i.e., not requesting a “hard” stop of
the vehicle),
then the source of the acceleration command shall not be a subsystem
FormalDef: ac: AccelerationCommand, bp: BrakePedal, ar:AccelerationRequest, tp:ThrottlePedal
(InForwardMotion(vsp.value)  (bp.active   tp.active)   ((ar.source = sn)   ar.active)   (ar.value  -2 m/s
2)) 
(ac.source =  ar.source)
ICPA for Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride] (4 of 4)
Subsystem: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA
Controls: AcelerationRequest
Observes: BrakePedal, ThrottlePedal
Goal: Acheive[DriverForwardAccelOverrideAccelRequest]
InformalDef: If a) a) the vehicle is moving in the forward direction and
b) the driver is applying the brake pedal or the throttle pedal
then the subsystem a) shall not request acceleration or
b) shall request acceleration less than -2 m/s
2 (i.e., request a “hard” stop of the vehicle) .
FormalDef: ar: AccelerationRequest, vsp: VehicleSpeed, sn: SubsystemName, hmi: HumanMachineInterface, 
tp:ThrottlePedal, st: StoppedTime, gt: GoTime
  (InForwardMotion(vsp.value)  (bp.active   tp.active)) 
ar.active  (ar.value < -2 m/s
2)  ar.value < RequestedAcceleration(bp, tp))))
Figure C.21. ICPA for Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride] (4 of 4)
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Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
System Safety Goal
Goal: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
InformalDef: If  a) the vehicle is moving in the backward direction and
b) the driver is applying the brake pedal or the throttle pedal and
c) a subsystem is requesting a vehicle acceleration less than or equal to 2 m/s
2 (i.e., not requesting a “hard” stop of
the vehicle),
then the subsystem shall not control vehicle acceleration.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, sn: SubsystemName, bp: BrakePedal, tp: ThrottlePedal
(InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)    (bp.active   tp.active )   RequestingAcceleration(sn) 
 (RequestedAcceleration(sn)    2 m/s
2))  (va.source = sn)
ICPA for Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride] (1 of 4)
va Arbiter ac: AccelerationCommand  (va.value =  ac.value)
% Acceleration is equal to the previous acceleration command value 01
 (va.source =  ac.source)
% The source of acceleration is equal to the source of the previous 
acceleration command
 (ac.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration command is either the driver or one 
% of the feature subsystems
02
03
Figure C.22. ICPA for Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride] (1 of 4)
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CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest ac.source =  ar.source  ac.value =  ar.value
% If the source of an acceleration command is the source of a 
% previous acceleration request, then the value of the acceleration 
% command is equal to the value of the previous acceleration request
 (ar.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration request is one of the feature 
% subsystems
04
05
ar.active  (ac.source =  ar.source)
% If a previous acceleration request is not active, then the source of 
% an acceleration command is not the source of that previous 
% acceleration request
06
va
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
sn Arbiter
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
07
08
09
((ar.source = sn)   ar.active) 
 (RequestedAcceleration(sn) = ar.value)
% If an acceleration request is active, then the requested acceleration 
% of the source of the acceleration request is the value of the 
% acceleration request.
((ar.source = sn)   ar.active)   RequestingAcceleration(sn)
% If an acceleration request is active, then the source of that 
acceleration request is requesting acceleration, and vice versa 
 (sn  {Arbiter, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% A subsystem is either the arbiter or one of the feature subsystems
ICPA for Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride] (2 of 4)
Figure C.23. ICPA for Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride] (2 of 4)
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Goal Elaboration
(InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)   (bp.active   tp.active) 
RequestingAcceleration(sn)   (RequestedAcceleration(sn)   2 m/s
2))
(va.source = sn)
(InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)  (bp.active   tp.active)   ((ar.source = sn) 
 ar.active)   (ar.value   2 m/s
2))
(ac.source =  ar.source)
  (InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)  (bp.active   tp.active)) 
ar.active  (ar.value > 2 m/s
2))
Indirect Control Relationships
01, 02, 08, 09 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal 
tactic. Assumes worst-case actuation delays for 
source of acceleration and acceleration value 
(built-in to definition of 01, 02)
OR reduction.  Also restricts acceleration requests 
one state earlier than necessary.
ICPA for Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride] (3 of 4)
Redundant Responsibility (Primary: Arbiter, Secondary: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case vehicle response to acceleration command; real response may be different. 
Also, OR reduction is used for CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, and PA goals, and restricts acceleration requests one 
state earlier than necessary.)
  Goal Scope
Figure C.24. ICPA for Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride] (3 of 4)
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Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: Arbiter
Controls: AcelerationCommand
Observes: AccelerationRequest, BrakePedal, ThrottlePedal
Goal: Acheive[DriverBackwardAccelOverrideAccelCommand]
InformalDef: If  a) the vehicle is moving in the backward direction and
b) the driver is applying the brake pedal or the throttle pedal and
c) a subsystem is requesting a vehicle acceleration less than or equal to 2 m/s
2 (i.e., not requesting a “hard” stop of
the vehicle),
then the source of the acceleration command shall not be a subsystem
FormalDef: ac: AccelerationCommand, bp: BrakePedal, ar:AccelerationRequest, tp:ThrottlePedal
(InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)  (bp.active   tp.active)   ((ar.source = sn)   ar.active)   (ar.value   2 m/s
2)) 
(ac.source =  ar.source)
ICPA for Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride] (4 of 4)
Subsystem: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA
Controls: AcelerationRequest
Observes: BrakePedal, ThrottlePedal
Goal: Acheive[DriverBackwardAccelOverrideAccelRequest]
InformalDef: If a) a) the vehicle is moving in the backward direction and
b) the driver is applying the brake pedal or the throttle pedal
then the subsystem a) shall not request acceleration or
b) shall request acceleration greater than 2 m/s
2 (i.e., request a “hard” stop of the vehicle) .
FormalDef: ar: AccelerationRequest, vsp: VehicleSpeed, sn: SubsystemName, hmi: HumanMachineInterface, 
tp:ThrottlePedal, st: StoppedTime, gt: GoTime
  (InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)  (bp.active   tp.active)) 
ar.active  (ar.value > 2 m/s
2)  ar.value < RequestedAcceleration(bp, tp))))
Figure C.25. ICPA for Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride] (4 of 4)
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Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
System Safety Goal
Goal: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
InformalDef: If the driver is turning the steering wheel, then no subsystem shall control vehicle steering
FormalDef: vst: VehicleSteering, sn: SubsystemName, sw: SteeringWheel
(sw.active)  (vst.source = sn)
ICPA for Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride] (1 of 4)
01
02
03
Arbiter sc: SteeringCommand  (vst.value =  sc.value)
% The value of steering is equal to the value of the previous steering 
% command
 (vst.source =  sc.source)
% The source of steering is the source of the previous steering 
% command
 (sc.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of a steering command is either the driver or one of the 
% feature subsystems
vst
Figure C.26. ICPA for Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride] (1 of 4)
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sn Arbiter
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
07
08
09
 (sn  {Arbiter, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% A subsystem is either the arbiter or one of the feature subsystems
((sr.source = sn)   sr.active)   RequestingSteering(sn)
% If a steering request is active, then the source of that steering 
request is requesting steering, and vice versa
06
04
05
((sr.source = sn)   sr.active) 
 (RequestedSteering(sn) = sr.value)
% If a steering request is active, then the steering value requested by 
% the source of the steering request is the value of the steering 
% request
sc.source =  sr.source  sc.value =  sr.value
% If the source of a steering command is the source of a previous 
% steering request, then the value of the steering command is equal 
% to the value of the previous steering request
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
sr: SteeringRequest
 (sr.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of a steering request is one of the feature subsystems
sr.active  (sc.source =  sr.source)
% If a previous steering request is not active, then the source of a 
% steering command is not the source of that previous steering 
% request
vst
ICPA for Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride] (2 of 4)
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
Figure C.27. ICPA for Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride] (2 of 4)
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Goal Elaboration
(sw.active)  (vst.source = sn)
(sw.active)  (sc.source =  sr.source)
(sw.active)  sr.active
Indirect Control Relationships
01, 02, 03, 05 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal 
tactic. Assumes worst-case actuation delays for 
source of acceleration and acceleration value 
(built-in to definition of 01, 02)
06 – Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability by 
Chaining.
Restricts acceleration requests one state earlier 
than necessary.
ICPA for Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride] (3 of 4)
Redundant Responsibility (Primary: Arbiter, Secondary: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case vehicle response to acceleration command; real response may be different. 
Restricts acceleration requests one state earlier than necessary.)
  Goal Scope
Figure C.28. ICPA for Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride] (3 of 4)
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Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: Arbiter
Controls: SteeringCommand
Observes: SteeringRequest, SteeringWheel
Goal: Acheive[DriverSteeringOverrideSteeringCommand]
InformalDef: If  the driver is turning the steering wheel, then the source of steering commands shall not be a steering request 
from a subsytem.
FormalDef: sc: SteeringCommand, sr: SteeringRequest, sw: SteeringWheel
(sw.active)  (sc.source =  sr.source)
Subsystem: CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA
Controls: SteeringRequest
Observes: SteeringWheel
Goal: Acheive[DriverSteeringOverrideSteeringRequest]
InformalDef: If  the driver is turning the steering wheel, then subsystem shall not request steering
FormalDef: sr: SteeringRequest, sw: SteeringWheel
(sw.active)  sr.active
ICPA for Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride] (4 of 4)
Figure C.29. ICPA for Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride] (4 of 4)
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Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
System Safety Goal
Goal: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
InformalDef: If the vehicle is moving forward, then the subsystem RCA shall not control vehicle acceleration or steering
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, vst: VehicleSteering, vsp: VehicleSpeed
InForwardMotion(vsp.value)  ((va.source = ‘RCA’)   (vst.source = ‘RCA’))
ICPA for Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering] (1 of 4)
ar.active  (ac.source =  ar.source)
% If a previous acceleration request is not active, then the source of 
% an acceleration command is not the source of that previous 
% acceleration request
va Arbiter ac: AccelerationCommand  (va.value =  ac.value)
% Acceleration is equal to the previous acceleration command value 01
 (va.source =  ac.source)
% The source of acceleration is equal to the source of the previous 
acceleration command
 (ac.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration command is either the driver or one 
% of the feature subsystems
ac.source =  ar.source  ac.value =  ar.value
% If the source of an acceleration command is the source of a 
% previous acceleration request, then the value of the acceleration 
% command is equal to the value of the previous acceleration request
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
 (ar.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration request is one of the feature 
% subsystems
02
03
04
05
06
Figure C.30. ICPA for Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering] (1 of 4)
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08
09
10
11
12
07
vst Arbiter sc: SteeringCommand  (vst.value =  sc.value)
% The value of steering is equal to the value of the previous steering 
% command
 (vst.source =  sc.source)
% The source of steering is the source of the previous steering 
% command
 (sc.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of a steering command is either the driver or one of the 
% feature subsystems
sc.source =  sr.source  sc.value =  sr.value
% If the source of a steering command is the source of a previous 
% steering request, then the value of the steering command is equal 
% to the value of the previous steering request
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
sr: SteeringRequest
 (sr.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of a steering request is one of the feature subsystems
sr.active  (sc.source =  sr.source)
% If a previous steering request is not active, then the source of a 
% steering command is not the source of that previous steering 
% request
ICPA for Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering] (2 of 4)
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
Figure C.31. ICPA for Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering] (2 of 4)
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ICPA for Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering] (3 of 4)
Redundant Responsibility (Primary: Arbiter, Secondary: RCA)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case vehicle response to acceleration command; real response may be different. 
Restricts acceleration requests one state earlier than necessary )
  Goal Scope
Goal Elaboration
InForwardMotion(vsp.value) 
((va.source = ‘RCA’)   (vst.source = ‘RCA’))
InForwardMotion(vsp.value) 
((ac.source = ‘RCA’)   (sc.source = ‘RCA’))
InForwardMotion(vsp.value)  (ar.active   sr.active)
Indirect Control Relationships
02, 08 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic. 
Assumes worst-case actuation delays for source 
of acceleration and acceleration value (built-in to 
definition of 01, 02)
06, 12 – Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability 
by Chaining.  Also restricts acceleration requests 
one state earlier than necessary
Figure C.32. ICPA for Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering] (3 of 4)
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Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: Arbiter
Controls: AccelerationCommand, SteeringCommand
Observes: VehicleSpeed
Goal: Acheive[ForwardBlockAccelSteeringCommand]
InformalDef: If the vehicle is moving forward, then the source of acceleration commands and steering commands shall not be 
RCA
FormalDef: ac: AccelerationCommand, sc: SteeringCommand, vsp: VehicleSpeed
InForwardMotion(vsp.value)  ((ac.source = ‘RCA’)   (sc.source = ‘RCA’))
Subsystem: RCA
Controls: AccelerationRequest, SteeringRequest
Observes: VehicleSpeed
Goal: Acheive[ForwardBlockAccelSteeringRequest]
InformalDef: If the vehicle is moving forward, then RCA a) shall not request acceleration and b) shall not request steering
FormalDef: ar: AccelerationRequest, sr: SteeringRequest, vsp: VehicleSpeed
InForwardMotion(vsp.value)  (ar.active   sr.active)
ICPA for Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering] (4 of 4)
Figure C.33. ICPA for Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering] (4 of 4)
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System Safety Goal
Goal: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
InformalDef: If the vehicle is moving backward, then the subsystems CA, ACC, and LCA shall not control vehicle acceleration or 
steering.
FormalDef: va: VehicleAcceleration, vst: VehicleSteering, vsp: VehicleSpeed
InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)  ((va.source   {CA, ACC, LCA})   (vst.source   {CA, ACC, LCA}))
ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (1 of 5)
Figure C.34. ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (1 of 5)
2
1
0A
P
P
E
N
D
I
X
C
.
I
C
P
A
F
O
R
A
S
E
M
I
-
A
U
T
O
N
O
M
O
U
S
A
U
T
O
M
O
T
I
V
E
S
Y
S
T
E
M
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
ar.active  (ac.source =  ar.source)
% If a previous acceleration request is not active, then the source of 
% an acceleration command is not the source of that previous 
% acceleration request
va Arbiter ac: AccelerationCommand  (va.value =  ac.value)
% Acceleration is equal to the previous acceleration command value 01
 (va.source =  ac.source)
% The source of acceleration is equal to the source of the previous 
acceleration command
 (ac.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration command is either the driver or one 
% of the feature subsystems
ac.source =  ar.source  ac.value =  ar.value
% If the source of an acceleration command is the source of a 
% previous acceleration request, then the value of the acceleration 
% command is equal to the value of the previous acceleration request
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
ar: AccelerationRequest
 (ar.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of an acceleration request is one of the feature 
% subsystems
02
03
04
05
06
ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (2 of 5)
Figure C.35. ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (2 of 5)
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ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (3 of 5)
Variable
Indirect Control Path
Subsystem Variables Indirect Control Relationships #
08
09
10
11
12
07
vst Arbiter sc: SteeringCommand  (vst.value =  sc.value)
% The value of steering is equal to the value of the previous steering 
% command
 (vst.source =  sc.source)
% The source of steering is the source of the previous steering 
% command
 (sc.source  {Driver, CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of a steering command is either the driver or one of the 
% feature subsystems
sc.source =  sr.source  sc.value =  sr.value
% If the source of a steering command is the source of a previous 
% steering request, then the value of the steering command is equal 
% to the value of the previous steering request
CA, RCA, 
ACC, LCA, 
PA
sr: SteeringRequest
 (sr.source  {CA, RCA, ACC, LCA, PA})
% The source of a steering request is one of the feature subsystems
sr.active  (sc.source =  sr.source)
% If a previous steering request is not active, then the source of a 
% steering command is not the source of that previous steering 
% request
Figure C.36. ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (3 of 5)
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Goal Elaboration
InBackwardMotion(vsp.value) 
((va.source   {CA, ACC, LCA})   (vst.source   {CA, ACC, LCA}))
InBackwardMotion(vsp.value) 
((ac.source   {CA, ACC, LCA})   (sc.source   {CA, ACC, LCA}))
InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)  (ar.active   sr.active)
Indirect Control Relationships
02, 08 – Introduce accuracy/actuation goal tactic. 
Assumes worst-case actuation delays for source 
of acceleration and acceleration value (built-in to 
definition of 01, 02)
06, 12 – Split Lack of Monitorability/Controllability 
by Chaining.  Also, restricts acceleration requests 
one state earlier than necessary.
ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (4 of 5)
Redundant Responsibility (Primary: Arbiter, Secondary: CA, ACC, LCA)
Goal Coverage Strategy
  Goal Assignment
Restrictive (Assumes worst-case vehicle response to acceleration command; real response may be different. 
Restricts acceleration requests one state earlier than necessary.)
  Goal Scope
Figure C.37. ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (4 of 5)
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Subsystem Safety Goals
Subsystem: Arbiter
Controls: AccelerationCommand, SteeringCommand
Observes: VehicleSpeed
Goal: Acheive[ForwardBlockAccelSteeringCommand]
InformalDef: If the vehicle is moving backward, then the source of acceleration commands and steering commands shall not be 
CA, ACC, or LCA.
FormalDef: ac:AccelerationCommand, sc: SteeringCommand, vsp: VehicleSpeed
InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)  ((ac.source   {CA, ACC, LCA})   (sc.source   {CA, ACC, LCA}))
Subsystem: RCA
Controls: AccelerationRequest, SteeringRequest
Observes: VehicleSpeed
Goal: Acheive[BackwardBlockAccelSteeringRequest]
InformalDef: If the vehicle is moving forward, then CA, ACC, and LCA a) shall not request acceleration and 
b) shall not request steering
FormalDef: ar:AccelerationRequest, sr: SteeringRequest, vsp: VehicleSpeed
InBackwardMotion(vsp.value)  (ar.active   sr.active)
ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (5 of 5)
Figure C.38. ICPA for Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering] (5 of 5)
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Table D.1. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 1
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 12.589 12.589 12.589 12.589 1
Duration (sec) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Vehicle Start (sec) 12.583 12.68 12.583 12.68 6
Duration (sec) 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.001
CA Start (sec) 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 1
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 9.624 0.001 0.001 2
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119
Scenario 1: The host vehicle is travelling forward, starting from a stop 20 m behind 
another stopped vehicle.   ACC is enabled, but not engaged.  CA is enabled. 
Notes: The simulation terminated early at time 12.681 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
None
None
None
None
None
None
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
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Table D.2. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 2
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 12.587 12.587 12.587 12.587 1
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Vehicle Start (sec) 12.568 12.568 12.568 12.568 1
Duration (sec) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Arbiter Start (sec) 12.561 12.561 12.561 12.561 1
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 9.624 0.001 0.001 2
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Vehicle Start (sec) 12.561 12.561 12.561 12.561 1
Duration (sec) 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
Arbiter Start (sec) 12.561 12.561 12.561 12.561 1
Duration (sec) 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119
None
None
Scenario 2: The host vehicle is travelling forward, starting from a stop 20 m behind 
another stopped vehicle.   ACC is enabled, but not engaged.  CA is enabled.  Just after 
CA begins to perform an emergency braking action at time 12.55 s to avoid the stopped 
vehicle, the driver engages PA at time 12.56 s.
Notes: Simulation terminated early at time 12.588 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
None
None
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
None
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Table D.3. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 3
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 13.652 13.652 13.652 13.652 1
Duration (sec) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Vehicle Start (sec) 12.565 12.913 12.913 12.565 3
Duration (sec) 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002
CA Start (sec) 12.6 13.85 12.6 12.6 4
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ACC Start (sec) 12.75 15.6 12.75 12.75 47
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
LCA Start (sec) 12.75 15.6 12.75 12.75 47
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 9.624 0.001 0.001 2
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 0.119 0.119 0.119 0.119
Vehicle Start (sec) 12.562 13.652 12.902 12.562 4
Duration (sec) 0.04 0.063 0.061 0.04
CA Start (sec) 12.6 13.85 13.85 12.6 5
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.2 0.2 0.05
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
None
None
None
Scenario 3: The host vehicle is travelling forward, starting from a stop 20 m behind 
another stopped vehicle.   ACC is enabled, but not engaged.  CA is enabled.  Just after 
CA begins to perform an emergency braking action at time 12.55 s to avoid the stopped 
vehicle, the driver applies the throttle pedal at time 12.56 s.
Notes: Simulation terminated normally at time 20 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
None
None
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
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Table D.4. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 4
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 12.987 13.127 13.002 13.074 10
Duration (sec) 0.004 0.014 0.067 0.001
Vehicle Start (sec) 8.617 13.127 12.997 11.248 98
Duration (sec) 0.004 0.006 0.039 0.001
Arbiter Start (sec) 9.051 13.051 9.051 9.051 48
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ACC Start (sec) 2.05 13.05 2.05 2.05 49
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
LCA Start (sec) 2.05 13.05 2.05 2.05 49
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 3.906 0.001 0.001 2
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.052 2.052 2.052 2.052 1
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Arbiter Start (sec) 2.051 2.051 2.051 2.051 1
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
ACC Start (sec) 2 2 2 2 1
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Vehicle Start (sec) 13.074 13.074 13.074 13.074 1
Duration (sec) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Arbiter Start (sec) 13.074 13.074 13.074 13.074 1
Duration (sec) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
ACC Start (sec) 13.074 13.074 13.074 13.074 1
Duration (sec) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Scenario 4: The host vehicle is travelling forward, starting 25m behind another vehicle 
that is travelling between 10-25 k/h (2.78-6.94 m/s).  The driver accelerates the host 
vehicle by applying the throttle pedal from time 0.5 s to 8.5 s.  At time 2.0 s, ACC is 
engaged by the driver. 
Notes: Simulation terminated early at time 13.142 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
None
None
None
None
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
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Table D.5. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 5
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.641 2.731 2.641 2.653 6
Duration (sec) 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.005
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.638 3.41 2.726 2.837 28
Duration (sec) 0.006 0.001 0.008 0.001
Arbiter Start (sec) 2.651 4.001 2.651 2.651 28
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ACC Start (sec) 2.05 4 2.05 2.05 30
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
LCA Start (sec) 2.05 4 2.05 2.05 30
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 4.123 0.001 0.001 2
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ACC Start (sec) 5.916 6.302 5.916 6.302 2
Duration (sec) 0.103 0.048 0.103 0.048
LCA Start (sec) 5.916 6.302 5.916 6.302 2
Duration (sec) 0.103 0.048 0.103 0.048
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.052 4.002 2.052 2.052 2
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Arbiter Start (sec) 2.051 4.001 2.051 2.051 2
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
ACC Start (sec) 2 2 2 2 1
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
Scenario 5: The host vehicle is travelling forward, starting 25m behind another vehicle 
that is travelling between 10-25 k/h (2.78-6.94 m/s).  The driver accelerates the host 
vehicle by applying the throttle pedal from time 0.5 s to 2.5 s.  At time 2.0 s, ACC is 
engaged by the driver.  The driver applies the brake pedal from time 4.0 s to time 9.0 s.
Notes: Simulation terminated normally at time 20 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
None
None
None
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
None
None
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
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Table D.6. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 6 (1 of 2)
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.641 13.953 2.641 13.911 17
Duration (sec) 0.009 0.001 0.009 0.001
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.638 13.953 13.828 2.837 108
Duration (sec) 0.006 0.001 0.038 0.001
Arbiter Start (sec) 2.651 13.951 2.651 2.651 83
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
ACC Start (sec) 2.05 13.95 2.05 2.05 85
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
LCA Start (sec) 2.05 13.95 2.05 2.05 85
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 4.12 0.001 0.001 2
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Vehicle Start (sec) 5.052 5.052 5.052 5.052 1
Duration (sec) 8.902 8.902 8.902 8.902
Arbiter Start (sec) 5.052 5.052 5.052 5.052 1
Duration (sec) 8.902 8.902 8.902 8.902
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.167
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.052 2.052 2.052 2.052 1
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Arbiter Start (sec) 2.051 2.051 2.051 2.051 1
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
ACC Start (sec) 2 2 2 2 1
Duration (sec) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Scenario 6:  The host vehicle is travelling forward, starting 25m behind another vehicle 
that is travelling between 10-25 k/h (2.78-6.94 m/s).  The driver accelerates the host 
vehicle by applying the throttle pedal from time 0.5 s to 2.5 s.  At time 2.0 s, ACC is 
engaged by the driver.  LCA is enabled by the driver at time 4.0 s, and engaged at time 
6.0 s. (1 of 2)
Notes: Simulation terminated early at time 13.954 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
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Table D.7. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 6 (2 of 2)
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 13.905 13.905 13.905 13.905 1
Duration (sec) 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
Arbiter Start (sec) 13.905 13.905 13.905 13.905 1
Duration (sec) 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
ACC Start (sec) 13.905 13.905 13.905 13.905 1
Duration (sec) 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
LCA Start (sec) 13.905 13.905 13.905 13.905 1
Duration (sec) 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
Notes: Simulation terminated early at time 13.954 s.
None
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
Scenario 6:  The host vehicle is travelling forward, starting 25m behind another vehicle 
that is travelling between 10-25 k/h (2.78-6.94 m/s).  The driver accelerates the host 
vehicle by applying the throttle pedal from time 0.5 s to 2.5 s.  At time 2.0 s, ACC is 
engaged by the driver.  LCA is enabled by the driver at time 4.0 s, and engaged at time 
6.0 s. (2 of 2)
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
None
None
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Table D.8. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 7
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
ACC Start (sec) 8.45 15.6 8.45 8.45 42
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
LCA Start (sec) 8.45 15.6 8.45 8.45 42
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 6.264 0.001 0.001 2
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
None
None
None
None
None
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
Scenario 7: The host vehicle is travelling in reverse, 30 m in front of another stopped 
vehicle, with RCA enabled.
Notes: Simulation terminated normally at 20 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
None
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
None
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Table D.9. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 8
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 1
Duration (sec) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.055 2.083 2.07 2.083 3
Duration (sec) 0.008 0.001 0.011 0.001
ACC Start (sec) 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 1
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
LCA Start (sec) 2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05 1
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 1
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.051 2.051 2.051 2.051 1
Duration (sec) 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032
Arbiter Start (sec) 2.051 2.051 2.051 2.051 1
Duration (sec) 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032
ACC Start (sec) 2 2 2 2 1
Duration (sec) 0.083 0.083 0.083 0.083
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Scenario 8: The host vehicle is travelling in reverse, 30 m in front of another stopped 
vehicle.  ACC is enabled and engaged by the driver at time 2.0 s.
Notes: Simulation terminated early at time 2.083 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
None
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
None
None
None
None
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
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Table D.10. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 9
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.098 2.098 2.098 2.098 1
Duration (sec) 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.003 2.112 2.042 2.003 6
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.046 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 1
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Vehicle Start (sec) 2.001 2.001 2.001 2.001 1
Duration (sec) 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112
Arbiter Start (sec) 2.001 2.001 2.001 2.001
Duration (sec) 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 2.093 2.093 2.093 2.093
None
Scenario 9: The host vehicle is stopped 20 m behind another stopped vehicle.  PA is 
enabled and engaged by the driver at time 2.0 s.
Notes: Simulation terminated early at time 2.113 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
None
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
None
None
None
225APPENDIX D. EVALUATION SCENARIO RESULTS
Table D.11. Goal and subgoal violations for Scenario 10
First Last Longest Shortest Total #
Vehicle Start (sec) 14.589 14.589 14.589 14.589 1
Duration (sec) 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
Vehicle Start (sec) 14.583 14.598 14.583 14.598 2
Duration (sec) 0.008 0.002 0.008 0.002
CA Start (sec) 14.6 14.6 14.6 14.6 1
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.001 11.538 0.001 0.001 2
Duration (sec) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
PA Start (sec) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 1
Duration (sec) 2.133 2.133 2.133 2.133
Scenario 10: The host vehicle is stopped 20 m behind another stopped vehicle, ACC is 
enabled and engaged by the driver at time 2.0 s.
Notes: Simulation terminated early at time 14.625 s.
Goal 1: Maintain[AutoAccelBelowThreshold]
Goal 2: Maintain[AutoJerkBelowThreshold]
Goal 3: Achieve[SubsystemAccelSteeringAgreement]
Goal 4: Achieve[NoAutoAccelFromStop]
Goal 5: Achieve[DriverForwardAccelOverride]
None
None
None
None
None
Goal 6: Achieve[DriverBackwardAccelOverride]
Goal 7: Achieve[DriverSteeringOverride]
Goal 8: Achieve[ForwardBlockAccelSteering]
Goal 9: Achieve[BackwardBlockAccelSteering]
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